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Summary 
 
Conflict within and between social groups is a conspicuous feature of cooperative 
animal societies. Theoretical and empirical research aims to understand the role of 
within- and between-group conflict in the evolution of cooperative behaviour, but 
these forms of conflict are rarely studied together. Eviction as a means of within-group 
conflict resolution can have important implications for the individuals involved, and 
the wider population through effects on dispersal, gene flow, and population 
structure. Intergroup conflict, although prevalent in many social species, is relatively 
understudied outside of humans and chimpanzees, but could play an important role in 
the evolution of cooperative behaviours. However, currently there is a lack of 
understanding of the causes and consequences of within- and between-group conflict 
to be able to draw conclusions on theoretical links to their role in social evolution. In 
this thesis, I use a wild population of banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, to 
investigate the causes and consequences of eviction and intergroup conflict in a highly 
cooperative species. First, I show that eviction in banded mongooses is triggered by 
reproductive competition in both sexes (Chapter 2). Second, I find that, once the 
decision to evict has been made, younger females and those older, more closely 
related females are preferentially evicted (Chapter 3). This surprising result is 
explained by a theoretical model which shows that, where individuals are capable of 
resisting eviction, the usual prediction of positive kin discrimination can be reversed. 
Third, I show that eviction has demographic effects, with consequences for group size 
and recruitment (Chapter 4). Finally, I show that intergroup conflict is stimulated by 
intensified resource competition, and that the consequences of intergroup conflict can 
have measureable costs to both individuals and groups in the long- and short-term 
(Chapter 5). This work shows that the means of resolving within-group conflict at an 
individual level can resonate to affect demography and dynamics at higher levels, and 
that the nature and intensity of intergroup conflict has the potential to influence 
patterns of cooperation and conflict within groups. I suggest that within- and between-
group conflict may often be intimately linked, and that recognising this link could help 
to advance our conceptual understanding of their role in the evolution of cooperative 
behaviour. 
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Cooperation and conflict 
 
Altruistic behaviour, where individuals pay a fitness cost to enhance the reproductive 
success of other group members, is an evolutionary puzzle that has long fascinated 
researchers. In fact, Darwin acknowledged that the evolution of this behaviour (in the 
form of sterile castes of social insects) was potentially a major flaw in his theory of 
natural selection (Darwin 1859). Natural selection should give rise to the evolution of 
selfishness but, in fact, cooperation is widespread in nature. For example, behavioural 
altruism is widespread in cooperatively breeding species, in which group members 
(‘helpers’) regularly provide care to young that are not their own genetic offspring 
(Cant 2012a). These systems raise a fundamental question: how can selection favour 
individuals who forego reproducing themselves, but often retain the capability to do 
so? The development of kin selection theory (Hamilton 1963, 1964), and later models 
of cooperation based on group augmentation (Kokko, Johnstone & Clutton-Brock 
2001) and coercion (Gaston 1978; Kokko, Johnstone & Wright 2002) have provided 
testable theories to explain costly helping behaviour. Cooperative systems offer fertile 
ground to test these evolutionary theories of cooperation. 
 
As well as themes of cooperation, research on cooperatively breeding species has 
focussed on evolutionary conflict. Evolutionary conflict arises in any social interaction 
when the fitness optima of individuals (or individual units of selection) differ and 
cannot be satisfied simultaneously (Parker 2000; Cant 2012b). In cooperative species, 
breeders and helpers are likely to have shared, but non-identical, interests and for 
cooperative behaviour to evolve these conflicts of interest must be resolved. Conflict 
can arise over reproduction, helping effort, parental care and dispersal, and much 
theoretical and empirical research has focussed on how individuals resolve these 
within-group conflicts, despite selection for selfishness (Emlen 1991; Koenig & 
Dickinson 2004; Cant 2012a). For example, where conflict originates over reproductive 
roles and shares, reproductive skew theory proposes that dominant individuals who 
have complete control over reproduction in the group will concede a share of their 
monopoly as an incentive for subordinates to remain peacefully in the group 
(Vehrencamp 1979, 1983a; b; Johnstone 2000). Conflict over individual workload can 
be settled by negotiation, where individuals can sometimes gain from adjusting their 
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effort to compensate for changes in effort by their social partners (Johnstone & Hinde 
2006). Punishment, and threats of punishment, can be effective in encouraging group 
members to behave cooperatively (Cant 2011; Raihani, Thornton & Bshary 2012). 
These strategies of conflict resolution all have one common theme: they aim to resolve 
conflict in a way that allows the cooperative interaction to continue.  
 
Where within-group conflict cannot be resolved by these means, individuals are often 
forced to terminate their social interaction, for example by leaving or evicting their 
social partners (Cant & Johnstone 2006). In cooperative breeders, the result of the 
breakdown of cooperative relations is sometimes the forcible eviction or exclusion of 
individuals from the group (Johnstone & Cant 1999). In ‘viscous’ populations, that is, 
populations where there are constraints on dispersal (Taylor 1992), eviction is often a 
primary mechanism by which individuals permanently disperse from their natal group, 
and may be an important source of gene flow between groups (Koenig, Haydock & 
Stanback 1998; Clutton-Brock & Lukas 2012). Eviction differs from other means of 
conflict resolution because it has the potential to affect individuals outside of the 
evicting group. Evicted individuals or cohorts might act as a perturbative force in the 
population as they attempt to disperse and form a new group. In structured 
populations where groups form tessellating territories, the presence of dispersing 
individuals and cohorts is likely to stimulate conflict between groups over necessary 
resources such as food, territory and mates (Koenig et al. 1992; Bonte et al. 2012; 
Travis et al. 2012). The effects of eviction are likely to be felt more widely than just the 
evicting group, and eviction has the potential to influence population structure, 
demography and intergroup relations (Rousset 2004; Lehmann & Rousset 2010). 
 
In addition to intense conflict within groups, cooperative breeding species often 
exhibit intense and sometimes violent conflict between groups. Intergroup conflict is 
another notable feature of animals that live in close-knit family groups. Indeed, we do 
not need to look further than our own species, Homo sapiens, for an example of how 
prevalent conflict can be between groups in social species (Smith 2007). The 
coordination of large groups of individuals into a coalitionary force to defend territory 
and resources against rival groups can be viewed as another form of cooperative 
behaviour, and the evolutionary significance of intergroup conflict for social evolution 
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has been explored, both theoretically and empirically (Hölldobler & Wilson 1990; 
Wilson & Wrangham 2003; Thayer 2004). However, the majority of research that 
examines patterns of intergroup conflict and within-group cooperation stems from 
theoretical models developed to explain the evolution of coalitional violence in 
humans (Durrant 2011; Rusch 2014). Tests of these theories have been conducted on 
empirical data from wild chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, but investigations of 
intergroup conflict in other social species are limited. 
 
In this thesis, I examine within- and between-group conflict in a cooperatively breeding 
species. I investigate the causes and consequences of eviction as a means of within-
group conflict resolution, and I examine the patterns and consequences of conflict 
between groups. Below I provide an overview of the hypotheses to explain eviction, 
and the patterns of eviction in vertebrate systems. I also summarise the adaptive 
explanations of intergroup conflict in social vertebrates. I finish by giving a general 
introduction to my study system, and outlining the aims and structure of this thesis. 
 
Eviction in social vertebrates 
 
Forcible eviction of individuals by others within a social group is relatively rare in wild 
vertebrate animal societies (Table 1). There are well documented observations of 
usurpations from groups, where immigrating individuals force out others during group 
takeovers (e.g. primates: Sugiyama 1967; Butynski 1982; Schaffner & French 1997; 
Fernandez-Duque 2009; and carnivores: Packer & Pusey 1983; Pusey & Packer 1987), 
but these types of eviction are not conducted by group conspecifics. An obvious 
question arises: why is eviction not observed in more social vertebrate species? A 
reason might be that within-group conflict is successfully resolved by other means, and 
that eviction is a ‘last resort’ strategy that is only employed when all other means of 
resolution have failed. In viscous populations, eviction is likely to be employed as a last 
resort means of conflict resolution because outside options are poor, dispersal is 
limited, and subordinates would prefer to stay in the group. Additionally, the use of an 
effective threat by dominants could be sufficient to resolve conflict without having to 
carry out the act of eviction itself (Johnstone & Cant 1999; Cant 2011). In fish that form 
size hierarchies, dominants use the threat of eviction to limit the growth and 
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competitive ability of subordinates (Wong et al. 2007), and subordinates starve 
themselves to curtail their growth in an attempt to avoid triggering eviction (Wong et 
al. 2008). Eviction is often only observed in these species following the experimental 
manipulation of the size hierarchy that breaks the social rules that the threat of 
eviction enforces (Wong et al. 2007, 2008; Cant 2011). In fact, this applies to many 
observations of eviction (Table 1). Some species in which eviction is documented to 
occur only demonstrate eviction when the system is perturbed through experimental 
manipulations (for example through the temporary removal of individuals; Taborsky 
1985; Mulder & Langmore 1993; Balshine-Earn et al. 1998). Eviction, therefore, 
appears to be a rarely observed natural phenomenon in vertebrate societies, 
consistent with it being a behavioural response of last resort, when other mechanisms 
of conflict resolution (e.g. through negotiation or threat) fail. 
 
Hypotheses of eviction 
In species that exhibit eviction, it is generally dominant individuals that evict 
subordinates, sometimes temporarily excluding them from the group but in other 
cases permanently evicting them and forcing them to disperse. There are currently two 
main hypotheses to explain the occurrence of eviction in social animals: (i) the 
‘reproductive competition’ hypothesis and the ‘coercion of cooperation’ hypothesis. 
The reproductive competition hypothesis proposes that eviction is driven by conflict 
over reproductive or social status within groups (Johnstone & Cant 1999). Eviction is 
predicted to occur when there is intense competition for breeding positions or 
vacancies, typically when there is a high number of same-sex, sexually mature 
individuals (Young et al. 2006; Raihani 2008; Cant et al. 2010). Eviction is commonly 
observed in species with high levels of reproductive skew, where one or a few 
individuals monopolise breeding (Zahavi 1990; Clutton-Brock et al. 1998; Buston 
2003a). In these systems, eviction may be employed by dominants to reduce the level 
of reproductive competition in the current breeding attempt by temporarily or 
permanently excluding subordinates from the group (Johnstone & Cant 1999; Buston 
et al. 2007). However, eviction may also serve to reduce reproductive competition in 
subsequent breeding attempts, either because the subordinate is forced to 
permanently disperse, or because the physiological effects of eviction result in a 
decreased capacity for the subordinate to successfully reproduce (Young et al. 2006). 
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Table 1. Forcible eviction by within-group individuals in wild vertebrate species. 
‘RC’=reproductive competition, and ‘CC’=coercion of cooperation. Symbols: ‘*’ denotes 
that eviction is naturally observed or inferred; ‘†’ denotes that eviction is induced 
experimentally; ‘♂’ denotes eviction in males; ‘♀’ denotes eviction in females. 
Taxa Species Reference Hypothesis 
Fish Cichlid fish 
Neolamprologus pulcher 
Taborsky 1985; 
Balshine-Earn et al. 1998 
CC† 
 Clown anemonefish 
Amphiprion percula 
Buston 2003 RC*†  
 Coral-dwelling goby 
Paragobiodon xanthosomus 
Wong et al. 2007 RC† 
 Dwarf angelfish 
Centropyge bicolor 
Ang 2010 RC* 
Birds Arabian babbler 
Turdoides squamiceps 
Zahavi 1990 RC* 
 Montezuma oropendola 
Psarocolius montezuma 
Webster 1994 RC* 
 Southern pied babbler 
Turdoides bicolor 
Raihani 2008; 
Ridley et al. 2008 
RC* 
 Superb fairy-wren 
Malurus cyaneus 
Mulder & Langmore 1993; 
Mulder 1995 
CC†♂  
RC*♀ 
Mammals Banded mongoose 
Mungos mungo 
Cant et al. 2001, 2010; 
Gilchrist 2006 
RC* 
 Cotton-top tamarin 
Saguinus oedipus 
Savage et al. 1997 RC* 
 Damaraland mole-rat 
Fukyomys damarensis 
Faulkes & Bennett 2001; 
M. Zӧttl, pers. comms. 
RC* 
 Meerkat 
Suricata suricatta 
Clutton-Brock et al. 1998; 
Young et al. 2006 
RC* 
 Redfronted lemur 
Eulemur rufifrons 
Kappeler & Fichtel 2012 RC* 
 Spotted hyena 
Crocuta crocuta 
Mills 1990; 
Holekamp et al. 1993 
RC* 
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A second prominent explanation of the function of eviction comes from the ‘pay-to-
stay’ hypothesis (Gaston 1978). This proposes that subordinate group members can 
compensate for costs that they inflict on dominant breeders (from increased 
competition for resources and reproduction) by providing help, such as cooperative 
care of offspring or territory defence, to stay in the group. According to the coercion of 
cooperation hypothesis, dominant individuals use eviction (and the threat of eviction) 
to coerce subordinates to help, and to punish ‘lazy’ individuals that are not providing a 
high enough level of helping behaviour. Theory suggests that temporary eviction of 
individuals should force them to work harder on their return through a process of 
appeasement (Bowles & Gintis 2004; Quiñones et al. 2016). Permanent exclusions of 
lazy helpers might be effective in establishing a dominant’s reputation for punishment 
and therefore act as a means of inducing cooperation from remaining helpers (dos 
Santos, Rankin & Wedekind 2011). Under the pay-to-stay hypothesis, eviction is 
predicted to occur when helpers exhibit low levels of helping effort, or when group 
productivity is poor (Taborsky 1985; Bergmüller & Taborsky 2005; Fischer et al. 2014). 
Eviction should also be associated with a subsequent increase in helping behaviour 
from remaining or returning helpers, or an improvement in group productivity 
(Balshine-Earn et al. 1998). 
 
Patterns of eviction in social vertebrates 
Many of the observations of eviction in fish occur through experimental manipulation 
(Table 1). In fish that form size-based hierarchies, dominant individuals use the threat 
of eviction to deter subordinates from growing large enough to challenge their 
position (Buston 2003a; Wong et al. 2007; Ang 2010). In these species, the largest fish 
monopolise breeding and so eviction is triggered by competition for the breeding 
position. In cooperatively breeding cichlids, Neolamprologus pulcher, however, 
experimental evidence provides support for the hypothesis that eviction (and the 
threat of eviction) is used to coerce subordinates to help. Helpers that are 
experimentally prevented from helping are subject to elevated aggression from 
dominants and other group members, and subsequently help more, as predicted if 
aggression is a signal of impending eviction (Taborsky 1985; Bergmüller & Taborsky 
2005; Fischer et al. 2014). In addition, helpers that are temporarily removed are often 
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evicted on their return, and those that are reaccepted work harder thereafter 
(Balshine-Earn et al. 1998). 
 
Among bird species where eviction has been observed, much of the evidence of 
eviction supports the reproductive competition hypothesis. Only one experimental 
study of superb fairy-wrens, Malurus cyaneus, found evidence that eviction is used to 
coerce cooperation (Mulder & Langmore 1993). Male subordinate helpers that were 
temporarily removed subsequently received more aggression from male dominants 
and some were not allowed to return to the nest (Mulder & Langmore 1993). 
However, a separate study in this species found that dispersal of female helpers occurs 
after a period of increased aggression from dominant females, suggesting that eviction 
of females is driven by reproductive competition (Mulder 1995). Similarly, in the 
southern pied babbler, Turdoides bicolor, eviction occurs between same-sex brood 
mates (Raihani 2008; Ridley et al. 2008) and in the tropical Montezuma oropendola, 
Psarocolius montezuma, dominant males exclude lower ranking males to prevent them 
from approaching nesting females (Webster 1994). In the Arabian babbler, Turdoides 
squamiceps, eviction occurs between same-sex subordinates as they compete for a 
vacant breeding position after the death of the dominant breeder (Zahavi 1990). In 
these species where there is high levels of reproductive skew, and monopolisation of 
reproduction by a dominant breeding pair, competition for the breeding position 
appears to be the primary cause of eviction. 
 
In social mammals, eviction is exclusively driven by competition over reproduction. 
Eviction is associated with high levels of competition among females, and with 
subsequent negative fitness consequences, in banded mongooses, Mungos mungo 
(Cant et al. 2010), redfronted lemurs, Eulemur rufifrons (Kappeler & Fichtel 2012) and 
meerkats, Suricata suricatta (Clutton-Brock et al. 1998). In meerkats, dominant 
females evict subordinate females in the latter half of their (own) pregnancy to avoid 
infanticidal attacks on their pups (Clutton-Brock et al. 1998). Females that are 
pregnant when evicted lose weight and become stressed, and often spontaneously 
abort their litter before gaining re-admittance to their group, similar to patterns 
observed in banded mongooses (Young et al. 2006; Gilchrist 2006). Evidence of 
eviction in spotted hyenas, Crocuta crocuta, Damaraland mole-rats, Fukyomys 
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damarensis, and cotton-top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus, is less well documented. In 
these species, dispersal of subordinate females is associated with increased levels of 
aggression from dominant females and so eviction is assumed to be triggered by 
reproductive competition (Mills 1990; Holekamp et al. 1993; Savage et al. 1997; 
Faulkes & Bennett 2001). 
 
In most vertebrate species where eviction is observed, eviction of group members is 
the primary means by which individuals disperse from their natal group. As such, 
eviction can have important consequences for gene flow between groups, and for 
population structure and dynamics. Most of the research on eviction to date has 
focussed on the causes of eviction but, because eviction is only observed in a handful 
of species, there is a still a lack of understanding of what triggers eviction. Additionally, 
it is vital to establish which individuals are targeted for eviction to inform on the 
possible consequences that eviction can have. Theoretical studies to date have 
focussed on the short-term fitness payoffs of eviction to individuals (Johnstone & Cant 
1999; Johnstone 2000; Hamilton & Taborsky 2005; Buston et al. 2007) but eviction is 
likely to have long-term demographic consequences that extend beyond those 
experienced by evictors and evictees. However, few studies are able to investigate the 
causes and consequences of eviction in this way because it requires following groups 
of animals for extremely long periods, being able to identify individuals and collect 
comprehensive data on their life history, being able to observe eviction in these 
groups, and tracking evicted cohorts through the population. These are all issues which 
are logistically very challenging. As such, the consequences of resolving within-group 
conflict by eviction and the potential effects of eviction on social evolution are not well 
understood. 
 
Intergroup conflict in social vertebrates 
 
Much of the research on patterns of conflict in social animals has focussed on that 
which occurs within groups. However, as suggested previously, conflict between 
groups is another conspicuous feature of animal societies. Intergroup conflict can take 
various forms, from aggressive vocalisations and territorial displays (Radford 2003; 
Bonanni et al. 2011; Mares, Young & Clutton-Brock 2012), to physical fighting and 
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lethal combat (Aureli et al. 2006; Wrangham, Wilson & Muller 2006; Batchelor & Briffa 
2011). Throughout human history, lethal violence between societies has been well 
documented (Ferguson 1997; Gat 2006; Smith 2007), and there has been a recent 
resurgence of interest in a long-held suggestion that warfare in humans can exert 
selection for cooperative traits (Darwin 1871; Bowles 2006, 2009; Choi & Bowles 2007; 
Rusch 2014). 
 
Violent conflicts are well documented among humans and non-human primates, 
particularly chimpanzees (Wilson, Wallauer & Pusey 2004; Wrangham et al. 2006; 
Mitani, Watts & Amsler 2010), but also in a range of other primate species (white-
faced capuchin monkeys, Cebus capucinus, Gros-Louis, Perry & Manson 2003; spider 
monkeys, Ateles geoffroyi yucatanensis, Aureli et al. 2006; black and white colobus 
monkeys, Colobus guereza, Harris 2010; black howler monkeys, Alouatta pigra, and 
tufted capuchin monkeys, Sapajus nigritus, Belle & Scarry 2015). Outside of primates, 
violent interactions between groups are less well observed, but have been examined in 
other social mammals (gray wolves, Canis lupus, Mech 1994; Cassidy et al. 2015; 
spotted hyena, Boydston, Morelli & Holekamp 2001; banded mongooses, Cant, Otali & 
Mwanguhya 2002; African lions, Panthera leo, Mosser & Packer 2009), and 
cooperatively breeding birds (green woodhoopoes, Phoeniculus purpureus, Radford 
2011; pied babblers, Golabek, Ridley & Radford 2012). Theoretical research has 
investigated the evolution of intergroup conflict in humans, and studies of patterns of 
lethal conflict in chimpanzees have provided empirical support for evolutionary 
models. However, beyond humans and chimpanzees, the significance of intergroup 
conflict as a selective force in the evolution of social species is not well understood. 
 
Hypotheses of violent intergroup conflict 
Evolutionary theories of violent conflict between groups have mainly focussed on the 
significance of collective violence in humans, but have been examined in the context of 
intergroup conflict in other social species (Durrant 2011; Rusch 2014). Most 
explanations for the evolution of violent intergroup conflict suggest that groups can 
achieve enhanced reproductive success by winning access to resources, such as food, 
territory and mates, in intergroup contests (Durrant 2011). Violent conflict can 
therefore apply a selection force at the group level because groups that are successful 
Chapter 1. General introduction 
26 
in winning these resources outcompete losing rivals (Hamilton 1975; Bowles & Gintis 
2011).  
 
The ‘imbalance of power’ hypothesis (Wrangham 1999) suggests that individual fitness 
is increased, both in absolute terms and relative to that of neighbours, when 
individuals participate to injure or kill conspecifics in neighbouring groups. As such, the 
group becomes more likely to win future contests. Wrangham (1999) proposes that 
lethal intergroup aggression is selected for when (1) neighbouring groups are 
sufficiently hostile, and (2) there exists an asymmetry in strength between groups such 
that one can attack the other at little cost. Selection for individuals who contribute to 
group violence increases the competitive ability of groups that contain many of these 
individuals, meaning that the forces of individual and group selection are aligned. The 
imbalance of power hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence for lethal 
intergroup attacks from humans and chimpanzees (Wrangham & Peterson 1996; 
Wrangham 1999), but has been little investigated among other species. 
 
Other hypotheses suggest that violent intergroup conflict has evolved as a facultative 
male reproductive strategy (van der Dennen 1995), since males can improve 
reproductive opportunities through increased access to females. Factors such as the 
capacity to form coalitions, group territoriality, and the ability to distinguish and favour 
the in-group over the out-group select for male coalitional violence because of a 
concomitant increase in reproductive fitness. The ‘male warrior’ hypothesis (van Vugt 
2009) similarly suggests that males benefit in fitness terms from violent intergroup 
conflict. Thus, selection favours male warriors who engage more in intergroup 
interactions and exhibit in-group allegiance in times of conflict. Under these 
hypotheses, increased reproductive prospects and access to mates as a result of 
engaging in contests with rivals is expected to drive the evolution of intergroup 
conflict. 
 
A final hypothesis to explain the evolution of intergroup conflict proposes that 
contributing to collective violence may represent a form of individual altruism. The 
‘parochial altruism’ hypothesis (Choi & Bowles 2007) suggests that individuals that 
exhibit extreme hostility to out-group members and a high degree of altruistic 
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behaviour to in-group members (‘parochial altruists’; Choi & Bowles 2007) increase the 
likelihood of their group being successful at attaining resources that improve 
reproductive success. Therefore, groups that contain more parochial altruists are 
selected for, relative to groups that do not contain these individuals. In a similar 
model, Lehmann and Feldman (2008) propose that selection for traits of ‘bravery’ 
(which increases a group’s success in intergroup contests) and ‘belligerence’ (which 
increases a group’s propensity to engage in intergroup contests) increases when there 
are constraints on dispersal, and so intergroup conflict is more likely to evolve in 
groups with high relatedness, such as those which form viscous societies (Hamilton 
1975; Lehmann & Feldman 2008).  
 
Despite its prevalence among social species, the adaptive significance of violent 
intergroup conflict has been explored mainly in humans and chimpanzees (Wrangham 
1999; Bernhard, Fischbacher & Fehr 2006; Bowles 2009; Wrangham & Glowacki 2012). 
Violent intergroup conflict is a notable feature of cooperatively breeding species 
where there is potential for intergroup conflict to influence demographic processes, 
such as migration, colonisation of new territory and population expansion (Lehmann & 
Feldman 2008), and the evolution of social traits (Lehmann & Rousset 2010; Bowles & 
Gintis 2011). However, a lack of understanding of the causes and consequences of 
intergroup conflict in species that exhibit conspicuous levels of cooperation and 
collective violence means that the role of intergroup conflict in the evolution of social 
behaviours is not well established. Cooperatively breeding species, for which there are 
long-term data on ecological conditions, genetic population structure, and individual 
behaviour, can provide the kind of data needed to advance conceptual understanding 
of the links between within-group and between-group conflict. 
 
Study system: The banded mongoose 
 
This thesis investigates within- and between-group conflict in a wild population of 
cooperatively breeding banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, in Queen Elizabeth 
National Park, Uganda. The banded mongoose is a small (ca. 1.5 kg) diurnal carnivore 
(Figure 1) of the family Herpestidae which is distributed widely in savannah, open 
forest and grassland habitats throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Hoffmann 2008). 
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Figure 1. A resting group of banded mongooses at the study site. 
 
 
Reproduction 
Individuals live in mixed-sex social groups of approximately 20 adults plus offspring, 
although groups as large as 75 individuals have been observed (Cant 2000). Groups 
consist of a core of breeding adults (one to five females, and three to seven males) 
that reproduce on average four times per year, along with a subset of younger 
individuals that breed occasionally (Cant et al. 2010; Nichols et al. 2010, 2012). 
Reproduction is highly synchronised within, but not between, groups: reproductive 
females in a group enter oestrus within 7-10 days of giving birth, and mate within a 
week of each other (Cant 2000). Most females start to breed regularly once they are 1 
year old, but males form an age based hierarchy in which the oldest three males 
monopolise mating, generally achieving paternity at 3 years old (Cant et al. 2016). 
During oestrus, dominant breeding males ‘mate-guard’ receptive females by closely 
following and trying to mate with them, and aggressively defending them from 
attempted matings by pestering males (Cant 2000). Each pregnant female gestates one 
to four pups for an average of 60 days (Cant 2000) and parturition is highly 
synchronised, with 64% of females giving birth on exactly the same day (Hodge, Bell & 
Cant 2011). 
Chapter 1. General introduction 
29 
Cooperative care of young 
Pups are born into a communal litter that is cared for by all members of the group 
(Cant 2003; Gilchrist & Russell 2007; Hodge 2007). There are two distinct forms of 
cooperative care, and most group members over 6 months old exhibit one or both of 
these behaviours (Cant et al. 2016). In the weeks after birth, pups are guarded at the 
den by ‘babysitters’, usually one to five individuals of both sexes (Cant 2003). The 
number of babysitters left to guard the litter has a strong effect on litter survival to 
emergence (Cant 2003; Marshall et al. 2016). Once pups emerge, at approximately 4 
weeks old, they form a one-to-one relationship with an adult ‘escort’ who protects 
them from predators, feeds them, and teaches them how to forage (Gilchrist & Russell 
2007; Gilchrist 2008). Being escorted also has large fitness benefits to pups. Pups that 
are more frequently escorted are more likely to survive to nutritional independence (3 
months old), grow faster, and reproduce earlier (Hodge 2005). 
 
Within- and between-group conflict 
Banded mongooses, as well as exhibiting high levels of cooperative care, also exhibit 
conspicuous levels of conflict, both within and between groups. Eviction from groups is 
common, and each eviction event starts suddenly, lasts several days, and involves 
intense aggression from males and females directed towards multiple individuals (Cant 
et al. 2001, 2010; Gilchrist 2006). Aggression continues until groups of females, and on 
occasion groups of males alongside them, are driven away from the group en masse 
(Cant et al. 2001). Following eviction, evictees are sometimes allowed to return to 
their group within a week (‘temporary evictions’) or they may disperse permanently 
(‘permanent evictions’; Gilchrist 2006). In eviction events where the permanently 
evicted cohort is mixed-sex, males and females split into single-sex cohorts and 
disperse separately, most likely to avoid inbreeding (Cant et al. 2016). 
 
Banded mongooses also experience high levels of conflict between groups. Intergroup 
conflict between neighbouring groups involves intense aggressive interactions (Cant et 
al. 2002). On meeting or discovering the smell of a rival group, individuals stand on 
their hind legs and start making ‘screeching calls’ that alert the rest of the group. 
Group members cluster together in preparation of attack, and physical fighting is likely 
if the groups are evenly matched in size (Cant et al. 2002). Contests are ferocious: 
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individuals often die during, or shortly after, these battles, and newly born pups have 
been observed to be killed by rival groups (Cant et al. 2002; Müller & Bell 2009; Jordan 
et al. 2010; Nichols, Cant & Sanderson 2015). Experimental evidence shows that 
groups respond more aggressively to stimuli from neighbours that represent a 
territorial threat (Müller & Manser 2007) compared to stimuli from non-neighbours. 
Both group size and the location of a group in its territory affect the strength of 
response to playbacks of rival groups: groups respond more intensely to stimuli 
presented in the core areas of their territory compared to the periphery; and larger 
groups are more likely to respond to stimuli than smaller groups (Furrer, Kyabulima & 
Willems 2011). Observations also suggest that males and females engage in intergroup 
interactions in order to achieve extra-group matings (Cant et al. 2002; Nichols et al. 
2015). 
 
Study site and methods 
All research for this thesis was conducted using a habituated population of banded 
mongooses that inhabit the Mweya peninsula in Queen Elizabeth National Park in 
south-west Uganda (012’S, 2754’E; Figure 2). This population was first studied by Jon 
Rood in the 1970s, subsequently by Daniela de Luca in the 1990s, and the current 
research project was started in 1995 by Mike Cant and Tim Clutton-Brock. 
 
The Mweya peninsula is a 4.95 km2 heart-shaped promontory that extends into Lake 
Edward and is connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus (Figure 2c). The habitat 
is mainly medium-height grassland with scattered Euphorbia candelabra trees, 
Euphorbia candelabrum, and thickets of the woolly caper bush, Capparis tormentosa, 
and needle bush, Azima tetracantha (Cant 2000; Cant et al. 2016). The peninsula is 
split into upper and lower halves by a 40 m high grassy slope (Figure 2c). The climate is 
equatorial with little fluctuation in temperature (Marshall et al. 2016) but seasonal 
variation in rainfall, with two dry periods in January-February and June-July (Cant et al. 
2016; Marshall et al. 2016). The peninsula is inhabited by large herbivores including 
African elephant, Loxodonta Africana, hippopotamus, Hippopotamus amphibious, Cape 
buffalo, Syncerus caffer, waterbuck, Kobus ellipsiprymnus, and warthog, Phacochoerus 
africanus. Large predators including leopard, Panthera pardus, African lion and spotted 
hyena are also frequently observed. 
Chapter 1. General introduction 
31 
 
Figure 2. Location of the Banded Mongoose Research Project study site. (a) Location 
of Uganda on the African continent. (b) Location of the Mweya peninsula in Uganda 
denoted by a gold star. (c) Map of the Mweya peninsula; the white dashed line 
denotes the boundary of the field site, and the blue dashed line denotes the grassy 
slope that separates the upper and lower peninsula. Maps courtesy of Philip Doherty. 
 
 
In our study population of banded mongooses, there are approximately 250 individuals 
living in 10 to 12 social groups at any one time (Cant et al. 2016). The Banded 
Mongoose Research Project database contains 20 years of life history and behavioural 
data on over 3000 individuals. All individuals in the study population are uniquely 
marked, in the past using plastic, coloured collars but more recently with shave 
patterns on their back. Individuals are captured as pups within 3 weeks of emergence 
and then every 3 to 6 months until they die or disperse to maintain these identification 
markings, and to take tissue and blood samples for genetic and physiological analysis. 
Individuals are trapped using box traps (67 x 23 x 23 cm; Tomahawk Live Trap Co., 
Tomahawk, WI, USA) and, following capture, anaesthetised using either ketamine or 
isoflurane  (for further details of the trapping procedure, see Cant 2000; Hodge 2007; 
Jordan et al. 2010). On first capture as a pup, a tail tip tissue sample is taken for 
genetic analysis (Nichols et al. 2010). The DNA extracted from these genetic samples 
has been used to construct a pedigree using a panel of 43 polymorphic microsatellite 
markers to allow assignment of parentage and relatedness estimates (for further 
details, see Sanderson et al. 2015). 
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In each group, one or two individuals are fitted with a VHF radio collar (Sirtrack Ltd., 
Havelock North, New Zealand) with a 20 cm whip antenna (Biotrack Ltd., UK) that 
enables observers to locate groups. All individuals within the study population are 
habituated to the presence of an observer within 5 m, allowing detailed behavioural 
data to be collected. Groups are visited every 1 to 3 days to record life history and 
behavioural data, and daily if females are in oestrus, there are dependent pups, if 
females are expected to give birth, or if an eviction has recently occurred. Observers 
locate a group in the morning (before 7 a.m.) as they emerge from their den, and then 
follow them during their morning foraging session which lasts approximately 4 hours. 
In the middle of the day groups return to the den to rest, before leaving again to 
forage in the afternoon. Groups are re-located at around 4 p.m. for observations 
before they return to their den to sleep. Most individuals in the study population are 
trained to step onto a small portable weighing scale using a dilute milk solution as a 
reward in order to collect body mass data each week. Individuals in a group are 
weighed in the morning before foraging begins, in the evening at the end of the 
afternoon foraging session, and again the next morning to give an estimate of 
individual daily weight gain and overnight weight loss. Behavioural data are collected 
using a combination of ad libitum, scan sampling, and focal observations (Martin & 
Bateson 1993) and recorded on Psion LZ-64 handheld data loggers (Psion Teklogix Inc., 
Ontario, Canada). 
 
Thesis aims and outline 
 
In this thesis, I use the banded mongoose as a model system to examine within- and 
between-group conflict in a cooperative species. Specifically, the aims of this thesis are 
to: (i) investigate the causes of eviction as a means of within-group conflict resolution; 
(ii) examine which individuals are targeted for eviction, and why; (iii) investigate the 
consequences of eviction for individuals, groups and the wider population; and (iv) 
investigate the causes and consequences of intergroup conflict. I explain in more detail 
below: 
Chapter 2 examines the triggers of eviction. I test established hypotheses and 
introduce a new hypothesis to explain the occurrence of eviction as a means of conflict 
resolution. 
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Chapter 3 investigates which individuals are evicted during an eviction event. I find a 
surprising effect of relatedness that motivated the development of a new theoretical 
model. I test the predictions of this model using data on eviction and another 
conspicuous manifestation of within-group conflict, infanticide. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the consequences of eviction for evicted individuals and evicting 
groups by investigating demographic effects such as dispersal, reproduction, survival 
and group composition. This chapter also investigates the wider effects of eviction by 
examining the relationship between eviction and intergroup conflict. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the environmental and social triggers of intergroup conflict in 
the population, the fitness costs of intergroup conflict for pups and adults, and the 
long-term consequences for group size. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a synthesis and a general consideration of the findings of 
this thesis. 
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Abstract 
 
In many vertebrate societies, forced eviction of group members is an important 
determinant of population structure, but little is known about what triggers eviction. 
Three main explanations are (1) the reproductive competition hypothesis; (2) the 
coercion of cooperation hypothesis; and (3) the adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis. 
The last hypothesis proposes that dominant individuals use eviction as an adaptive 
strategy to propagate copies of their alleles through a highly structured population. 
We tested these hypotheses as explanations for eviction in cooperatively breeding 
banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, using a 16-year dataset on life history, behaviour 
and relatedness. In this species, groups of females, or mixed-sex groups, are 
periodically evicted en masse. Our evidence suggests that reproductive competition is 
the main ultimate trigger for eviction for both sexes. We find little evidence that mass 
eviction is used to coerce helping, or as a mechanism to force dispersal of relatives into 
the population. Eviction of females changes the landscape of reproductive competition 
for remaining males, which may explain why males are evicted alongside females. Our 
results show that the consequences of resolving within-group conflict resonate 
through groups and populations to affect population structure, with important 
implications for social evolution. 
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Introduction 
 
Individuals living in ‘viscous’ groups, in which there are severe constraints on dispersal, 
face numerous conflicts of interest with other group members.  In cooperative 
breeders, conflict can arise over reproduction, helping effort, parental care, and 
dispersal (Emlen 1991; Koenig & Dickinson 2004; Cant 2012a). Much theoretical and 
empirical work has focused on how individuals resolve these within-group conflicts. In 
both insect and vertebrate societies, individuals may use threats, aggression, 
punishment and various strategies of negotiation to settle conflicts without breaking 
up the group (Johnstone & Hinde 2006; Cant 2011; Raihani et al. 2012). In other cases, 
however, within-group conflict results in the forcible eviction of one or more group 
members, typically following intense, targeted aggression (Cant et al. 2001; Young et 
al. 2006; Koenig & Walters 2011; Fischer et al. 2014). Eviction often leads to the 
permanent dispersal of individuals, or coalitions of individuals, and may be a major 
source of gene flow between groups (Koenig et al. 1998; Clutton-Brock & Lukas 2012). 
Determining what triggers eviction is therefore important to understand the factors 
that shape population genetic structure and demography in viscous populations, and 
hence social evolution (Rousset 2004; Lehmann & Rousset 2010). 
 
In social vertebrates, eviction often appears to be driven by conflict over reproductive 
or social status within groups. In some mammal species, dominant individuals maintain 
their reproductive monopoly by evicting reproductive competitors from the group 
(Young et al. 2006; Cant et al. 2010). For example, in meerkats, Suricata suricatta, 
dominant females evict subordinate females in the latter half of their (own) pregnancy, 
often as a strategic measure to avoid infanticidal attacks on their pups (Clutton-Brock 
et al. 1998). Subordinates that are pregnant when evicted experience a deterioration 
in condition, elevated stress levels, and often spontaneously abort before gaining re-
admittance to their group (Young et al. 2006). Consequently, eviction reduces future, 
as well as current, reproductive competition from the perspective of the dominant by 
suppressing subordinates’ future reproductive success. In fish that form size-based 
hierarchies, dominant individuals use the threat of eviction to deter subordinates from 
growing large enough to challenge their position (Buston 2003a; Heg, Bender & 
Hamilton 2004; Wong et al. 2007). As a result, in the coral dwelling goby, 
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Paragobiodon xanthosomus, subordinates starve themselves to avoid triggering 
eviction (Wong et al. 2008). 
 
Alternative explanations for eviction are based on the idea that dominant individuals 
can use eviction to coerce their subordinates to help. For example, the ‘pay-to-stay’ 
hypothesis (Gaston 1978) suggests that dominant individuals can threaten helpers with 
eviction unless they behave cooperatively. Additionally, dominant individuals might 
evict temporarily to coerce helpers to work harder on their return (Bowles & Gintis 
2004), or evict permanently to establish a reputation for punishment and thereby 
induce remaining helpers to cooperate (dos Santos et al. 2011). Clear evidence in 
support of such coercive mechanisms comes from the cooperative cichlid, 
Neolamprologus pulcher. Helpers that are experimentally prevented from helping are 
subject to elevated aggression from dominants and subsequently help more, as 
predicted if aggression is a signal of impending eviction (Bergmüller & Taborsky 2005; 
Fischer et al. 2014). In addition, helpers that are temporarily removed are often 
evicted on their return, and those that are reaccepted work harder thereafter 
(Balshine-Earn et al. 1998). In cooperative birds and mammals, evidence for the pay-
to-stay hypothesis is less clear-cut. In superb fairy-wrens, Malurus cyaneus, temporary 
removal of helpers results in increased aggression from dominants (Mulder & 
Langmore 1993), while in naked mole-rats, Heterocephalus glaber, and meerkats there 
is evidence that uncooperative helpers are subject to aggression from dominant 
breeders (Reeve 1992; Clutton-Brock et al. 2005). In addition, temporarily evicted 
female meerkats are more likely to allolactate on their return to the group than non-
evicted females (MacLeod, Nielsen & Clutton-Brock 2013). By contrast, studies of bell 
miners, Manorina melanophrys, (McDonald et al. 2008a; b) and chestnut-crowned 
babblers, Pomatostomus ruficep, (Nomano et al. 2015) have failed to find support for 
mechanisms based on pay-to-stay or punishment. 
 
A third, unexplored hypothesis is that eviction is an adaptive forced dispersal strategy 
used by breeders to spread copies of their alleles through the wider population. 
Traditionally, studies of cooperative breeders have used the number of surviving 
offspring as a measure of fitness. However, groups of cooperative breeders can be 
thought of as miniature populations embedded within a wider metapopulation (Hanski 
Chapter 2. Triggers of eviction 
40 
1998). In this kind of structured population, what matters is not just the number of 
offspring that are successfully raised, but how successful these offspring are at 
dispersing to form or join new groups, and in turn produce dispersing offspring of their 
own - sometimes referred to as metapopulation fitness (Metz & Gyllenberg 2001; 
Massol, Calcagno & Massol 2009). Forced dispersal could be a strategy to maximise 
metapopulation fitness, over and above any immediate benefits evictors might gain by 
reducing local competition (although more intense local competition should 
strengthen selection for forced dispersal). If eviction is primarily a strategy to export 
copies of alleles, one would expect dominants to evict related individuals rather than 
unrelated individuals, to evict when local competition is high, and to evict when the 
evictees have the best chance of dispersing successfully to found or usurp new groups. 
 
Banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, are a good system to test hypotheses about the 
causes and function of eviction in cooperative societies because evictions are common 
and conspicuous. This species lives in mixed-sex groups of around 20 adults, plus 
offspring. Each eviction event starts suddenly, lasts several days, and involves intense 
aggression from males and females directed toward multiple individuals. Aggression 
continues until groups of females, and on occasion groups of males alongside them, 
are driven away from the group, sometimes limping or bleeding (Cant et al. 2001). Up 
to 26 individuals have been observed to be evicted in a single eviction event (Cant et 
al. 2001). Evictees are sometimes allowed to return to their group within a week 
(‘temporary evictions’) or they may disperse permanently (‘permanent evictions’; 
Gilchrist 2006). In mixed-sex, permanent eviction events, males and females form 
same-sex cohorts and disperse separately, most likely to avoid inbreeding (Cant et al. 
2016). 
 
In banded mongoose groups there is intense reproductive competition among both 
males and females (Cant, Vitikainen & Nichols 2013). Among males, a few high-ranking 
‘mate guarding’ males aggressively monopolise access to females during oestrus: on 
average the oldest three males sire 85% of offspring in each group (Nichols et al. 
2010). Most females give birth in each breeding attempt, usually on the same day 
(Hodge et al. 2011), and the communal litter is reared by the whole group (Cant 2003; 
Gilchrist 2004). Pups compete for food and access to helpers, and the per capita 
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reproductive success of females declines as the number of breeding females grows 
large (Cant et al. 2010). There is also conspicuous helping behaviour exhibited by both 
parents and non-parents. Both males and females ‘babysit’ offspring at the den in the 
first month after birth (Cant 2003), and after pups emerge they are guarded and 
provisioned by adult ‘escorts’ (Gilchrist & Russell 2007). 
 
In this paper we investigated what triggers eviction events in groups of banded 
mongooses. We tested three distinct but non-exclusive hypotheses: (1) eviction is a 
response to reproductive competition; (2) eviction is used to coerce cooperation; (3) 
eviction is an adaptive forced dispersal strategy. We make the following predictions 
(Table 1). First, if eviction is a response to reproductive competition we predict that an 
eviction event is more likely to occur when intrasexual competition is high, and when 
ecological conditions are unfavourable for successful reproduction. Other things being 
equal, increasing relatedness should reduce the probability of an eviction event, 
because dominants should be more tolerant of kin competitors (Higashi & Yamamura 
1993), and because kinship should reduce competitive effort within groups (Harris 
1981; Reeve, Emlen & Keller 1998). Second, if eviction is used to coerce helpers we 
predict a higher probability of eviction following breeding attempts where helping 
performance was poor, where the outside options for helpers are good (Bergmüller, 
Heg & Taborsky 2005; Cant & Johnstone 2009), and where relatedness is low (Zöttl et 
al. 2013b). In addition, if eviction is used as a mechanism to enforce harder work, we 
expect eviction events to result in improved helping performance in the subsequent 
breeding attempt. Third, if eviction is a means by which dominants force copies of 
their alleles into the wider population we expect eviction events to occur when 
relatedness in the group is high, when local competition is high, and when ecological 
conditions are favourable for successful dispersal. 
 
We tested these predictions using a dataset of 496 breeding attempts for which we 
had information on group composition, reproductive success, helping behaviour, 
relatedness, ecological conditions, and whether eviction occurred. Note in this paper 
we explicitly focus on the factors that trigger group eviction events, rather than on 
what features of individuals determine the risk of being evicted. 
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Table 1. Predictions of the hypotheses of eviction. Predicted effects of social and environmental variables on the probability of eviction under the 
three hypotheses described in the text. References provide theoretical or empirical support for the predictions. 
Hypothesis 
Number of 
competitors 
Quality of ecological 
conditions 
Prior helping 
performance* 
Change in helping 
performance* 
following eviction 
Mean group 
relatedness 
Reproductive 
competition 
More same-sex 
competitors 
→ more intrasexual 
competition 
→ more evictions 
Poorer conditions 
→ more intrasexual 
competition 
→ more evictions 
No clear prediction No clear prediction Lower relatedness 
→ more intrasexual 
competition1,2 
→ more evictions 
 
Coercion of 
cooperation 
No clear prediction Better conditions 
→ groups less stable3, 
or helpers work less 
hard4 
→ more evictions 
Poorer helping 
performance  
→ more evictions 
Positive change 
→ more evictions 
Lower relatedness 
→ groups less stable3, 
or more coercion 
required5 
→ more evictions 
Adaptive forced 
dispersal 
Larger group size 
→ more resource 
competition 
→ more evictions 
Or 
More same-sex 
competitors 
→ more reproductive 
competition 
→ more evictions 
Better conditions 
→ more successful 
dispersal  
→ more evictions 
 
No clear prediction No clear prediction Higher relatedness → 
forced dispersal more 
effective  
→ more evictions 
* measured by outcome or helping effort 
1 Harris 1981; 2 Reeve et al. 1998; 3 Cant & Johnstone 2009; 4 Bergmüller et al. 2005; 5 Zöttl et al. 2013b  
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Methods 
 
Study population and data collection 
We studied a population of banded mongooses on the Mweya Peninsula, Queen 
Elizabeth National Park, Uganda (012’S, 2754’E), between October 1996 and 
February 2013. Details of habitat are given elsewhere (Cant et al. 2013). Daily 
measurements of temperature and rainfall were recorded by the Uganda Institute of 
Ecology Meteorological Station and, later, using our own weather station. Over the 16-
year study period, we observed 496 breeding attempts in 16 groups. Following Hodge 
et al. (2011), we defined a communal litter as one where all pregnant females gave 
birth within 30 days of one another. We defined a breeding attempt as the 67 day 
period prior to the birth of each litter (comprised of a 7 day oestrus and a 60 day 
gestation; Cant 2000). We defined an eviction event to have occurred in a breeding 
attempt if one or more individuals left their group for at least one day following a 
period of intense aggression toward themselves or other group members (Gilchrist 
2006; Cant et al. 2010). In practice, evictions are conspicuous and noisy events that are 
easy to recognise. Typically, individuals leave only after being repeatedly attacked, but 
much aggression occurs in the bushes where we are unable to identify the aggressors 
or their victims. Instances where individuals left their group without any observed 
aggression toward any group member were defined as voluntary dispersal events and 
were not considered in our analysis. Groups were visited every 1 to 3 days to record 
life history and behavioural data. Most were habituated to human presence, allowing 
observers to watch and follow them from less than 5 m. One or two individuals in each 
group were fitted with a VHF radio collar (Sirtrack Ltd., Havelock North, New Zealand) 
with a 20 cm whip antenna (Biotrack Ltd., UK) that enabled groups to be located. 
Individuals were easily identifiable by either colour-coded plastic collars or, more 
recently, unique shave markings on their back. Individuals were regularly trapped to 
maintain these identification markings (see Jordan et al. 2010 for details). On first 
capture a 2 mm skin sample was collected from the end of the tail using sterilised 
scissors for genetic analyses. DNA was extracted and used to assign parentage and 
estimate relatedness using a panel of 43 polymorphic microsatellite markers (see 
Sanderson et al. 2015b for further details). 
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Statistical analyses 
We used an information-theoretic approach (Burnham & Anderson 2002) in which we 
compared the explanatory power of models to investigate the factors that predict the 
probability that: 
(i) an eviction event occurred in a breeding attempt (‘female evictions’). Since 
females are evicted in every eviction event, we focused the analysis on the factors 
predicted to influence female eviction; 
(ii) when an eviction event occurred, males were evicted alongside females (‘male 
evictions’). Here we focused the analysis on the factors predicted to influence male 
eviction; 
(iii) when an eviction event occurred, it was temporary rather than permanent 
(‘temporary evictions’). Since temporary evictions could be either female-only or 
mixed-sex events, we included factors predicted to influence both male and female 
eviction. An eviction was defined as temporary if more than 50% of the evicted cohort 
were allowed to return to their group. 
 
For each analysis, we constructed a candidate set of models which together provided a 
comprehensive test of the predictions of our three hypotheses: reproductive 
competition, coercion of cooperation, and adaptive forced dispersal. The models 
incorporated additive combinations of the main terms predicted to influence eviction 
probability for the hypotheses, together with specific two-way interactions where we 
considered these biologically relevant. 
  
(i) Models of eviction as a response to reproductive competition 
To test whether an eviction event is more likely to occur when reproductive 
competition is high, we fitted the number of reproductive competitors at the start of 
the breeding attempt (denoted B), mean monthly rainfall (mm) (E) in the previous 6 
months, the interaction between these social and ecological variables (B:E), and mean 
group relatedness (R) as fixed effects. Rainfall and insect abundance are correlated 
(Rood 1975; Cant et al. 2013; H. Marshall, unpublished data) so we expect low rainfall 
to intensify competition for food resources. In the female evictions analysis, 
reproductive competitors were defined as females 10 months and over (10 months is 
the age at first conception; Gilchrist, Otali & Mwanguhya 2004; Cant et al. 2010). In the 
Chapter 2. Triggers of eviction 
45 
male evictions analysis, reproductive competitors were defined as males 3 years and 
over (3 years is the first age at which males typically become regular mate guards; Cant 
et al. 2016). In the temporary evictions analysis, male and female reproductive 
competitors were defined as above and fitted as separate fixed effects. 
 
(ii) Models of eviction as coerced cooperation 
The coercion of cooperation hypothesis predicts that eviction should be triggered by 
poor helper performance, but it is not clear whether animals should respond to the 
outcome of helping (i.e. reproductive success), or to helping behaviour per se. We 
separately investigated these alternatives by using two indices of helping performance: 
(i) female reproductive success (CS); and (ii) helping effort (CE). We also examined the 
change in helping performance (ΔCS or ΔCE). 
 
(i) Female reproductive success, CS, was defined as the number of emergent pups in 
the previous breeding attempt, per female that contributed to the communal litter. To 
account for differences in CS that could be explained by differences in the amount of 
help available, we included the number of helpers available to babysit that litter (H) 
and the interaction between these terms (CS:H). The interaction term is necessary to 
capture the difference between the same reproductive outcome achieved with few 
helpers versus many helpers. We included mean group relatedness (R) and mean 
monthly rainfall (E) as main effects. In the female evictions analysis, we defined 
helpers as females aged 6 months to 3 years, since females younger than 3 years are 
classed as subordinate and are more likely to participate in helping (Gilchrist & Russell 
2007; Cant et al. 2014). In the male evictions analysis, helpers were defined as males 
aged 6 months to 3 years, since males do not become consistent breeders until around 
3 years of age and, until then, contribute more to helping (Sanderson et al. 2015a; 
Cant et al. 2016). In the temporary evictions analysis, male and female helpers were 
defined as above and fitted as separate fixed effects. 
 
To investigate if eviction is used to coerce helpers to work harder in the subsequent 
breeding attempt, we tested whether the change in helping performance from one 
litter to the next predicted the probability that an eviction event occurred in the 
interim. We reasoned that if eviction is used as a punishment to improve future 
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helping performance, an eviction event (and temporary eviction events in particular) 
should be associated with an increase in helping performance of remaining or 
returning helpers after eviction. We fitted ΔCS, ΔH and the interaction between them 
(ΔCS:ΔH) as fixed effects, where ΔCS is the change in female reproductive success (i.e. 
the number of emergent pups, per female that contributed to the litter), and ΔH is the 
change in the number of available helpers, across two consecutive breeding attempts 
(the breeding attempt before the eviction, and the subsequent breeding attempt). 
Again, we included mean group relatedness (R) and mean monthly rainfall (E) as fixed 
effects. Note that ΔCS and ΔH are likely to be affected by the problem of regression to 
the mean (Kelly & Price 2005) because extremely high or low values in the first 
measure of a given variable are more likely to move closer to the mean in a second 
measure of that variable. We controlled for potential problems with regression to the 
mean following the methods in Kelly & Price (2005) (see Appendix A). 
 
(ii) Helping effort, CE, was defined as the contribution by helpers (H) to babysitting in 
the previous breeding attempt (i.e. CE = number of helpers that babysat per day of 
babysitting). We repeated the analyses outlined above, replacing CS with CE. In the 
female evictions analysis, CE was defined as the number of female babysitters aged 6 
months to 3 years left per day of babysitting of the previous litter. In the male 
evictions analysis, CE was defined as the number of male babysitters aged 6 months to 
3 years left per day of babysitting of the previous litter. In the temporary evictions 
analysis, CE was defined as in the previous two analyses and fitted as separate fixed 
effects. In the temporary evictions analysis, the model including both the change in 
female helpers’ babysitting effort and male helpers’ babysitting effort was too complex 
to fit to the reduced sample of data and so these variables were fitted in separate 
models. Since data on babysitting behaviour was not available for all breeding 
attempts, analysis using this helping effort measure of helping performance was 
performed on a reduced sample (see Appendix A Tables A2, A4 and A6). 
 
(iii) Models of eviction as an adaptive forced dispersal strategy 
To test whether an eviction event is more likely to occur when relatedness is high, 
ecological conditions are good and local competition is intense, we fitted mean group 
relatedness (R), mean monthly rainfall (E), group size (all individuals over 6 months) 
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(G), the interaction between relatedness and rainfall (R:E), and the interaction 
between relatedness and group size (R:G) as fixed effects. We included group size to 
allow for the possibility that local resource competition contributes to the timing of 
eviction events. The interaction between relatedness and rainfall is particularly 
important to test the prediction that high group relatedness in combination with 
favourable ecological conditions will make an eviction event more likely to occur. The 
definitions of R, E and G were consistent across our three analyses. An alternative 
prediction is that the nature of competition under which adaptive forced dispersal 
operates could be reproductive, rather than resource related. We fitted an identical 
set of models to those described above, but replaced G with the number of 
reproductive competitors (B) in each of the three analyses. 
 
(iv) Comparing model performance 
Models, including a null model containing no fixed effects, were estimated using 
generalised linear mixed models (GLMM). Group identity was included as a random 
intercept to control for repeated measures across groups. In all analyses we used the 
maximum sample size for which we had data on all the terms in all the models 
(Appendix A Tables A1-A6).  In all three analyses, the eviction metric was fitted as the 
binomial response variable using a logit link function in the ‘lme4’ package in R 3.1.2 
(Bates et al. 2012; R Development Core Team 2014). We performed subsets selection 
of the maximal model under each hypothesis using the ‘MuMIn’ package (Bartón 
2015), which examines all possible combinations of terms in each full model. Models 
were ranked by Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC), or corrected AIC (AICc) in analyses 
where N/k < 40, where N is the sample size and k is the number of parameters in the 
maximal model (Burnham & Anderson 2002). We defined a ‘top model set’ as models ≤ 
Δ6 AIC (or AICc) units of the best supported model (Richards, Whittingham & Stephens 
2011), after excluding any models where a simpler nested version attained stronger 
support (applying the ‘nesting rule’ of Richards et al. 2011). Full model tables are 
provided in Appendix A. 
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Results 
 
Observations of eviction 
In total, we observed 47 eviction events in 8 out of 16 groups in our population 
between October 1996 and February 2013 resulting in the expulsion of 457 individuals. 
More females than males were evicted; in the 46 events for which we knew the sex 
and identities of the evictees, evictions resulted in the expulsion of 274 females and 
170 males, with the median evicted cohort comprising 24% of the total group (range 
3% - 60%). Just 3 eviction events (6%) resulted in the eviction of a single individual. In 
25 (53%) of eviction events only females were evicted, with a median of 6 females 
evicted in a single event (range 1-12). On average, an eviction event resulted in the 
expulsion of 40% of female group members (range 6% - 79%). In the remaining 22 
eviction events (47%) a cohort of males was evicted alongside a cohort of females. In 
these cases the median number of evictees was 13 individuals (range 6-26); median 
number of female evictees was 6 (range 2-15) and median number of male evictees 
was 9 (range 1-17). On average, an eviction event resulted in the expulsion of 35% of 
male group members (range 3% - 65%). Males were only ever evicted alongside 
females. In 8 out of 22 mixed-sex evictions (36%), some or all of both sexes dispersed 
permanently as a consequence of eviction. In all these cases, the evicted cohorts of 
males and females split into single-sex groups and dispersed separately. In 47% of all 
eviction events, all evictees were eventually readmitted to their group after 
persistently attempting to re-join. In 32%, some evicted individuals (both males and 
females) were allowed to return but others were not. Of temporarily evicted 
individuals, 69% were readmitted to their group within 1 week, 97% within 1 month, 
and all individuals within 6 months of eviction. 
 
Testing the hypotheses 
(i) Female evictions 
Models of the reproductive competition hypothesis were by far the best predictors of 
the probability of an eviction event occurring during a breeding attempt (Table 2). 
Specifically it was the model containing the number of breeding females that 
performed the best out of the candidate model set, with an eviction event more likely 
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to occur when there were more breeding females (Figure 1). Models of the 
reproductive competition hypothesis had a cumulative adjusted Akaike’s model weight 
of 100% of retained models from the top model set when helping performance was 
measured in terms of female reproductive success (CS) (Table 2), and 95% when 
helping performance was measured in terms of helping effort (CE) (Appendix A Table 
A2). 
 
Figure 1. The probability of an eviction event occurring during a breeding attempt 
(N=415 breeding attempts in 15 groups). The line shows model predictions (± standard 
error).  
Chapter 2. Triggers of eviction 
50 
Table 2. Top models of the analysis of female evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability of an eviction event occurring during a 
breeding attempt (N=415 breeding attempts in 15 groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance 
under the coercion of cooperation hypothesis. Models comprise the top model set where ΔAIC ≤ 6. 
Hyp. Int. B E R B:E R:B R:E k logLik AIC ΔAIC wi Retained Adj. wi 
R -5.44 0.37      3 -108.63 223.26 0.00 0.34  1.00 
A -3.34 0.11  -14.46  1.76  5 -107.25 224.50 1.24 0.18   
A/R -5.49 0.37  0.42    4 -108.62 225.25 1.99 0.13   
R -5.45 0.37 0.00     4 -108.63 225.26 2.00 0.13   
A -3.29 0.11 0.00 -14.52  1.77  6 -107.25 226.50 3.24 0.07   
A/R -5.51 0.37 0.00 0.43    5 -108.62 227.24 3.99 0.05   
R -5.37 0.36 0.00  0.00   5 -108.63 227.26 4.00 0.05   
A -3.34 0.11 0.00 -14.11  1.77 -0.01 7 -107.25 228.49 5.23 0.02   
A -5.25 0.37 0.00 -1.44   0.03 6 -108.60 229.21 5.95 0.02   
R -5.42 0.36 0.00 0.44 0.00   6 -108.62 229.24 5.98 0.02   
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; R = Reproductive competition. Columns 2 to 8 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = 
Intercept; B = number of breeding females; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; R = mean group relatedness; : = interaction. k = number of estimated 
parameters including a random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AIC = Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAIC = change in AIC value from the best 
performing model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Retained = ticks indicate that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of (Richards et al. 2011); Adj. 
wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model. 
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(ii) Male evictions 
The probability that males were evicted with females, given that an eviction occurred, 
was also best explained by the reproductive competition hypothesis (analysis using the 
female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance). Specifically, the 
model that performed best contained the number of breeding males (Table 3), with 
males more likely to be evicted with females as the number of breeding males 
increased (Figure 2). The only other model to be retained after applying the nesting 
rule (Richards et al. 2011) was the model of adaptive forced dispersal containing group 
size and mean group relatedness, with males more likely to be evicted alongside 
females in larger groups and when group relatedness was low, although this model 
only attained an adjusted weight of 5%. When performing the same analysis but using 
the helping effort (CE) measure of helping performance on a reduced sample size, the 
only model that was retained was the null model which contained an intercept but no 
fixed effects (Appendix A Table A4). 
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Figure 2. The probability that males are evicted alongside females when an eviction 
event occurs (N=37 eviction events in 7 groups). The line shows model predictions (± 
standard error). 
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Table 3. Top models of the analysis of male evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability that males are evicted alongside females 
when an eviction event occurs (N=37 eviction events in 7 groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping 
performance under the coercion of cooperation hypothesis. Models comprise the top model set where ΔAICc ≤ 6.  
Hyp. Int. B E R B:E R:B G k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Retained Adj. wi 
R -2.28 0.38      3 -20.42 47.57 0.00 0.51  0.95 
R -1.81 0.39 -0.01     4 -20.32 49.88 2.32 0.16   
A/R -2.16 0.38  -0.68    4 -20.41 50.07 2.51 0.15   
R -0.30 -0.10 -0.04  0.01   5 -19.78 51.51 3.94 0.07   
A -0.94 0.11  -9.71  2.02  5 -20.24 52.41 4.85 0.05   
A/R -1.64 0.39 -0.01 -0.90    5 -20.31 52.55 4.98 0.04   
A -3.82   -1.58   0.15 4 -22.08 53.41 5.84 0.03  0.05 
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; R = Reproductive competition. Column headings as in Table 2, with the addition of B = number of breeding 
males; G = group size; AICc = corrected Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAICc = change in AICc value from the best performing model. Ticks indicate that the model 
was retained after applying the nesting rule of (Richards et al. 2011). Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.  
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(iii) Temporary evictions 
None of our hypotheses explained whether eviction events were temporary rather 
than permanent. The null model performed better than all other models and this 
result was consistent whether female reproductive success (CS) or helping effort (CE) 
was used as a measure of helping performance (Appendix A Tables A5 and A6). 
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Discussion 
 
Previous work on eviction in this species highlighted reproductive competition as a 
driver of female evictions, but did not consider male or temporary evictions, or test 
alternative hypotheses for eviction behaviour (Cant et al. 2001, 2010; Gilchrist 2006). 
For both female and mixed-sex eviction events, the reproductive competition 
hypothesis best explained our data. Females were more likely to be evicted when 
there were many breeding females in the group. These female eviction events are 
likely to radically alter the landscape of intrasexual competition among remaining 
males, which may explain why groups of males are commonly evicted alongside 
females. Males were more likely to be evicted when there were many breeding males 
in the group, again supporting the hypothesis that high levels of same-sex reproductive 
competition is a trigger for mass eviction. 
 
Sex differences in the intensity of reproductive competition may explain why evictions 
of females are almost twice as common as male evictions. Reproductive competition is 
particularly intense among female banded mongooses because dominants are unable 
to suppress reproduction by younger females and suffer substantial fitness costs when 
large numbers of subordinate females breed alongside them (Cant et al. 2010, 2014). 
Dominant males, by contrast, can usually prevent subordinate males from mating, and 
so are less sensitive to the presence of additional males in the group. However, 
dominant males are not immune from reproductive competition because they cannot 
fully control the mating behaviour of females (Cant 2000; Nichols et al. 2010). 
Dominant males might also evict (usually younger) subordinates before these become 
genuine reproductive competitors, similar to the explanations for eviction in size-
based fish hierarchies (Buston 2003a; Heg et al. 2004; Wong et al. 2007, 2008). At the 
same time, young male banded mongooses that are excluded from breeding have less 
to gain from putting up a fight to stay in their natal group compared to females. This 
potential difference in the level of resistance offered could explain why males 
sometimes disperse voluntarily, while female dispersal events almost always involve 
intense aggression. 
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We found little evidence to support the idea that mass evictions are triggered when it 
is adaptive for dominants to force subordinates to disperse. We did find weak support 
for a model that showed that males were more likely to be evicted with females when 
groups were large, but when mean group relatedness was low. This effect of 
relatedness is the opposite of that predicted under the adaptive forced dispersal 
hypothesis. Eviction of either sex was not more likely when mean group relatedness 
was high, nor when ecological conditions were benign. We cannot rule out adaptive 
forced dispersal entirely, however, because (1) we currently lack information about the 
long-term fate of evictees in the wider population; and (2) we currently lack a formal 
model of the adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis which might provide discriminating 
predictions beyond those based on our simple verbal arguments. Concerning point (1), 
eviction did result in the permanent dispersal of 193 individuals, which is 72% of the 
individuals in our population that left their natal group (Cant et al. 2016). Eviction is 
therefore likely to be a major determinant of gene flow and population structure in 
this system. Concerning (2), demographic models of kin selection (Johnstone & Cant 
2008; Lehmann & Rousset 2010) usually assume that dispersal is under the full control 
of the offspring themselves, or under full maternal control (e.g. Ronce, Clobert & 
Massot 1998, but see Uller & Pen 2011). Our observations of eviction, by contrast, 
suggest that in many real systems, no single party has full control over group 
membership, and group dynamics are a compromise between the interests of evictors 
and evictees. A model embedding a conflict resolution mechanism (e.g. similar to 
Higashi and Yamamura’s (1993) insider-outsider conflict model) in a demographic 
framework could be a useful tool to predict population consequences of reproductive 
competition. 
 
Finally, we found little evidence to support the coercion of cooperation hypothesis for 
mass eviction in this system. This contrasts with strong evidence that eviction, and the 
threat of eviction, is used to coerce helpers to work harder in the cooperative cichlid 
N. pulcher (Balshine-Earn et al. 1998; Bergmüller & Taborsky 2005; Heg & Taborsky 
2010; Zöttl et al. 2013b; Fischer et al. 2014). Why should eviction be effective to coerce 
cooperation in cichlids but not banded mongooses? We suggest two reasons. First, 
theory suggests that acts and threats of eviction will be much less effective at coercing 
cooperation when targeted at a group of individuals rather than specific individual 
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helpers (Cant et al. 2010). In a group of helpers, the threat of mass eviction creates a 
tragedy-of-the-commons over helping effort since the effort of any hard working 
helper can be readily exploited by the idleness of other potential evictees. Eviction is 
likely to be much more effective at inducing cooperation when targeted at individual 
transgressors, for example in dyads and in groups which exhibit a strict rank hierarchy 
(such as cooperative cichlids; Heg et al. 2004; Zöttl et al. 2013b; Fischer et al. 2014). 
Second, threats of eviction are predicted to be less effective at inducing pre-emptive 
cooperation when evictees are often reaccepted into the group, as in banded 
mongooses (Cant et al. 2010; this chapter) and meerkats (Clutton-Brock et al. 1998). 
The best tests of the coercion of cooperation hypothesis require experimental 
reduction of helper effort (Bergmüller & Taborsky 2005; Fischer et al. 2014), or 
manipulation of the availability of outside options (Heg & Taborsky 2010; Zöttl, 
Frommen & Taborsky 2013a), which is logistically challenging in birds and mammals. 
Further innovative experimental tests in a wider range of cooperative vertebrates 
would help to test the coercion of cooperation hypothesis more rigorously. 
 
To summarise, our results suggest that intrasexual reproductive competition is the 
trigger for mass eviction of both sexes from groups of banded mongooses. Eviction of 
females appears to alter the landscape of intrasexual competition among males, 
leading to the mass eviction of males at the same time as, but separate from, the 
eviction of females. We did not find evidence to link eviction events to the 
enforcement of helping or the propagation of alleles through a structured population. 
Nevertheless, our study highlights that the consequences of resolving within-group 
reproductive competition can scale up to affect population structure and demography. 
This link between within-group conflict strategies and population processes has been 
little studied theoretically or empirically, but may be an important determinant of life 
history evolution in viscous animal societies. 
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Abstract 
 
Kin selection theory predicts that, where kin discrimination is possible, animals should 
typically act more favourably towards closer genetic relatives, and direct aggression 
towards less closely related individuals. Contrary to this prediction, we use game 
theory to show that selection may, under certain conditions, favour negative kin 
discrimination in the targeting of aggressive acts, because unrelated targets are 
selected to invest more in resisting aggression. We tested our model using data from 
an 18-year study of wild banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, in which individuals are 
targeted for forcible eviction from their group, often suffering severe injury and death 
as a result. Consistent with our model, negative kin discrimination is restricted to 
eviction attempts of older females capable of resistance; dominants exhibit no kin 
discrimination when attempting to evict younger females, nor do they discriminate 
between more closely or less closely related young when carrying out infanticidal 
attacks on vulnerable infants who cannot defend themselves. We suggest that in 
contexts where recipients of selfish acts are capable of resistance, the usual prediction 
of positive kin discrimination can be reversed. Kin selection theory, as an explanation 
for social behaviour, can benefit from much greater exploration of sequential social 
interactions.  
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Introduction 
 
Kin selection theory aims to understand how selection acts on social traits, such as 
altruism and selfishness, that affect the fitness of social partners and local group 
members (Hamilton 1964; Grafen 1984). The theory predicts that where animals can 
discriminate between more closely and less closely related individuals within their 
social group, they will preferentially direct altruism towards closer genetic relatives, 
and aggression towards less closely related targets (Hamilton 1964; Grafen 1984; West 
& Gardner 2010). Instances of such positive kin discrimination are taxonomically 
numerous and widespread (Abbot et al. 2011), while reported examples of negative 
kin discrimination are rare (Dunn et al. 2014; Foster & Briffa 2014). 
 
Contrary to the predictions of traditional kin selection theory, we found evidence that 
banded mongooses exercise negative kin discrimination during attempts at eviction; 
and that this result was not readily explained by inbreeding avoidance. This result 
motivated us to develop a simple and very general sequential game model of selfish 
behaviour that takes into account the possibility of active resistance on the part of 
recipients, and which provides a potential explanation for negative kin discrimination. 
We first show the results of our initial analysis of patterns of eviction in banded 
mongooses, and then describe the model. Finally, we test predictions of the model 
using our data. 
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Patterns of eviction in banded mongooses 
 
We examine kin discrimination in the context of a conspicuous form of intragroup 
aggression in cooperatively breeding banded mongooses, Mungos mungo: the violent 
eviction of males and females from the group. Banded mongooses live in highly 
cooperative groups with limited dispersal and varying levels of relatedness between 
group members (Cant et al. 2016). In our study population in Uganda, groups consist of 
around 20 adults, plus offspring, and breed on average four times per year (Cant et al. 
2013). Multiple females give birth synchronously to a communal litter that is cared for 
by members of both sexes (typically not the parents) (Cant et al. 2016). Each group 
contains a cohort of multiple dominant females (median=4) that are older than the 
other females, breed more regularly and more successfully, and aggressively evict 
younger females (Cant et al. 2001, 2016; Nichols et al. 2010). Older males monopolise 
mating with oestrus females by mate-guarding them and aggressively driving away 
younger, subordinate males (Cant 2000; Nichols et al. 2010). Previous work shows that 
both sexes are capable of kin discrimination in the context of mating, supporting the 
assumption of our model that such discrimination is possible in this system (Sanderson 
et al. 2015b). Evictions are relatively common, involve intense, targeted aggression, 
and result in the forcible mass exclusion of groups (median=6 individuals) of females 
(female-only evictions) and, in around half of cases, groups (mean=9 individuals) of 
males alongside them (mixed-sex evictions; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). These 
mass evictions are triggered by high levels of intrasexual reproductive competition: 
females are evicted when there are many breeding females in the group, and males 
are evicted alongside females when there are many breeding males (Thompson et al. 
2016; Chapter 2). Evictions are very violent, and evictees are often left with serious 
injuries as a result of the aggression they receive. 
 
Among adult female banded mongooses, those more closely related to dominant 
individuals of both sexes (that is, males and females older than 3 years) in the group 
were more likely to be targeted for eviction (Generalised Linear Mixed Model (GLMM), 
β ± SE=9.95 ± 3.36, χ21=9.51, p=0.002; Figure 1a; Table 1). Younger females were also 
more likely to be subject to an eviction attempt (GLMM, β ± SE=-0.003 ± 0.0005, 
χ21=39.98, p<0.0001; Table 1), but there was no effect of a female’s pregnancy status 
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or non-pregnant weight on her probability of being targeted for eviction (pregnancy 
status: GLMM, β ± SE=-0.61 ± 0.49, χ21=1.63, p=0.20; weight: GLMM, β ± SE=0.002 ± 
0.001, χ21=2.59, p=0.11; Table 1). For a subset of eviction attempts (N=26 eviction 
attempts) we had data on the identity of ‘primary aggressors’ (individuals that were 
recorded as being notably more aggressive than other group members toward 
potential evictees). Females that were more closely related to primary aggressors were 
more likely to be targeted for eviction (GLMM, β ± SE=5.47 ± 2.87, χ21=3.85, p=0.0498; 
Table 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. Patterns of eviction and sex-specific aggression in banded mongooses. (a) 
The effect of mean pairwise relatedness to dominants (males and females older than 3 
years) on the probability of a female being targeted for eviction (N=207 females in 29 
eviction attempts in 5 groups). The line shows the prediction from the GLMM (± 
standard error). (Inset) Eviction attempts are highly aggressive and involve biting, 
chasing and wrestling (photo courtesy of Dave Seager). (b) The number of female (grey 
bars) and male (open bars) primary aggressors in female-only and mixed-sex eviction 
attempts (N=26 eviction attempts in 6 groups). The bars show the predictions from the 
GLMM (± standard error). 
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Table 1. Eviction and relatedness to dominants. Investigating the effect of mean 
pairwise relatedness to dominants (males and females older than 3 years) on eviction. 
Models predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for females (GLMM, 
N=207 females in 29 eviction attempts in 5 groups) and males (GLMM, N=177 males in 
15 eviction attempts in 5 groups). Models were fitted using a binomial error structure 
and logit link function, and with individual ID, eviction attempt and group as random 
intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
 Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
Females probability 
of a female 
being 
targeted for 
eviction 
intercept -1.53 1.81   
 relatedness to dominants     
 (males and females>3 years) 9.95 3.36 9.51 0.002 
 age -0.003 0.0005 39.98 <0.0001 
 weight 0.002 0.001 2.59 0.11 
  pregnancy status -0.61 0.49 1.63 0.20 
  rainfall -0.08 0.18 0.21 0.65 
  group size 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.63 
       
Males probability 
of a male 
being 
targeted for 
eviction in a 
mixed-sex 
eviction 
attempt 
intercept -5.01 2.88   
 relatedness to dominants     
 (males and females>3 years) 0.84 3.08 0.07 0.79 
 age -0.0004 0.0003 2.12 0.15 
 weight 0.002 0.002 1.65 0.20 
 male breeding status -0.43 0.49 0.80 0.37 
 rainfall 0.16 0.20 0.57 0.45 
 group size 0.03 0.04 0.42 0.52 
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Table 2. Eviction and relatedness to known aggressors. Investigating the effect of 
mean pairwise relatedness to known primary aggressors on eviction. Models 
predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for females (GLMM, N=131 
females in 19 eviction attempts in 4 groups) and males (GLMM, N=130 males in 11 
eviction attempts in 4 groups). Models were fitted using a binomial error structure and 
logit link function, and with individual ID, eviction attempt and group as random 
intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
 Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
Females probability of 
a female 
being 
targeted for 
eviction 
intercept 2.99 2.87   
 relatedness to primary      
 aggressors 5.47 2.87 3.85 0.0498 
 age -0.002 0.0006 12.85 <0.001 
 weight -0.0005 0.002 0.06 0.80 
  pregnancy status -1.07 0.68 2.72 0.10 
  rainfall -0.29 0.26 1.28 0.26 
  group size 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.57 
       
Males probability of 
a male being 
targeted for 
eviction in a 
mixed-sex 
eviction 
attempt 
intercept -5.28 1.32   
 relatedness to primary      
 aggressors 2.30 3.24 0.54 0.46 
 age -0.0001 0.0004 0.06 0.80 
 weight 0.002 0.002 0.64 0.42 
 male breeding status -0.58 0.64 0.86 0.35 
 rainfall 0.21 0.24 0.74 0.39 
 group size 0.06 0.05 1.52 0.22 
 
 
We did not find evidence that this pattern of negative kin discrimination was an 
attempt to reduce inbreeding between targeted females and dominant males. We 
tested the effect of relatedness to same-sex and opposite-sex dominants and found 
that it was relatedness of females to female dominants, not male dominants, that 
predicted whether they were targeted for eviction. Females were more likely to be 
targeted if they were more closely related to female dominants (females older than 3 
years; GLMM, β ± SE=5.10 ± 2.65, χ21=4.07, p=0.044; Table 3), but not if they were 
more closely related to male dominants (males older than 3 years; GLMM, β ± SE=3.69 
± 2.55, χ21=2.09, p=0.15; Table 3). Behavioural data indicate that females are almost 
entirely responsible for the attempts at eviction of other females: males rarely 
attacked females in female-only eviction attempts (GLMM, β ± SE=1.80 ± 0.56, 
χ21=12.48, p<0.001; Figure 1b; Table 4). Previous work indicates that eviction attempts 
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are triggered when the level of reproductive competition in the group is high, not 
when the potential for inbreeding is high (Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2); and that 
both sexes use kin discrimination during mating to avoid inbreeding (Sanderson et al. 
2015b). 
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Table 3. Eviction and relatedness to same-sex and opposite-sex dominants. 
Investigating the effect of mean pairwise relatedness to same-sex and opposite-sex 
dominants on eviction. Models predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction 
for females (GLMM, N=198 females in 27 eviction attempts in 5 groups) and males 
(GLMM, N=177 males in 15 eviction attempts in 5 groups). Models were fitted using a 
binomial error structure and logit link function, and with individual ID, eviction attempt 
and group as random intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
 Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
Females probability of 
a female 
being 
targeted for 
eviction 
intercept 0.39 1.72   
 relatedness to male      
 dominants (males>3 years) 3.69 2.55 2.09 0.15 
 age -0.002 0.005 34.49 <0.0001 
 weight 0.002 0.001 0.66 0.20 
 pregnancy status -0.67 0.50 1.91 0.17 
 rainfall -0.03 0.18 0.021 0.88 
 group size 0.002 0.04 0.001 0.98 
       
Females probability of 
a female 
being 
targeted for 
eviction 
intercept -0.01 1.78   
 relatedness to female      
 dominants (females>3 years) 5.10 2.65 4.07 0.044 
 age -0.002 0.0005 32.58 <0.0001 
 weight 0.002 0.001 1.80 0.18 
 pregnancy status -0.59 0.51 1.45 0.23 
 rainfall -0.05 0.18 0.06 0.81 
 group size 0.0004 0.04 -0.01 1.00 
       
Males probability of 
a male being 
targeted for 
eviction in a 
mixed-sex 
eviction 
attempt 
intercept -4.90 2.93   
 relatedness to male      
 dominants (males>3 years) -0.82 2.87 0.08 0.77 
 age -0.0004 0.0003 2.41 0.12 
 weight 0.002 0.002 1.70 0.19 
 male breeding status -0.48 0.49 0.97 0.33 
 rainfall 0.18 0.20 0.71 0.40 
 group size 0.03 0.04 0.48 0.49 
       
Males probability of 
a male being 
targeted for 
eviction in a 
mixed-sex 
eviction 
attempt 
intercept -5.34 2.84   
 relatedness to female      
 dominants (females>3 years) 2.88 2.50 1.41 0.24 
 age -0.0003 0.0003 1.26 0.26 
 weight 0.002 0.002 1.78 0.18 
 male breeding status -0.47 0.50 0.89 0.35 
 rainfall 0.11 0.22 0.25 0.62 
 group size 0.02 0.04 0.34 0.56 
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Table 4. Sex-specific aggression during eviction attempts. Model predicting the 
number of male and female primary aggressors in female-only and mixed-sex eviction 
attempts (GLMM, N=26 eviction attempts in 6 groups). Model was fitted using a 
Poisson error structure and a log link function, and with eviction attempt and group as 
random intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. a reference level = males,  b 
reference level = mixed-sex eviction attempt. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept 0.93 0.17   
sex of primary aggressor a -1.89 0.48   
eviction type b -0.28 0.27   
sex of primary aggressor a x     
eviction type b 1.80 0.56 12.48 <0.001 
 
 
Among males, by contrast with females, there was no effect of an individual’s mean 
pairwise relatedness to dominant group members (males and females older than 3 
years) on the probability of being subject to an eviction attempt (mixed-sex eviction 
attempts: GLMM, β ± SE=0.84 ± 3.08, χ21=0.07, p=0.79; Table 1). We found no evidence 
of any discrimination as to which males were targeted for eviction (Table 1). There was 
also no discrimination of any kind when we restricted our analysis to cases where the 
identity of primary aggressors was known (Table 2), or when we tested the effect of 
mean pairwise relatedness to same-sex and opposite-sex dominants (Table 3). Unlike 
the case for female-only eviction attempts, both males and females were primary 
aggressors in eviction attempts directed at both sexes (GLMM, β ± SE=1.80 ± 0.56, 
χ21=12.48, p<0.001; Figure 1b; Table 4). 
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Explaining negative kin discrimination: a model 
 
Consider the interaction between two individuals, the first of whom (Player 1) may 
perform a selfish act at the other’s expense, such as stealing a food item, killing 
offspring, or, in the case with which we are concerned, evicting the other from the 
territory or group. We suppose that this act entails some fitness cost to the actor, 
denoted c1, but that the cost is outweighed by the benefit to be gained, b1 > c1. The 
act, if carried out, also deprives the recipient, Player 2, of a benefit b2 that it would 
otherwise enjoy. If the two individuals are related by a coefficient r, then Hamilton’s 
rule tells us that the act will be favoured by selection provided that b1 – c1 – r b2 > 0. 
Consequently, selfishness will never be directed toward a closer relative where it 
would not also be directed toward a more distant one. 
 
Suppose, however, that if Player 1 attempts the selfish act, Player 2 may then choose 
to resist. Resistance ensures that the act will fail; Player 1 will still suffer the cost c1 of 
attempting the act, but will not enjoy the benefit b1 of success, nor will Player 2 suffer 
the consequent loss of benefit b2. At the same time, resistance entails a fitness cost to 
Player 2 of c2. This situation may be modelled as a two-step, sequential game, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. A sequential model of aggression and resistance. Player 1 (blue) first 
chooses whether or not to attempt a selfish act at the expense of Player 2 (red); in the 
event of such an attempt, Player 2 then chooses whether or not to resist. Direct fitness 
payoffs to both players are shown in their respective colours. 
 
 
How does relatedness affect the outcome of this game? Applying Hamilton’s rule once 
again, if c2 > b2 – r b1, then the cost of resistance to Player 2 outweighs the benefit of 
preventing a selfish act. Under these circumstances, Player 2 will submit, and selection 
once again favours performance of the selfish act provided that b1 – c1 – r b2 > 0. If, by 
contrast c2 < b2 – r b1, then Player 2 will resist, and selection consequently does not 
favour the selfish act. Since a more closely related recipient of the selfish act may 
prefer to submit where a more distantly related recipient would resist, it follows that 
selfishness may be directed toward a closer relative where it would not be directed 
toward a more distant one. To be precise, if we consider two levels of relatedness, rhigh 
and rlow (rlow < rhigh), then provided that 
𝑏1 − 𝑐1
𝑏2
> 𝑟high >
𝑏2 − 𝑐2
𝑏1
> 𝑟low 
then the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game features targeting of a selfish act 
towards a recipient related to the actor by rhigh, but not towards  a recipient related by 
rlow. To illustrate, suppose b1=b2=1, c1=0.25 and c2=0.75; then the model predicts that a 
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recipient of low relatedness (rlow<0.25) would resist a selfish act, and hence should not 
be targeted, while a recipient of higher relatedness (0.75>rhigh>0.25) will submit, and 
so should be targeted. 
 
Unrelated recipients are more likely to resist a selfish act, favouring preferential 
targeting of more closely related victims, when c2 (the cost of resistance) is small, and 
b2 (the benefit to be retained) is large. These effects are illustrated in Figure 3. If c2 is 
typically too large, or b2 too small, even unrelated recipients are unlikely to resist, 
favouring indiscriminate selfishness; only for smaller values of c2 or larger values of b2 
is negative kin discrimination predicted. 
 
 
Figure 3. Impact of model parameters on patterns of kin discrimination. Here we 
focus on a region of parameter space in which Player 1 should carry out the selfish act 
when unopposed, but in which Player 2 may do best to resist (i.e. b1 – c1 – r b2 > 0). 
We show the probability that, at equilibrium, the actor attempts a selfish act, as a 
function of relatedness, when c2 is drawn from a normal distribution with specified 
mean and standard deviation equal to 0.2. (a) Probability that a selfish act is 
attempted at equilibrium, assuming that b1=1, c1=0.1, b2=0.5 and mean c2̄ as 
specified for the plotted curves. (b)  Probability that a selfish act is attempted at 
equilibrium, assuming that b1=1, c1=0.1, c2̄=0.5, and b2 is as shown in the plot.  
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Testing model predictions 
 
Two specific predictions of the model are: (1) that selfish acts will be directed 
preferentially towards closer relatives only when recipients can resist; and (2) that 
resistance to selfish acts offered by recipients should decrease as their relatedness to 
the actor increases. After we had developed the model, we tested these predictions. 
To test the first prediction, we examined how the effect of relatedness varied with the 
age and weight of potential evictees. We tested the effect of two-way interactions 
between female relatedness to dominants (males and females older than 3 years) and 
age, and female relatedness to dominants and weight on a female’s probability of 
being targeted for eviction. Our reasoning was that younger or lighter females should 
be less able to resist eviction attempts, and that the pattern of negative kin 
discrimination should therefore be more pronounced when eviction is targeted at 
older or heavier individuals. We found that older females were indeed more likely to 
be targeted for eviction when more closely related to dominants, but that no such 
effect of relatedness was apparent for younger females (interaction between 
relatedness and age: GLMM, β ± SE=0.008 ± 0.004, χ21=5.98, p=0.014; Figure 4a; Table 
5). The strong overall positive relationship between the probability of being targeted 
for eviction and relatedness was thus driven almost entirely by the pattern in older 
females. A similar interaction was also found between relatedness and weight (GLMM, 
β ± SE=0.03 ± 0.02, χ21=5.63, p=0.018; Table 5). Consistent with prediction (1), 
therefore, negative kin discrimination was restricted to cases in which the targets of 
eviction were older or heavier, and potentially more capable of offering resistance. As 
predicted by our model, we found no discrimination on the basis of relatedness for 
cases where the targets of eviction were younger or lighter, and therefore likely to 
suffer high costs of resistance (a high value of c2̄; Figure 3a). 
 
In order to investigate whether this model had greater explanatory power than the 
model in our original analysis, which included main effects only, we performed a 
model comparison using an information-theoretic approach (Burnham & Anderson 
2002). We ranked the two models by corrected AIC (AICc) (since N/k < 40, where N is 
the sample size and k is the number of parameters in the maximal model; Burnham & 
Anderson 2002). We found that the model including the interactions between 
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relatedness and age, and relatedness and weight, had greater explanatory power than 
the model containing only main effects (Table 6). The model including the interaction 
terms had an Akaike’s model weight of over 99% (Table 6). Thus the result that the 
effect of relatedness on the probability of being targeted for eviction varies 
significantly with age, displayed in Table 5 and Figure 4a, supersedes the initial 
motivating result that relatedness has a significant effect independent of age, 
displayed in Table 1 and Figure 1a. Therefore, negative kin discrimination in banded 
mongooses in the context of eviction is restricted to older females. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Patterns of kin discrimination towards recipients capable of offering varying 
levels of resistance. (a) In eviction attempts, dominants (males and females older than 
3 years) exhibit negative kin discrimination only towards older females (N=207 females 
in 29 eviction attempts in 5 groups). The lines show the predictions from the GLMM (± 
standard error) for younger females (dotted line and light grey shaded area, 25th 
percentile of age=522 days) and older females (solid line and dark grey shaded area, 
75th percentile of age=1636 days). (b) Following an attempt at eviction, older females 
who were more related to dominants (males and females older than 3 years) were less 
successful in regaining entry to the group (N=76 females in 14 eviction attempts in 4 
groups); this pattern was reversed in younger females. The lines show the predictions 
from the GLMM (± standard error) for younger females (dotted line and light grey 
shaded area, 25th percentile of age=446 days) and older females (solid line and dark 
grey shaded area, 75th percentile of age=922 days). 
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Table 5. Kin discrimination in eviction and the capacity of recipients to resist. 
Investigating how the effect of relatedness on eviction varies with age and weight of 
potential evictees. Model predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for 
females (GLMM, N=207 females in 29 eviction attempts in 5 groups). Model was fitted 
using a binomial error structure and logit link function, and with female ID, eviction 
attempt and group as random intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept 5.88 3.31   
relatedness to dominants     
(males and females>3 years) -39.36 19.14   
age -0.005 0.001   
weight -0.001 0.002   
pregnancy status -0.60 0.52 1.41 0.24 
rainfall -0.10 0.19 0.20 0.65 
group size -0.0003 0.04 -0.08 1.00 
relatedness to dominants     
(males and females>3 years) x     
age 0.008 0.004 5.98 0.014 
weight 0.03 0.02 5.63 0.018 
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Table 6. Model comparison of models investigating negative kin discrimination. Models predicting the probability of being targeted for eviction for 
females (GLMM, N=207 females in 29 eviction attempts in 5 groups). Model 1 is the model from the original analysis investigating negative 
discrimination in banded mongooses (Table 1; Figure 1a). Model 2 is the model from the analysis testing prediction (1) of the theoretical model 
(Table 5; Figure 4a). Models were fitted using a binomial error structure and logit link function, and with female ID, eviction attempt and group as 
random intercepts. 
 Int. Rel. Age Weight Preg. R’fall G’size Rel.: Age Rel.: Weight k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi 
Model 2 5.88 -39.36 -0.005 -0.001 -0.60 -0.10 0.00 0.008 0.031 12 -84.53 194.68 0.00 0.999 
Model 1 -1.53 9.95 -0.003 0.002 -0.61 -0.08 0.02   10 -93.44 208.00 13.32 0.001 
Columns 2 to 10 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; Rel. = relatedness; Preg. = pregnant; R’fall = rainfall; G’size = group 
size; : = interaction. k = number of estimated parameters including random intercepts for female, eviction and group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AICc = 
corrected Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAIC = change in AICc value from the best performing model; wi = Akaike’s model weight. Blank cells indicate that the 
term was absent from that model. 
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To test further whether negative kin discrimination depends on the capacity of 
recipients to resist, we also examined kin discrimination in cases of infanticide of new 
born pups. Between one and 12 females reproduce in each breeding attempt (Cant et 
al. 2014) and birth is highly synchronised, with pregnant females giving birth on exactly 
the same morning in 63% of cases (Hodge et al. 2011). Experimental and observational 
evidence suggest that asynchronous litters are often killed by dominant females 
(Hodge et al. 2011; Cant et al. 2014). In asynchronous litters, we tested whether a 
mother’s relatedness to dominant females (older than 3 years) predicted the 
probability that her litter died in the first week after birth (as a proxy for infanticide; 
Hodge et al. 2011; Cant et al. 2014). By contrast with the negative kin discrimination 
described above for eviction of adult females, there was no evidence of kin 
discrimination in cases of presumed infanticide (GLMM, β ± SE=-0.64 ± 2.00, χ21=0.10, 
p=0.75; Table 7). This is again consistent with our model, which predicts zero or 
positive kin discrimination where resistance is impossible or prohibitively costly (Figure 
2; Figure 3a). 
 
Table 7. Kin discrimination in infanticide. Investigating whether negative kin 
discrimination depends on the recipient’s capacity to resist. Model predicting the 
probability of a female’s litter being killed in an infanticidal attack by dominant females 
in the first week after birth (GLMM, N=57 females giving birth to 52 communal litters 
in 12 groups). Model was fitted using a binomial error structure and logit link function, 
and with female ID, litter and group as random intercepts. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept 0.39 1.29   
mother’s relatedness to female dominants     
(females>3 years) -0.64 2.00 0.10 0.75 
mother’s age -0.0002 0.0005 0.26 0.61 
rainfall 0.29 0.23 2.01 0.16 
group size -0.04 0.04 0.95 0.33 
 
 
To test the second prediction, that resistance to the selfish act should decrease as the 
recipient’s relatedness to the actor increases, we examined the effects of relatedness 
to dominants (males and females older than 3 years) and age on the probability of 
females targeted for eviction overcoming efforts to permanently exclude them from 
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the group. After being targeted for eviction, some individuals leave the group, splitting 
into single-sex cohorts and dispersing separately in cases where males and females are 
evicted together. Other targeted individuals, however, actively resist eviction: they 
persist in following the rest of the group, despite being aggressively driven away, until 
efforts to expel them eventually cease (Cant et al. 2001). Some attempts at eviction 
may thus be said to ‘fail’, largely due to sheer persistence on the part of the potential 
evictees. We predicted, therefore, that the probability of resisting eviction and 
regaining entry to the group should decline with relatedness to dominant individuals, 
particularly among older females who are potentially more capable of resisting 
eviction. Consistent with this prediction, among older females, individuals that were 
more closely related to dominants were less likely to regain entry to the group. Among 
younger females, by contrast, less closely related targets were less likely to regain 
entry (interaction between relatedness and age: GLMM, β ± SE=-0.0. ± 0.01, χ21=5.96, 
p=0.015; Figure 4b; Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Resistance to eviction and relatedness. Investigating whether resistance 
offered by the recipient decreases as relatedness increases. Model predicting the 
probability of targeted females overcoming efforts to permanently evict them (GLMM, 
N=76 females in 14 eviction attempts in 4 groups). Model was fitted using a binomial 
error structure and logit link function, and with female ID, eviction attempt and group 
as random intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept -4.09 1.95   
relatedness to dominants 
(males and females>3 years) 
23.36 9.76   
age 0.004 0.002   
relatedness to dominants 
(males and females>3 years) x 
    
age -0.03 0.01 5.96 0.015 
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Discussion 
 
We have shown in very general terms that where recipients can offer resistance, 
individuals can gain from targeting selfish acts at closer, rather than more distant, 
relatives. In the particular case of eviction in banded mongooses, this model may 
therefore explain why dominant females exhibit negative kin discrimination when 
targeting older females, who are most capable of resistance, for violent attacks and 
eviction. We found no evidence of kin discrimination when targeting younger females 
for eviction, or when targeting helpless pups for infanticide. Further tests of the model 
could adopt an experimental approach to manipulate resistance or the costs and 
benefits of selfishness, which was not possible in our long-term field study.  
 
While our findings offer qualified support for the predictions of our model, it is 
important to consider alternative explanations for our results. For example, there has 
been much recent theoretical interest in the possibility that local competition among 
kin can erode selection for local helping and instead favour indiscriminate harming 
behaviour (West, Pen & Griffin 2002; Lehmann & Rousset 2010). A prediction of these 
models is that, across groups or species, rates of aggression may be independent of 
relatedness (West et al. 2001, 2002). However, these models cannot explain the 
targeting of closer kin for aggression when less closely related, but otherwise 
equivalent targets are available (i.e. our result that, among older females, more closely 
related females are preferentially targeted for eviction when less closely related 
females are available to target). A second possibility is that relatedness is correlated 
with some other factor influencing aggression, such as resource holding potential 
(RHP) or the level of reproductive competition. For example, in sea anemones, higher 
aggression among closer relatives has been attributed to their greater similarity in RHP 
(Foster & Briffa 2014). In banded mongooses, there is no evidence that related females 
are of higher RHP, or represent more of a reproductive threat. In fact, younger females 
(with lower RHP, and who reproduce less often) are more likely to be targeted for 
eviction overall, regardless of relatedness (Figure 4a). Moreover, our data show that 
dominant females do not suffer greater reproductive costs when they co-breed with 
more closely related subordinates (see Appendix B). Our findings also cannot be 
explained as a non-adaptive side effect of selection to discriminate between species of 
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heterospecific competitor, which has been suggested to explain negative kin 
discrimination in polyembryonic wasps (Dunn et al. 2014). 
 
Lastly, it has been suggested that targeting relatives for eviction could be part of an 
adaptive forced dispersal strategy by breeders to maximise metapopulation fitness in a 
structured population (Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). In a previous study we did 
not find support for this hypothesis as a predictor of eviction at a group level 
(Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this idea with 
our observations of negative kin discrimination among older females within a given 
eviction attempt. In classic models such as that of Hamilton and May (1977), dispersal 
entails direct costs for individuals who leave their natal patch, but is nevertheless 
favoured because it reduces local competition among kin. Because offspring value 
their own survival more than that of their siblings, while parents value all their 
offspring equally, offspring favour a lower dispersal rate than do their parents, and 
selection can therefore favour forced eviction of offspring (Motro 1983; Frank 1986; 
Taylor 1988). However, eviction by an adult of unrelated offspring offers equal 
benefits, in terms of reduced local competition, to eviction of related offspring, 
without inflicting the direct costs of dispersal on a relative. Hence, where adults can 
choose whom to evict, local kin competition alone cannot explain why they should 
preferentially target more related, over less related, older females for expulsion. There 
may be other asymmetries associated with the forced dispersal of kin versus non-kin, 
deriving, for example, from variation in local competitive ability, or variation in the bet-
hedging benefits of dispersal (Hidalgo, de Casas & Muñoz 2016), but the effect of such 
variation on forced dispersal in heterogeneous groups has been little explored 
theoretically or empirically (Young 2003; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). In banded 
mongooses, there is no evidence that closer kin compete more intensely (see 
Appendix B), or that forced dispersal of kin yields bet-hedging benefits. 
 
Among older females, unrelated females were more likely to regain entry to the group 
than related females, as we predicted on the basis of the differing inclusive fitness 
costs of resistance for strong individuals. However, among younger females, closer 
relatives were more likely to regain entry to the group than older or less closely related 
females (Figure 4b), which does not fit with our assumption that these females are 
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weaker and less able to force their way back into the group. This unexpected result 
suggests that factors other than strength or the costs of resistance may underlie the 
pattern by which younger females return to the group. For example, following eviction, 
dominants may voluntarily readmit closely related, younger females, that would 
otherwise fare very badly outside the group. The negotiation process by which females 
regain entry to the group may thus be more complex than the simple two-step 
sequence of eviction and resistance assumed by our model. While our analysis shows 
that even a two-step game can yield results that diverge from classical predictions, it is 
likely that many negotiations in family groups may better be modelled as a sequence 
of three or more steps, something we have not attempted here. 
 
Negative kin discrimination was evident only in eviction attempts of older females: in 
males we found no relationship between relatedness and the probability of being 
targeted for eviction. This difference between the sexes could reflect differences in the 
direct fitness incentive for males and females to retain group membership, which in 
our model is represented by the parameter b2 (Figure 1). Females gain greater direct 
fitness from group membership (i.e. higher b2) than males because there is little or no 
reproductive suppression, and most females breed from the age of 10 months (Cant 
2000; Gilchrist et al. 2004). In males, by contrast, most individuals are excluded from 
mating by the two or three oldest males within the group (Nichols et al. 2010). In our 
model, low values of b2 favour little or no kin discrimination (Figure 2b). A relatively 
low value of b2 in males compared to females may explain why males sometimes 
disperse voluntarily as a group, whereas females are invariably forced to leave after 
being subject to violent attack (Cant et al. 2016; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). 
 
More generally, our model shows that incorporating even very simple forms of 
behavioural anticipation can radically change the predictions of kin selection theory. 
Where such anticipation is possible, higher relatedness can lead to outcomes that are 
less favourable on average for all those involved, because the threat of resistance or 
punishment of selfish behaviour is less credible between relatives than between 
unrelated individuals. Many empirical studies have shown that animals are in fact 
capable of adjusting their behaviour according to the anticipated responses of their 
social partners in a range of contexts. Examples include signalling systems (Tibbetts & 
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Dale 2004), negotiation over care of offspring (Hinde 2006), restraint in competitive 
growth (Buston 2003b), and audience effects (Leaver et al. 2007). However, few have 
considered the possibility that this kind of anticipation might lead to less cooperative 
outcomes among closer kin. An example comes from economic studies of human 
behaviour in the context of joint-liability group lending, which have found higher rates 
of loan default when there are more relatives within a group (Sharma & Zeller 1997; 
Ahlin & Townsend 2007), leading to barring of remaining group members from future 
borrowing. This pattern has been attributed to the difficulty of group members 
imposing penalties on relatives to enforce repayment (see Hermes & Lensink 2007; 
Lamba 2014). Our results suggest that similar patterns might also occur in the 
behaviour of other species, and that the influence of kinship on aggression and 
cooperation within animal groups may be considerably more subtle and variable than 
predicted by classical kin selection theory.  
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Methods 
 
Study population and data collection 
Data were collected from 15 groups of banded mongooses living on the Mweya 
Peninsula, Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda (012’S, 2754’E), between 
September 1997 and October 2015.  For further details of habitat and climate, see 
(Cant et al. 2013). Groups were visited every 1 to 3 days to record group composition, 
life history and behavioural data. One or two individuals in each group were fitted with 
a VHF radio collar (Sirtrack Ltd., Havelock North, New Zealand) with a 20 cm whip 
antenna (Biotrack Ltd., UK) that enabled groups to be located. Individuals were easily 
identifiable by either colour-coded plastic collars or, more recently, unique shave 
markings on their back. Individuals were regularly trapped to maintain these 
identification markings (see Jordan et al. 2010 for details). On first capture a 2 mm skin 
sample was collected from the end of the tail using sterile scissors for genetic analyses. 
Individuals were trained to step onto portable electronic scales to obtain weight 
measurements. 
 
We observed the attempted eviction of 405 individuals from 8 groups in 44 eviction 
attempts between September 1997 and December 2012. Eviction attempts were 
conspicuous, violent events and easy to recognise. We defined an eviction attempt to 
have occurred if one or more individuals left their group for at least one day following 
a period of intense aggression towards themselves or other group members (Gilchrist 
2006; Cant et al. 2010; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). Rare instances where 
individuals left their group without any observed aggression towards any group 
member were defined as voluntary dispersal events and were not considered in our 
analyses. Groups were visited every day following an eviction attempt to record the 
identity of targeted individuals that returned to their group (if any). In 21 out of 44 
eviction attempts all targeted individuals re-joined their group; in 14 attempts some 
targeted individuals returned while others did not; and in 9 eviction attempts all 
targeted individuals dispersed. 
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Genetic analyses and calculating relatedness 
DNA was extracted from tail-tips and genotyped at up to 43 microsatellite loci isolated 
from a variety of carnivore species, including the banded mongoose. Genotyping was 
conducted following (Nichols et al. 2010) or (post-2010) using multiplex PCRs (Qiagen® 
Multiplex PCR Kit, UK) with fluorescent-labelled forward primers and were visualised 
through fragment size analysis on an ABI 3730 DNA Analyzer. For full details of 
genotyping methods, see Sanderson et al. (2015b). We assigned parentage using 
MasterBayes 2.51 (Hadfield, Richardson & Burke 2006), implemented in R 3.1.1 (see 
Sanderson et al. 2015b for further details). Estimates of pairwise relatedness were 
calculated from a 9-generation deep pedigree constructed using a combination of 
parentage and sibship assignments from MasterBayes 2.51 (Hadfield et al. 2006) and 
COLONY 2.0.5.7 (Jones & Wang 2010). Full details of pedigree construction are given in 
Sanderson et al. (2015b). 
 
Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were performed in R 3.3.0 (R Development Core Team 2014). We 
used generalised linear mixed effect models (GLMM) with a binomial error structure 
using a logit link function, or a Poisson error structure using a log link function, in the 
‘lme4’ package (Bates et al. 2012). Models fitted to Poisson data were checked for 
overdispersion of the response variable (Bolker et al. 2008). In all analyses, the 
maximal model was fitted, including all fixed effect terms of interest and biologically 
relevant interactions. We assessed the significance of each fixed effect by comparing 
the likelihood ratio of the maximal model to that of the model without the fixed effect 
(Bates et al. 2012). We present the parameter estimates and standard errors from the 
maximal models, rather than removing non-significant fixed effects from the model 
due to problems associated with stepwise model reduction (Forstmeier & Schielzeth 
2011). We did, however, remove non-significant interactions from our maximal model 
to allow the significance of the main effects to be tested (Engqvist 2005). 
 
(i) Analysis of patterns of eviction in banded mongooses 
Models were fitted to male and female data separately because not all eviction 
attempts involved males. To examine which females were targeted for eviction we 
considered adult females over 10 months old, since females younger than 10 months 
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are unlikely to be regular breeders and are rarely evicted (Cant 2000; Gilchrist et al. 
2004; Cant et al. 2016). We fitted whether or not a female was targeted for eviction 
during an eviction attempt as the binomial response variable in a GLMM. We included 
mean pairwise relatedness to dominants in the group, which we defined as males and 
females over 3 years of age, as a fixed effect. We used age as the criterion for social 
dominance because, in both males and females, individuals over 3 years of age are 
more likely to breed, have higher fertility, and appear to be socially dominant (Nichols 
et al. 2010; Cant et al. 2014, 2016; Sanderson et al. 2015a). For example, in males 
there is a clear age based dominance hierarchy, evident during oestrus (Nichols et al. 
2010; Sanderson et al. 2015a). In females, experiments show that suppressing 
reproduction in older females (> 3 years) results in the failure of the communal litter, 
whereas suppressing reproduction in younger females (< 3 years) does not (Cant et al. 
2014). Older females also breed more frequently (Cant 2000; Cant et al. 2016), and 
produce larger litters (Inzani et al. 2016). Age (days), pregnancy status at the time of 
the eviction attempt (pregnant or not pregnant), mean non-pregnant weight (grams) in 
the 60 days before the eviction attempt, mean rainfall (mm) in the 30 days preceding 
the eviction attempt, and group size (number of individuals over 6 months) were 
included as additional fixed effects. We controlled for repeated measures of 
individuals, eviction attempts and groups by including these terms as random 
intercepts, and fitted the model to data on 207 females in 29 eviction attempts in 5 
groups. To examine which males were targeted for eviction we considered adult males 
over 1 year old, since males under 1 year are unlikely to be regular breeders 
(Sanderson et al. 2015a; Cant et al. 2016) and fitted whether or not a male was 
targeted for eviction during an eviction attempt involving males (mixed-sex evictions) 
as the binomial response variable in a GLMM. We included the same fixed and random 
effects as the female model but, instead of pregnancy status, we included the male’s 
breeding status (whether or not the male had been observed mate-guarding or had 
sired pups in the breeding attempt during which the eviction attempt occurred), and 
fitted the model to data on 177 males in 15 eviction attempts in 5 groups. 
 
To investigate if the attempted eviction of relatives was in fact the result of inbreeding 
avoidance, we repeated the analysis of negative kin discrimination outlined above, but 
instead of including the mean pairwise relatedness to both male and female 
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dominants in the group, we used the mean pairwise to same-sex dominants aged over 
3 years and the mean pairwise relatedness to opposite-sex dominants aged over 3 
years as the measure of relatedness in separate models. All other fixed and random 
effects used in the original male and female analyses remained the same. We fitted 
the female models to data on 198 females in 27 eviction attempts in 5 groups, and the 
male models to data on 130 males in 15 eviction attempts in 5 groups. 
 
Aggressive interactions between individuals targeted for eviction and other group 
members during eviction attempts were numerous, but systematic data on the precise 
identity of aggressors and their victims was difficult to record. However, since 2000 we 
have noted ad libitum the identity of any individuals that were notably more 
aggressive than other group members toward potential evictees. Data on the identity 
and sex of 90 of these ‘primary aggressors’ were available for 26 eviction attempts. An 
individual received a single ‘count’ for each eviction attempt in which it was recorded 
as a primary aggressor. To investigate if there was a relationship between the sex of 
recorded primary aggressors and the sex of individuals targeted for eviction we fitted 
the number of primary aggressors observed in each eviction attempt as the Poisson 
response variable in a GLMM and included the sex of the primary aggressors, the type 
of eviction attempt (female-only or mixed-sex), and the interaction between these two 
variables as fixed effects. We included group identity and eviction attempt as random 
intercepts to control for repeated measures and fitted the model to 26 eviction 
attempts in 6 groups. 
 
To investigate the effect of relatedness to known aggressors on the probability of a 
female (or male) being targeted for eviction, we repeated the first analysis of negative 
kin discrimination outlined above, but restricted our analysis to eviction attempts 
where we had data on the identity of primary aggressors. In each of the female and 
male models we replaced mean pairwise relatedness to dominants in the group with 
mean pairwise relatedness to primary aggressors. All other fixed and random effects 
used in the original male and female analyses remained the same. We fitted the 
female model to data on 131 females in 19 eviction attempts in 4 groups, and the male 
model to data on 130 males in 11 eviction attempts in 4 groups. 
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(ii) Analysis to test model prediction (1): the selfish act will be directed preferentially 
towards closer relatives only when recipients can resist 
To test the first prediction of the model, we repeated the original analysis investigating 
negative kin discrimination among females in eviction attempts, but included two-way 
interactions between female relatedness to dominants (males and females aged over 3 
years) and age (days), and female relatedness to dominants and weight (grams). Other 
fixed and random effects remained the same as in the original analysis. We fitted this 
model to data on 207 females in 29 eviction attempts in 5 groups. Note that, following 
the model comparison described in the main text and presented in Table 6, the result 
of this analysis testing the first prediction of the theoretical model supersedes the 
result of the original motivating analysis presented in Table 1 and Figure 1a.  
 
To test further model prediction (1), we examined kin discrimination in cases of 
infanticide of new born pups. Infanticide is known to occur in this system, but is 
difficult to observe directly as it typically occurs in the den. In asynchronous litters, 
infanticide appears to be common because early life pup mortality is strongly 
dependent on the pregnancy status of other females in the group (Hodge et al. 2011; 
Cant et al. 2014): pups that are born early in  asynchronous litters almost always die in 
the first few days after birth, whereas pups born last almost always survive (Hodge et 
al. 2011). Between November 1997 and October 2015, we recorded the order in which 
each pregnant female gave birth in an asynchronous litter (i.e. if she gave birth first, 
middle or last) and recorded whether any of her pups survived the first week after 
birth. Following Hodge et al. (2011), we used the presence or absence of ‘babysitters’ 
(adults left at the den to guard newly born pups) to measure patterns of early life litter 
mortality. Specifically, to determine the survival of an individual female’s pups, we 
considered only females who gave birth early relative to the rest of the breeding 
females, and for which the failure of a specific female’s litter could be detected using 
cessation of babysitting (i.e. we did not consider females who gave birth when 
babysitting of other early birthing females’ pups was still ongoing). An individual 
female’s litter was determined to have survived the first week after birth if there were 
still babysitters being left 7 days after birth, or if she was retrospectively assigned 
maternity to at least one emergent pup from the communal litter following genetic 
analysis. We observed 166 females that fitted the criteria outlined above, who gave 
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birth to 120 asynchronous litters in 15 groups, and recorded whether each female’s 
pups survived the first week after birth. Where none of the female’s pups survived, 
they were assumed to have been subject to an infanticidal attack. To test whether 
pups are more likely to be targeted for infanticide when mothers are less related to 
female dominants in the group, we fitted whether or not each female’s pups survived 
the first week after birth (suggesting that they were likely to have been killed in an 
infanticidal attack) as the binomial response variable in a GLMM (0=no pups survived, 
1=at least one pup survived). We included the mother’s mean pairwise relatedness to 
female dominants older than 3 years of age, the mother’s age (days), group size 
(number of individuals over 6 months) and rainfall (mm) in the 30 days before birth as 
fixed effects. We controlled for repeated measures of mothers, communal litters and 
groups by including these terms as random intercepts, and fitted the model to data on 
59 females giving birth to 52 communal litters in 12 groups. 
 
(iii) Analysis to test model prediction (2): resistance to the selfish act offered by 
recipients should decrease as their relatedness to the actor increases 
To test this prediction we fitted whether or not a female over 10 months old that was 
targeted for eviction overcame efforts to permanently exclude them from the group as 
the binomial response variable in a GLMM. We only considered eviction attempts 
where some evictees were allowed to return and others were not due to problems 
with fitting a binomial model to outcomes that are exclusively successes or failures. 
We included mean pairwise relatedness to dominants (males and females over 3 years 
of age) in the group, female age (days), and the interaction between these two 
variables as fixed effects. We were unable to include additional fixed effects (such as 
weight and pregnancy status) in the model due to problems with model convergence 
using a small sample size. We controlled for repeated measures of individuals, eviction 
attempts and groups by including these terms as random intercepts, and fitted the 
model to data on 46 females in 14 eviction attempts in 4 groups. 
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Abstract 
 
In animal societies, conflict within groups can result in eviction, where individuals are 
often permanently expelled from their group. Most theoretical and empirical studies 
to date have focussed on the short-term fitness payoffs of eviction to individuals, but 
eviction could have demographic consequences that extend beyond those experienced 
by evictors and evictees. Here we investigate the consequences of eviction for 
individuals, groups, and intergroup relations in cooperatively breeding banded 
mongooses, Mungos mungo, using a 16-year dataset on life history and demography. 
In this species, groups of individuals are periodically evicted en masse and eviction is 
the primary mechanism by which new groups form in the study population. Following 
eviction, we find significant sex differences in dispersal distance, with females more 
successful in establishing a new group within the study area. Eviction results in 
changes in group size and composition, but we do not find subsequent long-term 
survival or reproductive costs associated with being evicted. We find evidence that 
permanent eviction increases the per capita reproductive success of females in the 
evicting group, suggesting that eviction can provide fitness benefits by reducing 
reproductive competition. We find that eviction is not associated with an increase in 
the intensity of intergroup conflict. Our results show that the demographic 
consequences of within-group conflict resolution strategies may reach beyond the 
individuals involved in eviction. These effects may have important implications for the 
structure and dynamics of groups and populations.  
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Introduction 
 
Conflict in social groups can be resolved by various means, a conspicuous form of 
which is eviction or forced expulsion. Eviction, although sometimes temporary, often 
results in the permanent exclusion of an individual, or cohorts of individuals, from their 
group (Balshine-Earn et al. 1998; Clutton-Brock et al. 1998; Buston 2003a; Kappeler & 
Fichtel 2012; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). The costs, benefits and respective 
fitness payoffs to evictors in employing eviction as a means of conflict resolution, and 
to evictees in being expelled, have been the focus of recent theoretical research 
(Johnstone & Cant 1999; Johnstone 2000; Hamilton & Taborsky 2005; Buston et al. 
2007; Chapter 3). Empirical studies have focused on the individual consequences of 
eviction, in particular the short-term fitness costs of eviction to evictors and evictees 
(Clutton-Brock et al. 1998; Young et al. 2006; Cant et al. 2010; Kappeler & Fichtel 2012; 
Bell et al. 2012). However, the costs and benefits of eviction are not always realised in 
the period immediately following eviction. In particular, longer term consequences are 
likely for evicted individuals who are forced to permanently leave their group, for 
evicting groups who experience considerable changes in group size, and for the wider 
population into which evicted individuals disperse. 
 
Eviction is likely to impose long-term costs on permanently dispersing individuals who 
are faced with the challenge of living outside their natal group (Dieckmann, O’Hara & 
Weisser 1999; Bowler & Benton 2005; Clobert et al. 2012). The fitness consequences of 
eviction for permanently evicted individuals depend on their success in establishing 
new groups and, where evicted cohorts are composed of same sex individuals, finding 
opposite sex individuals with whom to form a new group and successfully mate. 
Potential mates might voluntary leave established groups, or evicted individuals may 
try to immigrate into other groups, perhaps usurping group members (Pusey & Packer 
1987; Braude 2000; Jack & Fedigan 2004). Evicted cohorts and newly forming groups 
also require territory, mates and access to food resources in order to survive and 
reproduce. In a saturated population where groups form tessellating territories, 
establishing a territory may lead to frequent conflicts with other groups, and have 
perturbative effects on intergroup interactions in the wider population (Koenig et al. 
1992; Bonte et al. 2012; Travis et al. 2012).  The survival and reproductive success of 
Chapter 4: Demographic consequences of eviction 
93 
evicted individuals is dependent on overcoming these obstacles to establish a new 
group, but little is known about these consequences of eviction because tracking 
dispersing cohorts is logistically challenging and the long-term fate of evicted 
individuals is often unknown. 
 
One obvious consequence of permanent eviction is the step-reduction in group size for 
the evicting group, and changes in group composition when evicted individuals leave. 
In cooperatively breeding species, group size is an important determinant of a group’s 
ability to successfully raise offspring, and to defend themselves against neighbouring 
groups and predators (Courchamp 1999; Courchamp, Clutton-Brock & Grenfell 1999; 
Kokko et al. 2001; Kingma et al. 2014). Eviction is therefore likely to affect survival and 
reproduction in individuals that are allowed to remain in the group following an 
eviction. These longer term demographic effects of eviction for evictees and natal 
individuals will be a major determinant of decisions to evict, and decisions to resist 
eviction. To understand variation in the timing and frequency of eviction, and 
individual responses to eviction attempts, thus requires studies that can follow 
individuals over extensive periods, before and after eviction events. 
 
Here we investigate the demographic consequences of eviction in banded mongooses, 
a highly cooperative species that exhibits conspicuous conflict over reproduction and 
group membership. In this species, evictions of groups of females, and sometimes 
groups of males alongside them, are triggered by intense levels of intrasexual 
reproductive competition (Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). Over half (53%) of 
eviction events result in some or all of evicted individuals permanently dispersing from 
their group (Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). Females that are more closely related 
to dominants in their group are more likely to be targeted for eviction and, of evicted 
females, those that are more related to their dominants are more likely to 
permanently disperse (Chapter 3). Voluntary dispersal is very rarely observed in 
females, and is also uncommon in males: the vast majority of individuals are born and 
die in their natal group (Cant et al. 2016). Consequently, eviction is the primary 
mechanism by which new groups form in the population (Cant et al. 2016). 
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In our study population, banded mongooses live in groups of approximately 20 adults, 
plus offspring, and breed continuously throughout the year. A few older ‘mate-
guarding’ males aggressively monopolise access to females during oestrus (Nichols et 
al. 2010) and most females give birth in each breeding attempt (Cant 2000). Birth is 
highly synchronised within (but not between) groups (Hodge et al. 2011) and the 
communal litter is cared for by parents and non-parents of both sexes (Cant 2003; 
Gilchrist & Russell 2007). Individuals in our population have been continuously 
monitored for over 20 years, therefore we have extensive data on eviction, dispersal, 
group formation, and individual survival and reproductive success that allows us to 
examine the long-term demographic consequences of eviction. Here we examine the 
effects of eviction on (i) the dispersal fate of permanent evictees, (ii) the survival and 
fertility of evicted and non-evicted individuals, (iii) the size and composition of evicting 
groups, and (iv) other groups in the study area. In the discussion we evaluate the 
relevance of our findings for theoretical understanding of the role of demography in 
social evolution. 
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Methods 
 
Study population and data collection 
We studied a population of banded mongooses in 13 groups living on the Mweya 
Peninsula, Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda (012’S, 2754’E), between 
December 1996 and December 2012.  For further details of habitat and climate, see 
Cant, Vitikainen & Nichols (2013). Measurements of daily rainfall were recorded by the 
Uganda Institute of Ecology Meteorological Station and, later, using our own weather 
station. Groups were visited every 1 to 3 days to record group composition, life history 
and behavioural data. One or two individuals in each group were fitted with a VHF 
radio collar (Sirtrack Ltd., Havelock North, New Zealand) with a 20 cm whip antenna 
(Biotrack Ltd., UK) that enabled groups to be located. All individuals were uniquely 
marked by either colour-coded plastic collars or, more recently, shave patterns on 
their back and were regularly trapped to maintain these identification markings (see 
Jordan et al. 2010 for details). Individuals in the population were trained to step onto 
portable electronic scales to obtain weight measurements. 
 
Evictions were conspicuous, violent events and easy to recognise. We defined an 
eviction event to have occurred if one or more individuals left their group for at least 
one day following a period of intense aggression toward themselves or other group 
members (Gilchrist 2006; Cant et al. 2010; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). Instances 
where individuals left their group without any observed aggression towards any group 
member were defined as voluntary dispersal events and were not considered in our 
analyses. Groups were visited every day following eviction to record the identity of 
evictees that were allowed to return (if any). We observed 47 eviction events from 8 
groups in our population between December 1996 and December 2012 which resulted 
in the expulsion of 457 individuals (Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). Evictions were 
either temporary (whereby all evictees were re-admitted to the group), permanent 
(whereby all evictees permanently left the group), or mixed (whereby some individuals 
re-joined the group but others dispersed). 
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Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were performed in R 3.1.2 (R Development Core Team 2014) using 
generalised linear mixed effect models (GLMM) in the ‘lme4’ package (Bates et al. 
2012). In each analysis, the maximal model was fitted, including all fixed effect terms 
of interest and biologically relevant interactions. We assessed the significance of each 
fixed effect by comparing the likelihood ratio of the maximal model to that of the 
model without the fixed effect (Bates et al. 2012). We present the parameter 
estimates and standard errors from the maximal models, rather than removing non-
significant fixed effects from the model due to problems associated with stepwise 
model reduction (Whittingham et al. 2006; Mundry & Nunn 2009; Forstmeier & 
Schielzeth 2011). We did, however, remove non-significant interactions from our 
maximal model to allow the significance of the main effects to be tested (Engqvist 
2005). To compare individual, group and population effects before and after eviction 
we used paired t-tests where data was normally distributed, and paired Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests where data did not follow a normal distribution. 
 
 (i) Consequences of eviction for dispersing evictees 
To investigate the consequences of eviction for dispersing cohorts’ group size and 
composition, we compared the size and sex ratio of evicted cohorts, and new groups 
formed from evicted cohorts, with the evicting groups from which they originated. For 
each eviction event where at least some of the evictees dispersed permanently, we 
compared the size of the permanently evicted same sex cohort with the number of 
same sex individuals aged over 6 months in the group from which they were evicted 
(N=22 evicted female cohorts from 6 evicting groups, and N=8 evicted male cohorts 
from 3 evicting groups). We compared the size and sex ratio (individuals aged over 6 
months) of the newly formed group (the female evicted cohort and the males with 
which they joined in the 6 months after eviction) with that of the group from which 
they originated (N=6 new groups formed from female cohorts evicted from 3 groups). 
 
(ii) Consequences of eviction for survival and fertility 
To examine if eviction affected a female’s survival we compared the probability of 
surviving the 12 month period following eviction for females that were not evicted, 
temporarily evicted or permanently evicted (those that remained on the study 
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peninsula and for whom we had accurate life history data). We fitted whether or not a 
female was alive 12 months after eviction as the response variable in a GLMM using a 
binomial error structure and a logit link function. Eviction category (not evicted, 
temporarily evicted or permanently evicted) was fitted as the main term of interest, 
and female age (days), weight (grams) and mean rainfall (mm) in the 30 days before 
eviction were fitted as additional fixed effects. To account for repeated measures of 
groups, eviction events and females we included group identity, eviction event and 
female identity as random intercepts and fitted the model to data on 235 females in 33 
eviction events in 5 groups. Note that this analysis could not be performed on male 
data as no permanently evicted males remained on the study peninsula for longer than 
10 months and so we did not have sufficient life history data for these males. 
 
To investigate if eviction affected female reproductive success we compared the 
number of litters born in the 12 month period following eviction to females that were 
not evicted, temporarily evicted or permanently evicted (those that remained on the 
study peninsula and for whom we had accurate life history data). We fitted the 
number of litters to which a female gave birth in the 12 months after an eviction as the 
response variable in a GLMM using a Poisson error structure and a log link function. 
Eviction category (not evicted, temporarily evicted or permanently evicted) was fitted 
as the main term of interest, and female age (days), weight (grams), and the number of 
days that she was alive in the 12 months after eviction were fitted as additional fixed 
effects. To account for repeated measures of groups, eviction events and females we 
included group identity, eviction event and female identity as random intercepts and 
fitted the model to data on 296 females in 33 eviction events in 5 groups. We also 
investigated if eviction affected female lifetime reproductive success by repeating the 
above analysis but fitting the number of litters born to a female in her remaining 
lifetime following an eviction as the response variable. We included the same fixed and 
random effects as the previous analysis but instead of the number of days that the 
female was alive in the 12 months after eviction, we included the female’s remaining 
lifetime following eviction (in days) as a fixed effect, and we fitted the model to data 
on 296 females in 33 eviction events in 5 groups. 
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(iii) Consequences of eviction for the size and composition of evicting groups 
To investigate the effect of eviction on the evicting group we compared the size and 
sex ratio of the group (individuals aged over 6 months) before and after an eviction 
where at least some of the evicted cohort permanently left the group (N=23 
permanent evictions in 6 groups). To examine if eviction had an effect on the 
reproductive success of the evicting group we compared the number of pups that 
survived to emergence (per female that gave birth) in litters born before and after an 
eviction event. We restricted our analysis to post-eviction litters born in the same 
breeding attempt as the eviction event, i.e. litters born within 60 days of an eviction 
event (the approximate length of gestation; Cant 2000). We compared the number of 
pups that survived to emergence in a post-eviction litter with the number of pups that 
survived to emergence in the most recent pre-eviction litter (N=18 temporary evictions 
in 5 groups, and N=18 permanent evictions in 6 groups). 
 
(iv) Consequences of eviction for other groups in the study area 
To investigate the perturbative effects of eviction on the wider population we 
examined the frequency of intergroup interactions before and after an eviction. 
Intergroup interactions occur when neighbouring groups meet, and physical fights are 
particularly likely if the groups are evenly matched in size (Cant et al. 2002). Contests 
between groups are ferocious and individuals are often injured and die as a result of 
these fights (Cant et al. 2002; Gilchrist & Otali 2002; Jordan et al. 2010). We compared 
the frequency of intergroup interactions in all groups in the population, those involving 
the evicting group and those involving groups other than the evicting group in the 30 
days before and the 30 days after an eviction (N=41 eviction events in 8 groups). We 
also compared the frequency of intergroup interactions in these categories, but 
excluded any intergroup interaction that involved the evicted cohort to understand the 
effect that the presence of an evicted had on intergroup conflict in the population. We 
chose a period of 30 days because, as only 55% of evicted individuals remain on the 
peninsula longer than 30 days after eviction, any effects of dispersing evicted cohorts 
on the wider population are likely to be detectable during this period. We used the 
‘gao’ function in the package ‘nparcomp’ (Gao et al. 2008; Konietschke et al. 2015) to 
perform a nonparametric multiple test for many-to-one comparisons. This was 
because we compared the number of intergroup interactions after eviction (either 
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including or excluding the evicted cohort) to the number of intergroup interactions 
before eviction. To be conservative, we present the Bonferroni adjusted p-values.  
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Results 
 
(i) Consequences of eviction for dispersing evictees 
Following a mixed sex eviction (where both males and females were evicted), the 
permanently evicted group split into single-sex cohorts and dispersed separately, 
either remaining on the study peninsula or dispersing away from the area. Evicted 
males always dispersed from the peninsula within 10 months (median time to dispersal 
from the peninsula=22.5 days, range=0-296 days) and therefore were never successful 
in joining with a dispersing cohort of females to form a new group in the study area. 
The majority of evicted females dispersed away from the peninsula within 90 days 
(median time to dispersal from the peninsula=75 days, range=0-2436 days) but 32% of 
females that were permanently evicted were successful in forming a new group on the 
peninsula. A total of 6 new groups were formed by 29 permanently evicted females. 
They did this either by usurping all females from an established study group (N=1), 
joining with unknown immigrant males (N=2), joining with dispersing known males 
(N=1), or joining with dispersing known males and immigrant males (N=1). One cohort 
of 7 females remained on the peninsula for over 2 years without ever permanently 
joining with males. Despite this, all females in this cohort were reproductively 
successful, mating with males from established groups and giving birth to 7 communal 
litters over the course of their combined lifetime. 
 
Permanently evicted individuals experienced markedly different group environments 
after leaving their original groups. Males dispersed in cohorts that were on average 
42.3% ± 0.04% (mean ± SE) of the size of the male cohort in their natal group (paired 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, V=36, N=8, p=0.014; Figure 1a). For females this figure was 
36.8% ± 0.04% (mean ± SE) (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, V=253, N=22, p<0.0001; 
Figure 1a). New groups that were formed on the study peninsula by successfully 
dispersing female cohorts were significantly smaller than the group from which they 
originated (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, V=21, N=6, p=0.031; Figure 1b). However, 
the sex ratio of these newly formed groups was not significantly different to that of the 
original group (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, V=11, N=6, p=0.42). 
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Figure 1. Group size and composition of evicted cohorts and newly formed groups, 
compared with evicting groups. (a) The size of same-sex dispersing cohorts and the 
number of same-sex individuals in evicting groups for females (grey bars) and males 
(open bars) (N=22 evicted female cohorts from 6 evicting groups, and N=8 evicted 
male cohorts from 3 evicting groups). The bars show means ± standard error. (b) The 
size of evicting groups and groups newly formed from evicted cohorts (N=6 new 
groups formed from female cohorts evicted from 3 groups). The bars show means ± 
standard error. 
 
 
(ii) Consequences of eviction for survival and fertility 
We did not find evidence that eviction had adverse effects on female survival or 
reproduction. For those females that remained on the study peninsula (and for which 
we could record data on survival and reproductive efforts) there was no significant 
difference in the probability that they survived the 12 months after eviction compared 
to temporarily evicted or non-evicted females (GLMM, χ22=3.08, p=0.21; Table 1). 
There was also no significant difference in the number of litters produced in the 12 
months following eviction, or in a female’s lifetime after eviction, for non-evicted, 
temporarily evicted or permanently evicted females (reproductive success in 12 
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months after eviction: GLMM, χ22=0.34, p=0.84; Table 2; lifetime reproductive success 
after eviction: GLMM, χ22=1.23, p=0.54; Table 3). 
 
Table 1. Eviction and survival. Model predicting the survival of females in the 12 
month period following an eviction event (GLMM, N=235 females in 33 eviction events 
in 5 groups). Model was fitted using a binomial error structure and a logit link function, 
and with female, eviction event and group identity as random intercepts. Significant 
terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect  β SE χ2 p 
intercept  0.52 1.28   
eviction category not evicted 0.00 0.00 3.08 0.21 
 permanently evicted -0.40 1.05   
 temporarily evicted -0.98 0.57   
age  -0.002 0.0006 19.68 <0.0001 
weight  0.003 0.0008 13.78 <0.001 
rainfall  -0.013 0.017 0.64 0.42 
 
 
Table 2. Eviction and short-term reproductive success. Model predicting the number 
of litters born to females in the 12 month period following an eviction event (GLMM, 
N=296 females in 33 eviction events in 5 groups). Model was fitted using a Poisson 
error structure and a log link function, and with female, eviction event and group 
identity as random intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect  β SE χ2 p 
intercept  -3.17 0.35   
eviction category not evicted 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.84 
 permanently evicted 0.11 0.20   
 temporarily evicted 0.04 0.12   
age  0.0001 0.00009 2.31 0.13 
weight  0.001 0.0002 34.74 <0.0001 
days alive in 12 month period 0.007 0.0008 95.95 <0.0001 
  
Chapter 4: Demographic consequences of eviction 
103 
Table 3. Eviction and lifetime reproductive success. Model predicting the number of 
litters born to females in their remaining lifetime following an eviction event (GLMM, 
N=296 females in 33 eviction events in 5 groups). Model was fitted using a Poisson 
error structure and a log link function, and with female, eviction event and group 
identity as random intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect  β SE χ2 p 
intercept  -0.44 0.18   
eviction category not evicted 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.54 
 permanently evicted -0.21 0.19   
 temporarily evicted -0.06 0.11   
age  0.00007 0.0001 0.44 0.51 
weight  0.0004 0.0001 12.69 <0.001 
days alive after eviction event 0.0009 0.00008 121.82 <0.0001 
 
 
(iii) Consequences of eviction for the size and composition of evicting groups 
Following an eviction that resulted in the permanent dispersal of some, or all, of the 
evicted cohort, there was a significant reduction in the size of the evicting group 
(paired t-test, t22=6.68, p<0.0001; Figure 2a), and a significant increase in the sex ratio 
of males to females (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, V=67, N=23, p=0.030; Figure 
2b). Temporary evictions (where all evictees were allowed to return to the group) did 
not affect the reproductive success of the group. In litters born in the 60 days following 
a temporary eviction, there was no significant difference in the number of pups (per 
female that gave birth) that survived to emergence (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, 
V=77, N=18, p=0.66). However, more pups survived to emergence (per female that 
gave birth) when there was a step-reduction in group size following a permanent 
eviction (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, V=24, N=18, p=0.043; Figure 3). 
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Figure 2. Changes in group size and composition of evicting groups following eviction. 
(a) The size of evicting groups before and after a permanent eviction (N=23 permanent 
evictions in 6 groups). The bars show means ± standard error. (b) The sex ratio of 
males to females of evicting groups before and after a permanent eviction (N=23 
permanent evictions in 6 groups). The bars show means ± standard error. 
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Figure 3. Pup survival following eviction. The number of pups that survive to 
emergence, per female that gave birth, in the litter born before a  permanent eviction 
and in the first litter born within 60 days after a permanent eviction (N=18 permanent 
evictions in 6 groups). The bars show means ± standard error. 
 
 
(iv) Consequences of eviction for other groups in the study area 
Compared to the 30 days preceding an eviction, in the 30 days after an eviction there 
was no significant increase in the number of intergroup interactions when considering 
all groups in the population (estimator=0.10, degrees of freedom=79.5, test 
statistic=1.64, Bonferroni adjusted p-value=0.21); when considering only those 
interactions involving the evicting group (estimator=0.09, degrees of freedom=79.9, 
test statistic=1.53, Bonferroni adjusted p-value=0.26); or when considering only those 
interactions  involving groups other than the evicting group (estimator=0.08, degrees 
of freedom=79.9, test statistic=1.36, Bonferroni adjusted p-value=0.35). There was also 
no increase in the number of intergroup interactions following an eviction once the 
intergroup interactions involving the evicted cohort were excluded (all groups in the 
population: estimator=0.07, degrees of freedom=79.9, test statistic=1.17, Bonferroni 
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adjusted p-value=0.48; evicting group: estimator=0.07, degrees of freedom=80, test 
statistic=1.15, Bonferroni adjusted p-value=0.50; groups other than the evicting group: 
estimator=0.07, degrees of freedom=80, test statistic=1.09, Bonferroni adjusted p-
value=0.55). 
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Discussion 
 
Eviction in banded mongooses had consequences for dispersal, survival, and 
reproduction in the population, with effects on both evicted individuals and evicting 
group members. When eviction resulted in permanent dispersal, groups of evicted 
females occasionally formed new groups in the study area, whereas evicted groups of 
males did not. Groups that formed from an evicted cohort were significantly smaller 
than the evicting group from which they originated, and evicting groups also suffered 
substantial changes in size and composition. Surprisingly, we did not detect survival or 
long-term reproductive costs to evictees following eviction, in the sample of females 
that were successful in establishing a new group in the study site. For evicting groups, 
pup survival improved after a permanent eviction, suggesting that mass eviction is an 
effective method of reducing reproductive competition.  However, eviction was not 
associated with an increase in intergroup interactions in our population. Our results 
suggest that eviction can have consequences on demography in cooperative species, 
and that these effects can occur at an individual, group and population level. 
 
Eviction is the main mechanism by which individuals leave their natal group and is, 
therefore, the primary means by which new groups form in our population (Cant et al. 
2016). We found that evicted females tend to remain on the study peninsula for longer 
following eviction, and are more likely to be successful in establishing a new group in 
the study area than males. Whether this means that females are more successful 
dispersers overall, or that males simply travel longer distances before forming groups, 
requires further study, which may become possible with next generation Global 
Positioning System (GPS) technology. In other mammals, females that leave their natal 
group are often unable to join established groups without usurping female group 
members, and so the formation of new groups occurs on part of their natal group’s 
range (Ethiopian wolves, Canis simensis, Sillero-Zubiri & Macdonald 1998; meerkats, 
Suricata suricatta, Clutton-Brock et al. 2006; African lions, Panthera leo, VanderWaal, 
Mosser & Packer 2009; yellow-bellied marmots, Marmota flaviventris, Armitage et al. 
2011). Theory suggests that sex differences in dispersal can affect selection for helping 
and harming behaviours in structured populations (Johnstone & Cant 2008), due to 
effects on local competition and the genetic structure of the population (Gardner 
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2010). In general, these models predict that selection will favour helping among 
members of the more philopatric sex, and harming among members of the dispersing 
sex (Johnstone & Cant 2008). However, these models assume individuals disperse 
independently. Eviction of cohorts of same-sex individuals, as occurs in banded 
mongooses and other cooperative vertebrates (Koenig & Dickinson 2016), may 
influence selection for helping and harming in ways that have yet to be explored 
theoretically. For example, simple haploid, asexual models suggest that dispersal of 
groups of relatives (budding dispersal; Gardner & West 2006) may promote altruism 
within groups (Gardner & West 2006), but these effects have not been investigated in 
sexual systems. 
 
We found that eviction resulted in significant changes in the size and composition of 
groups to which individuals belonged. Permanently evicted females formed smaller 
groups following dispersal than the group from which they originated, although with a 
similar sex ratio. Group size is highly important for survival and reproductive success in 
cooperative species (Courchamp 1999; Courchamp et al. 1999; Kokko et al. 2001). We 
might expect, therefore, that eviction would have a major impact on the fitness of 
individuals in evicting groups and evictees in newly formed groups. However, we found 
no difference in survival or the number of litters to which a female gave birth following 
eviction for females that were evicted and permanently dispersed, females that were 
evicted and allowed to return to their group, or females that were not evicted. 
Previous studies in this species have shown that dominant females do experience 
reduced fitness in the form of decreased pup weight and reduced pup survival to 
independence when they evict individuals during their pregnancy (Bell et al. 2012), and 
evicted pregnant females often abort their litter (Cant et al. 2010). Our results indicate 
that survival and female reproductive success is not affected by eviction beyond short-
term negative effects on the subsequent litter. 
 
Previous work in this species has shown that eviction is a mechanism employed to 
reduce levels of intrasexual reproductive competition in both males and females (Cant 
et al. 2010; Thompson et al. 2016; Chapter 2). In banded mongooses, per capita female 
reproductive success is negatively affected as the number of breeding females grows 
large and competition between pups born in large communal litters intensifies (Cant et 
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al. 2010). Our results suggest that permanent eviction, which resulted in a significant 
reduction in group size, is successful in alleviating the level of competition among 
pups: pup survival to emergence was higher following a permanent eviction compared 
to the most recent pre-eviction litter. Permanent eviction, thus, appears to reduce 
reproductive competition among females in the subsequent litter, and most likely in 
several subsequent litters thereafter. In contrast to this pattern in females, permanent 
eviction increased the ratio of males to females, suggesting that eviction intensifies 
male-male competition for mates. Consequently, we might expect sexual conflict over 
eviction of females: dominant females gain from evicting subordinate females, but 
breeding males stand to lose potential mating partners. This may explain why males 
are rarely active evictors in female-only evictions, but are frequently active in mixed-
sex evictions (Chapter 3).  Given such sexual conflict, males might even be predicted to 
intervene to help subordinate females to resist eviction by dominant females. Future 
detailed behavioural data on the dynamics of eviction would help to reveal how 
potential sexual conflict over eviction is resolved. 
 
In conclusion, where within-group conflict resolution strategies result in the dispersal 
of individuals or cohorts, these processes are likely to have consequences beyond the 
reduction of conflict for individuals within the group. Both empirical studies of 
cooperative breeders and theoretical studies of social evolution in structured 
populations would benefit by broadening the scope of research to examine how these 
multi-level consequences of within-group conflict resolution affect the long-term 
demography and dynamics of groups and populations in viscous animal societies. 
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Abstract 
 
Conflict between groups is a notable feature of many animal societies. Recent 
theoretical models suggest that violent intergroup conflict can shape patterns of 
within-group cooperation. However, despite its prevalence in social species, the 
adaptive significance of violent intergroup conflict has been little explored outside of 
humans, Homo sapiens, and chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. A barrier to current 
understanding of the role of intergroup conflict in the evolution of social behaviours is 
a lack of information on the causes and consequences of aggression between groups. 
Here we examine the causes and fitness consequences of intergroup conflict in the 
banded mongoose, Mungos mungo, a highly cooperative species that engages in 
frequent violent contests between groups. We find that intensified competition for 
food and mates increases the frequency of aggressive intergroup interactions, but with 
no resulting costs to adult survival or fertility. Intergroup conflict did have fitness costs 
in terms of reduced litter survival, and groups were less able to recruit and grow in size 
when they engaged in more intergroup interactions. Our results suggest that 
intergroup conflict has measurable costs to both individuals and groups in the long- 
and short-term, and that levels of conflict among groups could be high enough to 
affect patterns of within-group cooperative behaviour. Establishing the consequences 
of intergroup conflict in cooperative species can shed light on patterns of conflict and 
cooperation within groups, and in turn, facilitate our understanding of social evolution.  
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Introduction 
 
Cooperatively breeding species have received much attention because the 
conspicuous helping behaviour they exhibit through the cooperative care of young 
offers an opportunity to test evolutionary theories of cooperation (Emlen 1991; Cant 
2012a; Koenig & Dickinson 2016). In many social species, individuals also demonstrate 
high degrees of cooperation and coordination in the form of coalitional aggression, 
which they employ to defend territories and fight neighbouring conspecifics 
(Hölldobler & Wilson 1990; Wilson & Wrangham 2003; Smith 2007). In humans, Homo 
sapiens, warfare and the coordination of huge armies to invade and battle rival 
societies has punctuated human history. Recent theoretical models of collective 
violence in humans suggest that the costs of intergroup conflict can drive the evolution 
of cooperative behaviour (Bowles 2006, 2009; Choi & Bowles 2007; Rusch 2014), and 
that out-group threats can lead to increased in-group cohesion (Puurtinen & Mappes 
2009; Gneezy & Fessler 2012; Burton-Chellew & West 2012). 
 
Violent conflicts are well documented among non-human primates, particularly 
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes (Wilson et al. 2004; Wrangham et al. 2006; Mitani et al. 
2010), but also in a range of other primate species (Gros-Louis et al. 2003; Aureli et al. 
2006; Harris 2010; Belle & Scarry 2015). Other than primates, aggressive interactions 
between groups are also reported in other social mammals (Mech 1994; Boydston et 
al. 2001; Mosser & Packer 2009; Cassidy et al. 2015), cooperatively breeding birds 
(Radford 2011; Golabek et al. 2012), and ants (Plowes & Adams 2005; Tanner 2006; 
Batchelor & Briffa 2011). Intergroup conflict is known to carry large potential costs 
(Wrangham et al. 2006; Jordan et al. 2010; Batchelor & Briffa 2011; Crofoot 2013) but, 
although conspicuous among a variety of animal species, the adaptive significance of 
intergroup conflict is still much debated. 
 
 Explanations for the evolution of collective violence suggest that, by engaging in 
attacks with rivals, a group can increase access to resources such as territory and food. 
Collective violence is selected for because groups that are successful in gaining these 
resources achieve enhanced reproductive success by outcompeting rivals (Durrant 
2011). Collective violence can therefore evolve by selection acting at the level of the 
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group (Hamilton 1975; Bowles & Gintis 2011). If there exist power asymmetries 
between neighbours then large groups can attack smaller groups at little cost, and so 
outcompete rivals (Wrangham 1999). Selection at the level of the individual may also 
favour contributing to collective violence, such that the forces of individual and group 
selection are aligned. By engaging in intergroup encounters, males can improve 
reproductive opportunities through increased access to females, and so collective 
violence has been suggested as a facultative male reproductive strategy (van der 
Dennen 1995), with selection for successful male ‘warriors’ (van Vugt 2009). In other 
cases, contributing to collective violence may represent a form of individual altruism, 
which is selected against at the level of the individual, but can spread through benefits 
to relatives of other local group members. Groups that contain ‘parochial altruists’ 
(individuals that cooperate with in-group members at a personal cost, and are hostile 
to out-group members) are more likely to be successful in securing resources 
important for reproductive success, relative to groups without these individuals (Choi 
& Bowles 2007). 
 
Empirical evidence that has been used to evaluate these hypotheses comes mainly 
from humans and chimpanzees (Wrangham 1999; Bernhard et al. 2006; Bowles 2009; 
Wrangham & Glowacki 2012), but has been little investigated among other species in 
which violent intergroup aggression exists. This is especially the case for cooperatively 
breeding species that exhibit levels of intergroup hostility sufficient to influence 
selection for helping behaviour (Cant et al. 2016), and where there is potential for 
intergroup conflict to influence demographic processes, such as migration, 
colonisation of new territory and population expansion (Lehmann & Feldman 2008). To 
improve understanding of the role of intergroup conflict in social evolution it is 
important to  establish the causes and consequences of intergroup conflict in species 
that feature  conspicuous levels of both cooperation and collective violence between 
groups (Lehmann & Rousset 2010). 
 
Banded mongooses, Mungos mungo, provide an ideal system to investigate the causes 
and consequences of intergroup conflict because they live in highly cooperative groups 
that actively defend territories, compete with neighbours for access to food and 
mates, and regularly engage in violent physical contests (‘intergroup interactions’) with 
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rival groups (Cant et al. 2013, 2016). Groups respond more aggressively to 
experimental stimuli from neighbours that represent a territorial threat (Müller & 
Manser 2007) compared to stimuli from non-neighbours. There is also observational 
evidence that males and females engage in intergroup interactions in order to achieve 
extra-group matings (Cant et al. 2002; Nichols et al. 2015). As in chimpanzees and 
humans, fights between groups are costly: individuals are often injured (sometimes 
fatally) and newly born pups have been observed to be killed by rival groups during 
these encounters (Müller & Bell 2009; Jordan et al. 2010; Nichols et al. 2015). 
 
Here we examine the factors that influence the frequency of intergroup conflict in 
groups of banded mongooses, and the fitness consequences of engaging in intergroup 
interactions for individuals and groups. Specifically, we investigate (i) the potential 
ecological and social triggers of intergroup interactions, and (ii) the survival costs to 
pups and adults, and fertility costs to pregnant females. 
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Methods 
 
Study population and data collection 
We studied a population of banded mongooses in a total of 38 groups living on the 
Mweya Peninsula, Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda (012’S, 2754’E), between 
November 1999 and January 2016.  For further details of habitat and climate, see Cant, 
Vitikainen & Nichols (2013). Measurements of daily rainfall were recorded by the 
Uganda Institute of Ecology Meteorological Station and, later, using our own weather 
station. Groups were visited every 1 to 3 days to record group composition, life history 
and behavioural data. One or two individuals in each group were fitted with a VHF 
radio collar (Sirtrack Ltd., Havelock North, New Zealand) with a 20 cm whip antenna 
(Biotrack Ltd., UK) that enabled groups to be located. All individuals were uniquely 
marked by either colour-coded plastic collars or, more recently, shave patterns on 
their back and individuals were regularly trapped to maintain these identification 
markings (see Jordan et al. 2010 for details). Individuals in the population were trained 
to step onto portable electronic scales to obtain weight measurements. 
 
Incidences of intergroup interactions in the population were recorded ad libitum. 
Intergroup interactions occur when neighbouring groups meet, and physical fights are 
particularly likely if the groups are evenly matched in size (Cant et al. 2002). 
Individuals, on sighting or discovering the smell of a rival group, stand upright and give 
a ‘screeching call’ that alerts the rest of their group and causes them to cluster 
together in preparation to attack. Where there are large size asymmetries between 
rival groups the smaller group often flees. Contests between groups are ferocious, with 
individuals chasing, scratching and biting each other (Rood 1975; Cant et al. 2002; 
Gilchrist & Otali 2002). 
 
Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were performed in R 3.1.2 (R Development Core Team 2014) using 
linear mixed effect models (LMM) or generalised linear mixed effect models (GLMM) in 
the ‘lme4’ package (Bates et al. 2012). LMMs were fitted using a normal error 
structure with an identity link function, and residuals were checked to ensure they 
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were normally distributed with constant variance. GLMMs were fitted using a Poisson 
or binomial error structure with log and logit link functions, respectively. Models fitted 
to Poisson data were checked for overdispersion of the response variable (Bolker et al. 
2008; Hilbe 2011). In each analysis, the maximal model was fitted, including all fixed 
effect terms of interest and biologically relevant interactions. We assessed the 
significance of each fixed effect by comparing the likelihood ratio of the maximal 
model to that of the model without the fixed effect (Bates et al. 2012). We present the 
parameter estimates and standard errors from the maximal models, rather than 
removing non-significant fixed effects from the model due to problems associated with 
stepwise model reduction (Whittingham et al. 2006; Mundry & Nunn 2009; Forstmeier 
& Schielzeth 2011). We did, however, remove non-significant interactions from our 
maximal model to allow the significance of the main effects to be tested (Engqvist 
2005). 
 
(i) Ecological and social causes of intergroup conflict 
Reproduction in banded mongooses is highly synchronised within, but not between 
groups, and so groups in the population can be in different phases of the reproductive 
cycle at different times. Most females in a group enter 5-10 day oestrus period within 
one week of each other and, once mated, gestate for between 55 and 60 days (Cant 
2000). Females give birth synchronously to a communal litter which is guarded at the 
den by ‘babysitters’ of both sexes for approximately 30 days before they emerge (Cant 
2003). We examined whether the probability of a group being involved in an 
intergroup interaction depended on their phase of the reproductive cycle, or ecological 
conditions including rainfall, population density and group size. We fitted whether a 
group was involved in an intergroup interaction on each day during the study period as 
the response variable in a GLMM using a binomial error structure. We included the 
group’s reproductive status (which phase of the reproductive cycle they were in on 
that day) as a fixed effect. A group was defined as being in oestrus when males were 
observed mate-guarding females, pregnant between the end of oestrus and birth of 
the communal litter, and babysitting when helpers were left to guard newly born pups 
at the den. A group was defined as non-breeding when not in oestrus, pregnant or 
babysitting. We also included mean rainfall (mm) in the previous 30 days, the density 
of the study population calculated as the number of individuals in the population aged 
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over 6 months/4.95 km2 (the size of the study area; Rood 1975; Gilchrist & Otali 2002), 
and group size (number of individuals aged over 6 months) as fixed effects, along with 
all two-way interactions between fixed effects. To account for repeated measures of 
groups we included group ID as a random intercept. During the breeding attempts of 
some groups there was an overlap in the phases of the reproductive cycle and, as such, 
days when a group was classed as being in two or more phases of the reproductive 
cycle. In order to be able to determine the effect of the different phases of the 
reproductive cycle on the probability of a group being involved in an intergroup 
interaction we first excluded days when a group was classed as being in multiple 
phases of the reproductive cycle and fitted the model to data on 42470 study days in 
39 groups. We then repeated the analysis including these days when a group was 
classed as being in multiple phases of the reproductive cycle, but randomly assigning 
the group a reproductive phase chosen from the multiple phases in which they were 
classed. For example, if a group was observed both as being in oestrus and babysitting 
on a particular day, they were randomly assigned to be in oestrus or babysitting. We 
fitted the model to data on 48831 study days in 39 groups. We found no qualitative 
difference in the results of these analyses and so we present the results from the first 
analysis in which the days on which a group was classed as being in multiple phases of 
the reproductive cycle were excluded. To determine differences in the probability of a 
group being involved in an intergroup interaction between all phases of the 
reproductive cycle, we conducted a post-hoc multiple comparison of means using the 
‘glht’ function with Tukey’s all-pairwise comparisons in the ‘multcomp’ package in R 
(Hothorn, Bretz & Westfall 2008; Hothorn et al. 2016). 
 
To further investigate the relationship between group size and the frequency of 
intergroup conflict we examined if the change in a group’s size influenced the number 
of intergroup interactions in which they were involved. We predicted that groups that 
are growing in size should be involved in more intergroup interactions. We fitted the 
number of intergroup interactions in which a group was involved during a 12 month 
period as the response variable in a GLMM using a negative binomial error structure 
(to account for overdispersion of the Poisson response variable). We only included 12 
month periods where we observed the group engaging in intergroup interactions. We 
fitted as fixed effects the group’s change in group size (number of individuals aged 
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over 6 months) over this 12 month period (group size at the end of the 12 month 
period – group size at the start of the 12 month period), group size at the start of the 
12 month period and the interaction between change in group size and starting group 
size. We confirmed that the level of correlation between change in group size and 
starting group size was less than levels suggested by Freckleton (2011) to cause model 
fitting issues such as inflated variance of effect estimates (correlation between change 
in group size and starting group size=-0.31). Additionally, we confirmed that the 
variance inflation factors (VIF) of the change in group size and starting group size 
variables were less than 2 (the conservative level suggested by Zuur, Ieno & Elphick 
(2010) to show problematic degrees of collinearity; VIF change in group size=1.24, VIF 
starting group size=1.50). We also included as fixed effects population density at the 
start of the 12 month period (calculated as the number of individuals in the population 
aged over 6 months/4.95 km2), mean monthly rainfall (mm) in the 12 month period, 
the interaction between starting population density and rainfall, and the number of 
oestrus events that the group has during the 12 month (as a proxy for reproductive 
frequency, and because groups are known to engage in intergroup interactions when 
females are in oestrus; Cant et al. 2002; Nichols et al. 2015). To account for repeated 
measures of groups we included group ID as a random intercept and fitted the model 
to data on 113 sample (12 month) periods in 16 groups. 
  
(ii) Costs of intergroup conflict to pups and adults 
To examine whether intergroup interactions resulted in decreased pup survival we 
fitted whether or not any pups in a litter survived to emergence (1=some pups 
survived to emergence, 0=all pups died before emergence) as the response variable in 
a GLMM using a binomial error structure. We included whether or not the group was 
involved in an intergroup interaction in the 30 days after the birth of the litter (the 
period in which newly born pups are babysat at the den; Rood 1974) as the main term 
of interest and fitted mean rainfall in the 30 days before the birth of the litter, group 
size, and the interaction between rainfall and group size as additional fixed effects. To 
account for repeated measures of groups we included group identity as a random 
intercept and fitted the model to data on 516 communal litters born in 19 groups. 
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To investigate if intergroup conflict had mortality costs for adults we split the analysis 
by sex and fitted a separate model for males and females, since the inclusion of sex as 
an explanatory variable in the full analysis caused model fitting problems. We fitted 
whether or not an individual aged over 1 year old survived a 30 day period as the 
response variable in a GLMM using a binomial error structure. We used a 30 day 
period to investigate survival in order to detect the potential immediate effect, in 
terms of injuries and subsequent death, of intergroup interactions on individuals. We 
restricted our analyses to 30 day periods where there was no intergroup interaction 
involving the group recorded in the 30 days prior. This allowed us to exclude potential 
effects of any other previous, recent intergroup interactions. In both models we 
included whether or not the group was involved in an intergroup interaction at the 
start of the 30 day period as the main term of interest. We fitted individual age, 
weight, group size, mean rainfall in the 30 days before the start of the 30 day period, 
and the interaction between group size and rainfall as additional fixed effects. We 
accounted for repeated measures of groups and individuals by including these terms as 
random intercepts and fitted the female model to data on 1373 females in 17 groups, 
and the male model to data on 2179 males in 15 groups. 
 
To examine if intergroup conflict has pre-natal costs, we fitted whether or not a 
pregnant female aborted her litter as the response variable in a GLMM using a 
binomial error structure. We included whether or not the group was involved in an 
intergroup interaction during gestation as the main term of interest, and fitted mean 
rainfall in the 30 days before pregnancy, the number of breeding females (females 
aged over 10 months; Gilchrist, Otali & Mwanguhya 2004; Cant et al. 2010) in the 
group, the interaction between rainfall and the number of breeding females, female 
age and weight as fixed effects. We accounted for repeated measures of groups, litters 
and females by including these terms as random intercepts and fitted the model to 
data on 502 females giving birth to 139 communal litters in 7 groups.  
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Results 
 
(i) Ecological and social causes of intergroup conflict 
We observed a total of 570 intergroup interactions in our population over the course 
of the study period. Groups were involved in 0.73 ± 0.2 intergroup interactions per 
month (mean ± SE). Groups were more likely to be involved in an intergroup 
interaction as population density increased, and this effect was more pronounced 
when rainfall was low (interaction between rainfall and population density: GLMM, β ± 
SE=-0.02 ± 0.005, χ21=7.79, p=0.0053; Figure 1a; Table 1). The probability of engaging in 
an intergroup interaction was greater for larger groups than smaller groups (GLMM: β 
± SE=-0.03 ± 0.006, χ21=23.71, p<0.0001; Figure 1b; Table 1). 
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Figure 1. Causes of intergroup conflict. (a) The effect of population density on the 
probability of a group being involved in an intergroup interaction on a given day. The 
lines show predictions from the GLMM ± standard error when rainfall is low (dotted 
line and light grey shaded area, 25th percentile of mean rainfall in the previous 30 
days=0.93 mm) and when rainfall is high (solid line and dark grey shaded area, 75th 
percentile of mean rainfall in the previous 30 days=2.91 mm) (N=42470 study days in 
39 groups). (b) The effect of group size on the probability of a group being involved in 
an intergroup interaction on a given day. The lines show predictions from the GLMM ± 
standard error (N=42470 study days in 39 groups). 
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Table 1. Ecological and social causes of intergroup conflict. Model predicting the daily 
probability of a group being involved in an intergroup interaction (GLMM, N=42470 
study days in 39 groups). Model was fitted using a binomial error structure and a logit 
link function, and with group ID as a random intercept. Significant terms are given in 
bold. 
Fixed effect  β SE χ2 p 
intercept  -7.29 0.63   
phase of reproductive 
cycle 
babysitting 0.00 0.00 21.40 <0.0001 
oestrus 0.70 0.18   
 pregnant -0.0009 0.11   
 non-breeding -0.18 0.14   
rainfall  0.60 0.20   
population density  0.07 0.02   
group size  0.03 0.006 23.71 <0.0001 
phase of reproductive 
cycle x  
babysitting 0.00 0.00   
oestrus 0.15 0.13   
 pregnant -0.04 0.07   
 non-breeding 0.02 0.09   
rainfall    3.43 0.33 
phase of reproductive 
cycle x  
babysitting 0.00 0.00   
oestrus 0.01 0.04   
 pregnant 0.02 0.02   
 non-breeding 0.009 0.03   
population density    1.22 0.75 
phase of reproductive 
cycle x  
babysitting 0.00 0.00   
oestrus -0.02 0.02   
 pregnant -0.02 0.01   
 non-breeding -0.03 0.01   
group size    4.41 0.22 
rainfall x      
population density  -0.02 0.005 7.79 0.005 
rainfall x      
group size  0.0008 0.003 0.09 0.76 
population density x      
group size  0.0007 0.0009 0.75 0.39 
 
 
The probability of a group being involved in an intergroup interaction varied 
significantly across different phases of the reproductive cycle (GLMM: χ23=21.40, 
p<0.0001; Figure 2; Table 1). Groups were more likely to be involved in an intergroup 
interaction when they were in oestrus than during any other phase (GLMM with post-
hoc Tukey’s all-pairwise comparison of means:  oestrus versus non-breeding: β ± 
SE=0.88 ± 0.18, z=5.01, p<0.001; oestrus versus pregnant: β ± SE=-0.70 ± 0.16, z=4.36, 
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p<0.001; oestrus versus babysitting: β ± SE=0.70 ± 0.18, z=3.82, p<0.001; Figure 2; 
Table 2). 
 
Figure 2. The probability of an intergroup interaction during the reproductive cycle.  
The probability of a group being involved in an intergroup interaction on a given day 
against the phase of the reproductive cycle they are in on that day (N=42470 study 
days in 39 groups). The bars show means from the GLMM ± standard error. Symbol: 
*** p<0.001; asterisks refer to post-hoc Tukey’s all-pairwise comparison of means 
across all four categories. 
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Table 2. Intergroup conflict during the reproductive cycle. Post-hoc multiple 
comparison of means with Tukey’s all-pairwise comparisons to determine differences 
in the daily probability of engaging in an intergroup interaction on different phases of 
the reproductive cycle (GLMM, N=42470 study days in 39 groups). Original model was 
fitted using a binomial error structure and a logit link function, and with group ID as a 
random intercept. Significant post-hoc comparisons are given in bold.  
 β SE z p 
oestrus vs non-breeding 0.88 0.18 5.01 <0.001 
pregnant vs oestrus -0.70 0.16 -4.36 <0.001 
oestrus vs babysitting 0.70 0.18 3.82 <0.001 
non-breeding vs babysitting -0.18 0.14 -1.30 0.55 
pregnant vs babysitting -0.0009 0.11 -0.008 1.00 
pregnant vs non-breeding 0.17 0.10 1.69 0.32 
 
 
Our analysis of the number of intergroup interactions in which a group was involved 
over a 12 month period and their growth (or decay) over the same 12 month period 
revealed that groups that grew in size were involved in more intergroup interactions 
than groups that shrunk in size (GLMM: β ± SE=0.03 ± 0.009, χ21=10.96, p=0.0009; 
Figure 3; Table 3). Groups that were larger at the start of the 12 month period were 
involved in more intergroup interactions over the 12 month period than smaller 
groups (GLMM: β ± SE=0.03 ± 0.01, χ21=12.09, p=0.0005; Table 3), but there was no 
significant difference in the effect of growth on the number of intergroup interactions 
for large and small groups (interaction between change in group size and starting 
group size: GLMM, β ± SE=-0.0001 ± 0.0007; χ21=0.03, p=0.87; Table 3). 
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Figure 3. Changes in group size and intergroup interactions. The number of intergroup 
interactions in which a group is involved over a 12 month period against the group’s 
change in group size over the 12 month period (N=113 sample (12 month) periods in 
16 groups). The vertical dashed line shows no change in group size. The line shows 
prediction from the GLMM ± standard error.  
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Table 3. Changes in group size and intergroup conflict. Model predicting the number 
of intergroup interactions in which a group is involved over a 12 month period against 
the group’s change in group size over the 12 month period (N=113 sample (12 month) 
periods in 16 groups). Model was fitted using a negative binomial error structure and a 
log link function, and with group ID as a random intercept. Significant terms are given 
in bold. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept -0.13 0.46   
change in group size 0.03 0.008 10.96 0.0009 
starting group size 0.03 0.01 12.09 0.0005 
population density 0.03 0.01 4.21 0.04 
rainfall 0.008 0.004 3.66 0.056 
number of oestrus 
periods 
-0.004 0.02 0.03 0.85 
change in group size x     
starting group size -0.0001 0.0007 0.03 0.87 
rainfall x     
population density -0.002 0.001 3.32 0.07 
 
 
(ii) Costs of intergroup conflict to pups and adults 
Pup survival was affected by the occurrence of intergroup conflict during the period in 
which pups were in the den. A communal litter was significantly less likely to survive to 
emergence if the group was involved in an intergroup interaction during the 30 days 
after birth (GLMM, β ± SE=-0.45 ± 0.20, χ21=5.01, p=0.025; Figure 4; Table 4). The 
occurrence of an intergroup interaction involving their group did not significantly 
affect male or female survival in a 30 day period. Neither males nor females were 
significantly more likely to die in a 30 day period following an intergroup interaction 
than in a 30 day period where there was no intergroup interaction (males: GLMM, β ± 
SE=0.05 ± 0.48, χ21=0.01, p=0.92; females: GLMM, β ± SE=-0.55 ± 0.0007, χ
2
1=1.50, 
p=0.22; Table 5). Pregnant females did not suffer pre-natal costs if their group was 
involved in an intergroup interaction during their gestation. In fact, a pregnant female 
was significantly less likely to abort her litter if her group engaged in an intergroup 
interaction during the period for which she was pregnant (GLMM, β ± SE=-1.29 ± 0.51, 
χ21=9.12, p=0.003; Figure 5; Table 6). 
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Figure 4. Litter survival following an intergroup interaction. The probability of a litter 
surviving to emergence against whether or not the group was involved in an 
intergroup interaction in the 30 days after the birth of the communal litter (N=516 
communal litters born in 19 groups). The bars show means from the GLMM ± standard 
error. 
 
 
Table 4. Intergroup conflict and litter survival. Model predicting the probability of a 
litter surviving to emergence (GLMM, N=516 communal litters born in 19 groups). 
Model was fitted using a binomial error structure and a logit link function, and with 
group identity as a random intercept. Significant terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept -0.25 0.29   
intergroup interaction -0.45 0.20 5.01 0.025 
rainfall 0.18 0.07 7.51 0.006 
group size 0.02 0.01 3.66 0.055 
rainfall  x     
group size 0.002 0.008 0.06 0.81 
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Table 5. Intergroup conflict and survival. Models predicting the probability of a 
surviving a 30 day period for females (GLMM, N=1373 females in 17 groups) and males 
(GLMM, N=2179 males in 15 groups). Models were fitted using a binomial error 
structure and logit link function, and with individual and group identity as random 
intercepts. Significant terms are given in bold. 
 Response Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
Females probability of 
surviving a 30 
day period 
intercept 1.01 0.0007   
 intergroup interaction -0.55 0.0007 1.50 0.22 
 age -0.003 0.0004 35.23 <0.0001 
 weight -0.0003 0.0006 -0.64 1.00 
  group size 0.09 0.0007 1.61 0.20 
  rainfall 0.19 0.0007 1.98 0.16 
  group size x     
  rainfall 0.03 0.02 1.29 0.26 
       
Males probability of 
surviving a 30 
day period 
intercept 0.38 5.22   
 intergroup interaction 0.05 0.48 0.01 0.92 
 age -0.007 0.003 49.88 <0.0001 
  weight -0.003 0.003 1.56 0.21 
  group size -0.27 0.08 22.46 <0.0001 
  rainfall 0.01 0.15 0.009 0.92 
  group size x     
  rainfall -0.03 0.02 -0.72 1.00 
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Figure 5. Female abortion following an intergroup interaction. The probability of a 
female aborting her litter against whether or not her group was involved in an 
intergroup interaction during gestation (N=502 females giving birth to 139 communal 
litters in 7 groups). The bars show means from the GLMM ± standard error. 
 
 
Table 6. Intergroup conflict and abortion. Model predicting the probability of a 
pregnant female aborting her litter (GLMM, N=502 females giving birth to 139 
communal litters in 7 groups). Model was fitted using a binomial error structure and a 
logit link function, and with female, litter and group identity as a random intercept. 
Significant terms are given in bold. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept 3.28 1.47   
intergroup interaction -1.29 0.51 9.12 0.003 
rainfall -0.27 0.16 2.92 0.09 
number of breeding females -0.007 0.09 0.005 0.94 
age -0.0004 0.0003 2.87 0.09 
weight -0.003 0.001 7.58 0.006 
rainfall  x     
number of breeding females 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.71 
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Discussion 
 
Intergroup conflict in banded mongooses, manifested in violent interactions between 
neighbouring groups, was widespread in our population and groups were regularly 
involved in contests with one another. The probability of a group being involved in an 
intergroup interaction on a given day increased when population density was high and 
rainfall was low: two factors that increase ecological competition for limited resources. 
Larger groups were more likely to be involved in intergroup conflict than smaller 
groups, and our results suggest that groups were involved in more intergroup 
interactions during periods when they grew in size. The probability of a group being 
involved in an intergroup interaction on a given day also depended on the phase of the 
reproductive cycle that they were in, with groups most likely to be involved in an 
intergroup interaction when their females were in oestrus. Intergroup conflict resulted 
in fitness costs, through reduced litter survival, but did not affect adult fertility or 
survival. These results show that intergroup conflict has measurable costs to both 
offspring survival and group recruitment, and suggest that the consequences of 
intergroup conflict can have important effects on individual fitness and group 
dynamics. 
 
In our population, intensified population-wide resource competition was associated 
with a greater probability of being involved in aggressive contests with other groups. 
Low rainfall (known to negatively affect insect abundance; Marshall et al., in 
preparation) coupled with increased population density resulted in a greater 
probability of intergroup interactions, suggesting that competition for food resources 
exacerbates intergroup conflict. As in other social carnivores and primates, scarcity of 
resources might force groups to travel further, encroaching more on one another’s 
territories to find sufficient food (Harrison 1983; Isbell 1991; Mech 1994; Harris 2010), 
and in an attempt to expand territories (Wilson & Wrangham 2003; Mosser & Packer 
2009; Mitani et al. 2010). In our population, larger groups were more likely to be 
involved in an intergroup interaction than smaller groups, and our results suggest that 
groups engaged more frequently in intergroup interactions during periods of growth. 
This pattern could arise because groups that grow in size need to forage in a greater 
area, which may inevitably bring them into conflict with their neighbours. In addition, 
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larger groups probably experience lower per capita costs of intergroup fighting and 
greater success in such conflicts, so groups that grow in size may actively start to seek 
out competition with neighbours. To disentangle these possibilities requires more 
detailed information on which individuals seek and initiate conflicts. In the future we 
will have this information from lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) collars that 
we have recently deployed in our population. 
 
In addition to food, groups compete for access to mates, particularly when there is a 
high risk of inbreeding within the natal group. In chimpanzees, for example, intergroup 
aggression is linked to male competition to gain access to females (Wrangham 1999; 
Wilson & Wrangham 2003). In our population, groups engaged more frequently in 
intergroup interactions during oestrus than during any other phase of the reproductive 
cycle, suggesting that individuals may be more inclined to engage in intergroup conflict 
to increase access to mates (Lazaro-Perea 2001; Cant et al. 2002; Nichols et al. 2015). 
Detailed data on the distribution and movement of groups in response to food 
resources and mating opportunities would allow us to test in more detail how resource 
competition affects patterns of intergroup conflict and how intergroup fighting can 
subsequently influence patterns of territory expansion. The development of 
lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) collars deployed in our population will 
allow us to conduct these tests in the near future. 
 
In addition to food, groups compete for access to mates, particularly when there is a 
high risk of inbreeding within the natal group. In chimpanzees, for example, intergroup 
aggression is linked to male competition to gain access to females (Wrangham 1999; 
Wilson & Wrangham 2003). In our population, groups were more likely to engage in 
intergroup interactions during oestrus than during any other phase of the reproductive 
cycle, suggesting that individuals may be more inclined to engage in intergroup conflict 
to increase access to mates (Lazaro-Perea 2001; Cant et al. 2002; Nichols et al. 2015). 
Detailed data on the distribution and movement of groups in response to food 
resources and mating opportunities would allow us to test in more detail how resource 
competition affects patterns of intergroup conflict and how intergroup fighting can 
subsequently influence patterns of territory expansion. Again, the development of 
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lightweight GPS collars deployed in our population will allow us to conduct these tests 
in the near future. 
 
Intergroup conflict, because it frequently results in participants’ injury and death, can 
have important effects on group size and recruitment. Although we did not detect 
short-term effects on adult mortality, we did find that litters were less likely to survive 
to emergence when groups were involved in intergroup interactions during the 
babysitting period, which is suggestive of intergroup infanticide. These data are 
supported by occasional direct observations of intergroup infanticide (and 
cannibalism) in this population (Cant et al. 2002, 2016; Müller & Bell 2009). A previous 
study in banded mongooses has shown that intergroup interactions contribute to 20% 
of known pup deaths (Nichols et al. 2015). Cases of observed infanticide during 
intergroup encounters are also common in chimpanzees (Watts, Mitani & Sherrow 
2002; Wilson & Wrangham 2003; Wilson et al. 2004). This significant cost of intergroup 
conflict might be a means by which members of rival groups can ensure their own 
success by reducing the size of neighbouring competitors which, in turn, is likely to give 
them a greater competitive advantage in future disputes (Wrangham 1999; Mosser & 
Packer 2009; Batchelor & Briffa 2011; Wrangham & Glowacki 2012; Cassidy et al. 
2015). In cooperatively breeding species, the maintenance of a critical group size is 
vital to avoid extinction (Courchamp 1999; Courchamp et al. 1999). Intergroup conflict 
could, therefore, have important consequences for the dynamics and success of 
groups through group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001), particularly if the costs of 
engaging in and losing an intergroup interaction are higher for groups that are already 
small. 
 
Recent theoretical models have proposed that intergroup conflict and collective 
violence in humans can influence the evolution of cooperative behaviour within groups 
through selection for individuals that display high levels of in-group favouritism and 
out-group hostility (Choi & Bowles 2007; Lehmann & Feldman 2008). Although we did 
not specifically examine the link between intergroup aggression and helping behaviour 
in groups that were involved in intergroup interactions, we did find an interesting 
relationship between intergroup conflict and a potential marker of within-group 
reproductive conflict; spontaneous abortion. Abortion in pregnant females is more 
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likely when they have been evicted from their group (Cant et al. 2010), which occurs 
during intense periods of reproductive competition (Cant et al. 2010; Thompson et al. 
2016; Chapter 2). However, we found that pregnant females were significantly less 
likely to abort their litter if their group was involved in an intergroup interaction during 
their gestation. One hypothesis to explain this otherwise puzzling result is that within-
group conflict over reproduction is suppressed during periods of high out-group 
conflict, perhaps to compensate for higher rates of litter mortality following intergroup 
fighting. Links between intergroup conflict and within-group cooperation are not well 
studied in non-human animal species, but increases in affiliative behaviour following 
intergroup conflict have been demonstrated in green woodhoopoes, Phoeniculus 
purpureus (Radford 2008, 2011), and the cooperatively breeding cichlid fish, 
Neolamprologus pulcher (Bruintjes et al. 2015). Further experimental manipulations of 
levels of intergroup conflict through simulated territorial intrusions could illuminate 
how the nature and intensity of intergroup conflict affects patterns of cooperation and 
conflict within the group in banded mongooses, and other cooperative species. 
 
In conclusion, our results suggest that intergroup conflict is driven by competition for 
resources and matings in banded mongooses. Groups engaged in intergroup 
interactions during periods of high competition for resources, and also when females 
were in oestrus, indicating that individuals fight to attain food, territory and 
reproductive opportunities that are important for survival and reproductive success. 
Intergroup conflict also had consequences for litter survival, suggesting that intergroup 
conflict can have important implications for individual fitness and group recruitment. 
In banded mongooses, rates of mortality resulting from intergroup conflict are 
comparable to those experienced by chimpanzees and humans (Wrangham et al. 2006; 
Nichols et al. 2015). According to recent theoretical work, it is therefore likely that 
levels of conflict among groups of banded mongooses are sufficient to provide a 
selective force in the evolution of within-group cooperative behaviour (Choi & Bowles 
2007). Studies of cooperative breeders which exhibit high levels of both intragroup 
cooperation and intergroup conflict can provide a new lens through which to 
understand social evolution among competing cooperative groups. 
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Overview 
 
Conflict within and between social groups is a conspicuous feature of cooperative 
animal societies. Eviction, because it results in the break-up of the social group, can 
have important implications for the individuals involved and the wider population 
through effects on dispersal, gene flow, and population structure. The logistical 
difficulties of observing a population for a period long enough to obtain sufficient data 
to examine these effects means that the causes and consequences of eviction are not 
well understood. Similarly, intergroup conflict is a notable occurrence in many social 
species but is relatively understudied outside of humans, Homo sapiens, and 
chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. Violent intergroup conflict could play an important role 
in the evolution of cooperative behaviours, but there is currently a lack of 
understanding of the causes and consequences of intergroup conflict to be able to 
draw conclusions on these theoretical links. It is therefore important to utilise those 
cooperative species in which within- and between-group conflict is exhibited to a high 
degree in order to address these shortfalls in our knowledge. 
 
To that end, in this thesis I have examined the causes and consequences of eviction 
and intergroup conflict in a highly cooperative species, the banded mongoose, Mungos 
mungo. I have found that eviction is driven by competition over reproduction in both 
sexes. The pattern of eviction among individuals motivated the development of a new 
theoretical model, which predicted that negative kin discrimination should be 
restricted to individuals that are more capable of resistance. Our data provided 
qualified support for this model, and suggested that where individuals are capable of 
resisting eviction, the usual prediction of positive kin discrimination can be reversed. I 
have investigated the long-term consequences of eviction beyond those for the 
evictees and evictors, and found evidence that eviction can have demographic effects 
on the evicting group and on the wider population. Finally, I have investigated the 
causes and consequences of intergroup conflict in our population and found that 
intergroup conflict has measureable costs to both individuals and groups in the long- 
and short-term. Below, I discuss the key findings of this thesis, the implications for our 
understanding of within- and between-group conflict in the evolution of cooperative 
species and, where appropriate, suggest future research objectives. 
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Eviction and social evolution 
 
Eviction as a means of within-group conflict resolution is rarely naturally observed in 
social vertebrates (Chapter 1). Where it does occur, it is important to determine what 
triggers eviction in order to understand how it might influence population genetic 
structure and demography in structured populations, and hence social evolution 
(Rousset 2004; Lehmann & Rousset 2010). In Chapter 2, I investigated established 
hypotheses, as well as introducing a new hypothesis to explain patterns of eviction. I 
employed a model comparison approach to compare competing hypotheses: that 
eviction is driven by reproductive competition; that eviction is used to coerce 
cooperation; or that eviction is an adaptive forced dispersal strategy used by 
dominants to force copies of their genes into the wider population. I found clear 
evidence that eviction in banded mongooses is driven by competition over 
reproduction in both sexes. There was little evidence to suggest that eviction is used 
by dominants to force subordinate helpers to work harder, which is consistent with 
generally weak evidence for the pay-to-stay hypothesis in cooperative birds and 
mammals (McDonald et al. 2008a; Cant 2012a; Santema & Clutton-Brock 2012; 
Nomano et al. 2015). This hypothesis assumes relatively complex strategies of 
negotiation and punishment, behaviours that may simply be beyond the capabilities of 
many cooperative species (Donaldson et al. 2013). Eviction as a response to the 
intensity of reproductive competition that an individual experiences is a simple, 
biologically feasible mechanism, and the body of evidence from cooperative birds, 
mammals and fish supports this assertion (Chapter 1; Chapter 2). I did not find 
evidence to show that eviction is an adaptive forced dispersal strategy. However, in 
Chapter 3 I did find that, among older females, kin were preferentially evicted, 
suggesting that once the decision to evict (as a response to intensified reproductive 
competition) has been made, kinship plays a role in which individuals are targeted for 
eviction, and potential patterns of resistance. Current models of kin selection assume 
that one party has full control of group membership but, as our results suggest, 
conflict resolution is a compromise between the interests of both parties. A formal 
model of the adaptive forced dispersal hypothesis that integrates a mechanism of 
conflict resolution over group membership (such as a ‘tug-of-war’; Reeve, Emlen & 
Keller 1998) into a demographic framework would provide discriminating predictions 
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beyond those of our simple verbal arguments. For example, such a model would help 
to clarify the conditions where it would be adaptive for subordinates to attempt to 
remain in groups, and adaptive for dominants to force them to disperse. These 
conditions remain unclear at present. 
 
As well as understanding the triggers of eviction, it is also important to determine 
which individuals are targeted for eviction because this can have implications for 
patterns of dispersal, gene flow and population demography and dynamics (Gardner & 
West 2006; Johnstone & Cant 2008; Gardner 2010; Clutton-Brock & Lukas 2012). In 
Chapter 3, I investigated which individuals are evicted when an eviction occurs and, in 
females, found that younger individuals, and those older individuals that were more 
related to dominants in their group, were more likely to be evicted. This latter result, 
which seems contrary to the prediction of positive kin discrimination under classical 
kin selection theory, stimulated the development of a theoretical model with 
collaborators. The model shows that negative kin discrimination can be explained by 
selection for unrelated subordinates to invest more effort in resisting eviction. 
Empirical tests of the model predictions showed some support for this explanation. 
Together, the theoretical and empirical results of this chapter suggest that the capacity 
to resist may be a crucial determinant of patterns of conflict among kin and, in 
contexts where recipients are capable of resistance, the usual prediction of positive kin 
discrimination can be reversed. There is already evidence that animals adjust their 
behaviour according to the anticipated responses of their social partners (Buston 
2003b; Raihani, Grutter & Bshary 2004; Tibbetts & Dale 2004; Wong et al. 2007). 
However, most theoretical models of these interactions examine the evolution of 
‘sealed-bid’ strategies, where players are not permitted to adjust their behaviour 
depending on the expected response of their social partner. It is unrealistic to assume 
that theoretical models can reflect the real world in every sense, but in the study of 
social evolution there appears to be a disconnect between theoretical models and 
observed behaviour. Our results suggest that the influence of relatedness on within-
group conflict and cooperation may be considerably more variable than predicted by 
classical kin selection theory. 
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The long-term consequences of eviction are exceptionally understudied because of the 
logistical difficulties in tracking populations and evicted cohorts over periods long 
enough to generate sufficient data. The Banded Mongoose Research Project is in a 
unique position to be able to address these shortfalls in our understanding because we 
have studied the same population of banded mongooses for over 20 years. In Chapter 
4 I took advantage of this to investigate the long-term demographic consequences of 
eviction for individuals, groups, and intergroup relations. I found that eviction resulted 
in changes in group size and composition for evicting groups, but did not translate to 
long-term survival or reproductive costs for evicted individuals. There was evidence 
that eviction was successful in reducing reproductive competition among females by 
increasing per capita reproductive success. However, eviction also resulted in a more 
male-biased sex ratio within evicting groups. These findings suggest that the long-term 
consequences of within-group conflict resolution strategies reach beyond the 
individuals involved in eviction, with potential effects on population demography and 
dynamics. This highlights a current limitation of many theoretical models of within-
group conflict resolution, and of many models of social evolution more broadly. At 
present, most models focus on the drivers of cooperative behaviour and conflict at an 
individual level, but fail to incorporate the potential effects of population-level 
consequences of individual decisions (Cant et al. 2016). As such, we lack a clear 
understanding of how individual-level behaviour and population-level processes link 
up. Long-term empirical studies of cooperative breeders can provide unique insight 
into how the effects of individual-level behaviour can resonate through groups and 
populations, and can inform theoretical models with an aim to synthesise these 
currently disparate themes of research. 
 
Intergroup conflict and social evolution 
 
Violent intergroup conflict is a notable feature of cooperatively breeding species. 
Theory suggests there is potential for intergroup conflict to influence demographic 
processes, such as migration, colonisation of new territory and population expansion 
(Lehmann & Feldman 2008), and the evolution of social  and cooperative traits (Choi & 
Bowles 2007; Lehmann & Rousset 2010; Bowles & Gintis 2011). However, a lack of 
understanding of the causes and consequences of intergroup conflict in species that 
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exhibit conspicuous levels of cooperation and collective violence means that the role 
of intergroup conflict in the evolution of social behaviours is not well established. In 
Chapter 5, I investigated the ecological and social causes, and the fitness 
consequences, of intergroup conflict in our population. I found that intensified 
competition for food, territory and mates increased the frequency of intergroup 
interactions but this did not translate into costs to adult survival or fertility. There is 
now a need to investigate the more fine-scale interactions of intergroup conflict to 
gain a better understanding of which individuals instigate contests between groups. 
Detailed data on the spatial distribution and movement of groups in response to the 
availability of resources would allow us to test in more detail how resource 
competition affects patterns of intergroup conflict, and how groups respond to conflict 
in terms of the expansion or contraction of territory boundaries. The development of 
lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) collars deployed in our population will 
allow us to conduct these tests in the near future. This will shed light on the 
motivations of individuals to participate in potentially lethal conflict, and will enable 
tests of the hypotheses of the adaptive function of intergroup conflict. 
 
In Chapter 5, I also found that intergroup conflict had fitness costs in the form of 
reduced litter survival. This result suggests that intergroup conflict has measurable 
costs to both individuals and groups in the long- and short-term, with important 
implications for fitness and survival. In banded mongooses, rates of mortality are likely 
to be high enough to influence patterns of within-group cooperation, as proposed by 
theoretical models (Choi & Bowles 2007; Lehmann & Feldman 2008). In this chapter, I 
found that pregnant females were less likely to abort their litter following an 
intergroup interaction which, although speculative, could suggest that intergroup 
conflict promotes the suppression of within-group conflict. Further investigation of 
individual contributions to helping and fighting would clarify whether there are 
tradeoffs between these forms of cooperation, and stimulate both new theory and 
new tests of theoretical models. Experimental manipulations of levels of intergroup 
conflict through simulated territorial intrusions could illuminate how the nature and 
intensity of intergroup conflict affects cooperation and, in turn, facilitate our 
understanding of the role of intergroup conflict in social evolution. 
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Summary 
 
Eviction in banded mongooses is triggered by high levels of reproductive competition 
in both males and females. When an eviction occurs, younger females, and those older 
females that are more related to dominants in their group, are targeted for eviction. As 
predicted by our theoretical model that incorporates the resistance of targets to 
selfish acts, older, more closely related females that are potentially more capable of 
resistance are preferentially targeted for eviction, and are less likely to return to their 
group following eviction. Eviction, as well as having effects on the evicted cohort, has 
important consequences for litter survival, group size and recruitment in the evicting 
group. Intergroup conflict in banded mongooses is stimulated by intensified 
competition for resources and mates, and has measurable fitness costs to individuals 
and groups in the long- and short-term. This thesis demonstrates that the means of 
resolving conflict within groups can have effects at an individual, group and population 
level, and that, conversely, conflict between groups has the potential to influence 
patterns of cooperation and conflict between groups. Within- and between-group 
conflict are likely to be closely linked, and recognising this link could help to advance 
our conceptual understanding of the role of conflict in the evolution of cooperative 
behaviour.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Much of the research into within-group conflict and cooperation has focussed on the 
drivers of these behaviours within the group, without acknowledging the potential 
influence of external forces. Similarly, patterns of intergroup conflict are usually 
considered independently of within-group pressures. In this thesis I have argued that 
within- and between-group conflict may often be intimately linked, and that 
recognising this link in the formulation of hypotheses and models could help to 
illuminate the causes of individual behaviour and population patterns. We aim to 
pursue this avenue for future research by using simulated territorial intrusions in our 
population to examine the effect of increased intergroup conflict on the cooperative 
and social behaviour within groups. We also plan to investigate how social groups 
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respond spatially to each other using lightweight GPS collars to capture group home 
range, space use and movement. Social groups in a viscous population are unlikely to 
behave as discrete units that are insensitive to the external pressures exerted upon 
them by neighbours. Instead, we hope to determine the behavioural and spatial 
response of groups to the behaviour of their neighbours, and to discover how the 
nature and intensity of within-group cooperation and conflict can, in turn, affect the 
nature and intensity of conflict between groups. 
  
The study of within- and between-group conflict in cooperative species can provide 
crucial insight into how conflict is resolved and cooperative behaviour maintained in 
animal societies. There is now a need to unify the study of these forms of conflict by 
developing integrated theoretical models of individual behaviour and population 
processes. Cooperatively breeding species are particularly powerful systems to 
stimulate the development of such models, and to test them, using long-term studies 
of individuals and populations, across multiple generations and in varying 
environments. This will certainly enable a huge advance in our conceptual 
understanding of the links between within-group and between-group conflict, and 
their role in the evolution of cooperative behaviour. 
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Appendix A 
 
Controlling for regression to the mean 
To account for potential problems with regression to the mean, we calculated ΔCS, ΔCE 
and ΔH as an adjusted change using the formulae from Kelly & Price (2005): 
∆𝑋 = (𝑋2 − ?̅?2) − ?̂?(𝑋1 − ?̅?1) 
and 
?̂? =
2𝑟𝑠1𝑠2
𝑠12 + 𝑠22
 
where 𝑋1 and 𝑠1 are the observation and standard deviation of the observation in the 
breeding attempt before eviction, and 𝑋2 and 𝑠2 are the observation and standard 
deviation of the observation in the breeding attempt of the eviction, and 𝑟 is the 
correlation between the observations in the two consecutive breeding attempts.  
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Table A1. Female evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability of an eviction event occurring during a breeding attempt (N=415 
breeding attempts in 15 groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance under the coercion of 
cooperation hypothesis. Models above the line comprise the top model set where ΔAIC ≤ 6.  
Hyp. Int. CS H CS:H R E ΔCS ΔH ΔCS:ΔH B B:E R:E G R:G R:B k logLik AIC ΔAIC wi Retained Adj. wi 
R -5.44         0.37      3 -108.63 223.26 0.00 0.34  1.00 
A -3.34    -14.46     0.11     1.76 5 -107.25 224.50 1.24 0.18   
A/R -5.49    0.42     0.37      4 -108.62 225.25 1.99 0.13   
R -5.45     0.00    0.37      4 -108.63 225.26 2.00 0.13   
A -3.29    -14.52 0.00    0.11     1.77 6 -107.25 226.50 3.24 0.07   
A/R -5.51    0.43 0.00    0.37      5 -108.62 227.24 3.99 0.05   
R -5.37     0.00    0.36 0.00     5 -108.63 227.26 4.00 0.05   
A -3.34    -14.11 0.00    0.11  -0.01   1.77 7 -107.25 228.49 5.23 0.02   
A -5.25    -1.44 0.00    0.37  0.03    6 -108.60 229.21 5.95 0.02   
R -5.42    0.44 0.00    0.36 0.00     6 -108.62 229.24 5.98 0.02   
C -4.99 0.47 0.40 -0.07            5 -111.65 233.30 10.04 0.00   
C -5.07 0.47 0.40 -0.07 0.57           6 -111.63 235.27 12.01 0.00   
C -4.97 0.47 0.40 -0.07  0.00          6 -111.65 235.30 12.04 0.00   
C -5.05 0.46 0.40 -0.07 0.57 0.00          7 -111.63 237.27 14.01 0.00   
A -2.75    -11.13        0.01 0.56  5 -115.16 240.31 17.05 0.00   
A -4.32    1.65        0.07   4 -116.75 241.50 18.24 0.00   
A -2.98    -10.94 0.00       0.01 0.56  6 -115.10 242.21 18.95 0.00   
A -4.60    1.76 0.00       0.07   5 -116.66 243.33 20.07 0.00   
A -2.65    -13.35 0.00      0.04 0.01 0.56  7 -115.07 244.14 20.88 0.00   
A -4.19    -1.11 0.00      0.05 0.07   6 -116.62 245.25 21.99 0.00   
C -2.86      0.37 0.11 0.01       5 -118.19 246.37 23.11 0.00   
Null -2.87               2 -121.28 246.57 23.31 0.00   
C -3.37     0.01 0.38 0.11 0.01       6 -117.86 247.71 24.45 0.00   
C -3.19    2.03  0.38 0.11 0.01       6 -117.98 247.96 24.70 0.00   
Any -3.15    1.69           3 -121.14 248.28 25.02 0.00   
C -3.80    2.32 0.01 0.39 0.11 0.01       7 -117.59 249.19 25.93 0.00   
Any -3.62    1.93 0.01          4 -120.90 249.81 26.55 0.00   
A -3.00    -2.86 0.00      0.08    5 -120.79 251.57 28.31 0.00   
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; C = Coercion of cooperation; R = Reproductive competition; Any = Any of the three hypotheses; Null = null model. 
Columns 2 to 16 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; CS = number of emergent pups per female that contributed to the 
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previous litter; H = number of female helpers in the previous breeding attempt; R = mean group relatedness; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; ΔCS = change 
in the number of emergent pups per female that contributed to the litter in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; ΔH = change in the number of 
female helpers in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; B = number of breeding females; G = group size; : = interaction. k = number of estimated 
parameters including a random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AIC = Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAIC = change in AIC value from the best 
performing model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Retained = tick indicates that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of Richards, Whittingham & 
Stephens (2011); Adj. wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.  
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Table A2. Female evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability of an eviction event occurring during a breeding attempt (N=270 
breeding attempts in 14 groups). Analysis using the helping effort (CE) measure of helping performance under the coercion of cooperation 
hypothesis. Models above the line comprise the top model set where ΔAICc ≤ 6. 
Hyp. Int. CE H CE:H R E ΔCE ΔH ΔCE:ΔH B B:E R:E G R:G R:B k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Retained Adj. wi 
R 1.28     -0.11    -0.67 0.02     5 -62.26 134.76 0.00 0.27  0.49 
R 1.66    -3.95 -0.11    -0.62 0.02     6 -61.82 135.96 1.20 0.15   
R -7.65     0.03    0.43      4 -64.04 136.22 1.47 0.13  0.24 
R -5.73         0.44      3 -65.16 136.41 1.65 0.12  0.22 
A/R -6.95    -4.25 0.03    0.45      5 -63.50 137.23 2.48 0.08   
A/R -5.10    -4.46     0.46      4 -64.55 137.24 2.49 0.08   
A -6.67    4.71     0.66     -1.13 5 -64.36 138.95 4.20 0.03   
A -8.49    4.67 0.03    0.64     -1.10 6 -63.33 138.99 4.23 0.03   
A -8.18    3.23 0.05    0.45  -0.12    6 -63.43 139.17 4.42 0.03   
C -5.30 -5.16 0.17 0.79  0.03          6 -64.13 140.58 5.83 0.01  0.03 
C -3.44 -5.13 0.18 0.79            5 -65.18 140.60 5.84 0.01  0.02 
A -9.65    11.65 0.05    0.64  -0.11   -1.07 7 -63.27 140.96 6.21 0.01   
C -3.02 -5.04 0.18 0.79 -2.66           6 -64.95 142.21 7.46 0.01   
C -4.86 -5.11 0.17 0.79 -2.45 0.03          7 -63.94 142.30 7.55 0.01   
A -4.97    -1.57        0.13   4 -67.35 142.85 8.10 0.00   
A -6.56    -1.51 0.03       0.13   5 -66.51 143.24 8.48 0.00   
A -4.45    -4.97        0.11 0.15  5 -67.33 144.88 10.12 0.00   
A -7.75    5.59 0.05      -0.11 0.12   6 -66.44 145.20 10.44 0.00   
A -5.84    -6.40 0.03       0.09 0.22  6 -66.45 145.22 10.47 0.00   
A -7.02    0.63 0.05      -0.12 0.09 0.24  7 -66.37 147.18 12.42 0.00   
Null -2.61               2 -75.89 155.83 21.07 0.00   
Any -5.13    -0.03 0.04          4 -74.03 156.21 21.46 0.00   
C -5.09     0.04 0.26 -0.54 0.19       6 -72.56 157.45 22.69 0.00   
Any -2.63    0.15           3 -75.89 157.87 23.12 0.00   
A -6.61    9.04 0.06      -0.14    5 -73.91 158.05 23.30 0.00   
C -2.58      0.25 -0.49 0.11       5 -74.37 158.98 24.22 0.00   
C -5.04    -0.23 0.04 0.26 -0.53 0.19       7 -72.56 159.55 24.80 0.00   
C -2.53    -0.24  0.25 -0.49 0.11       6 -74.37 161.07 26.31 0.00   
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; C = Coercion of cooperation; R = Reproductive competition; Any = Any of the three hypotheses; Null = null model. 
Columns 2 to 16 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; CE = number of female helpers left per day of babysitting of the 
Appendix A 
169 
previous litter; H = number of female helpers in the previous breeding attempt; R = mean group relatedness; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; ΔCE = change 
in the number of female helpers left per day of babysitting in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; ΔH = change in the number of female helpers in 
the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; B = number of breeding females; G = group size; : = interaction. k = number of estimated parameters including a 
random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AICc = corrected Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAICc = change in AICc value from the best performing 
model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Retained = tick indicates that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of Richards, Whittingham & Stephens 
(2011); Adj. wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.  
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Table A3. Male evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability that males are evicted alongside females when an eviction event occurs 
(N=37 eviction events in 7 groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance under the coercion of 
cooperation hypothesis. Models above the line comprise the top model set where ΔAICc ≤ 6. 
Hyp. Int. CS H CS:H R E ΔCS ΔH ΔCS:ΔH B B:E R:E G R:G R:B k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Retained Adj. wi 
R -2.28         0.38      3 -20.42 47.57 0.00 0.47  0.95 
R -1.81     -0.01    0.39      4 -20.32 49.88 2.32 0.15   
A/R -2.16    -0.68     0.38      4 -20.41 50.07 2.51 0.13   
R -0.30     -0.04    -0.10 0.01     5 -19.78 51.51 3.94 0.07   
A -0.94    -9.71     0.11     2.02 5 -20.24 52.41 4.85 0.04   
A/R -1.64    -0.90 -0.01    0.39      5 -20.31 52.55 4.98 0.04   
A -3.82    -1.58        0.15   4 -22.08 53.41 5.84 0.03  0.05 
Null -0.38               2 -24.98 54.31 6.75 0.02   
R -0.25    -0.35 -0.04    -0.10 0.01     6 -19.78 54.37 6.80 0.02   
A -0.21    -10.96 -0.01    0.09     2.25 6 -20.10 55.00 7.44 0.01   
A -1.35    -3.19 -0.01    0.39  0.03    6 -20.30 55.40 7.84 0.01   
A -3.45    -1.54 -0.01       0.16   5 -21.90 55.74 8.18 0.01   
A -6.12    14.14        0.25 -0.70  5 -21.95 55.84 8.27 0.01   
Any 0.09    -2.97           3 -24.83 56.38 8.82 0.01   
A 0.11    -13.50 -0.01    0.08  0.04   2.26 7 -20.10 58.05 10.49 0.00   
A -5.84    14.56 -0.01       0.26 -0.71  6 -21.78 58.36 10.80 0.00   
A -2.14    -11.17 -0.03      0.14 0.16   6 -21.85 58.49 10.93 0.00   
Any 0.18    -3.00 0.00          4 -24.82 58.90 11.33 0.00   
C -1.61 0.38 0.11 -0.02            5 -24.15 60.24 12.68 0.00   
C -0.53      0.35 0.01 -0.05       5 -24.21 60.35 12.78 0.00   
A 2.51    -22.06 -0.03      0.28    5 -24.48 60.90 13.34 0.00   
A -4.48    4.69 -0.03      0.16 0.27 -0.76  7 -21.71 61.28 13.72 0.00   
C -1.25 0.37 0.12 -0.02 -2.29           6 -24.07 62.95 15.38 0.00   
C -1.47 0.38 0.11 -0.02  0.00          6 -24.14 63.09 15.52 0.00   
C -0.25    -1.74  0.33 0.02 -0.05       6 -24.16 63.12 15.55 0.00   
C -0.81     0.00 0.37 0.01 -0.05       6 -24.17 63.14 15.57 0.00   
C -1.10 0.37 0.12 -0.02 -2.33 0.00          7 -24.06 65.98 18.42 0.00   
C -0.52    -1.55 0.00 0.35 0.01 -0.05       7 -24.13 66.12 18.56 0.00   
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; C = Coercion of cooperation; R = Reproductive competition; Any = Any of the three hypotheses; Null = null model. 
Columns 2 to 16 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; CS = number of emergent pups per female that contributed to the 
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previous litter; H = number of male helpers in the previous breeding attempt; R = mean group relatedness; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; ΔCS = change in 
the number of emergent pups per female that contributed to the litter in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; ΔH = change in the number of male 
helpers in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; B = number of breeding males; G = group size; : = interaction. k = number of estimated parameters 
including a random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AICc = corrected Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAICc = change in AICc value from the best 
performing model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Retained = tick indicates that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of Richards, Whittingham & 
Stephens (2011); Adj. wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.  
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Table A4. Male evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability that males are evicted alongside females when an eviction event occurs 
(N=22 eviction events in 6 groups). Analysis using the helping effort (CE) measure of helping performance under the coercion of cooperation 
hypothesis. Models above the line comprise the top model set where ΔAICc ≤ 6. 
Hyp. Int. CE H CE:H R E ΔCE ΔH ΔCE:ΔH B B:E R:E G R:G R:B k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Retained Adj. wi 
Null 0.18               2 -15.16 34.95 0.00 0.31  1.00 
R -1.00         0.24      3 -14.24 35.80 0.86 0.20   
A -3.25    1.65        0.13   4 -13.56 37.47 2.52 0.09   
Any 0.06    0.70           3 -15.15 37.64 2.69 0.08   
R -2.36     0.02    0.22      4 -14.07 38.50 3.55 0.05   
R 8.86     -0.16    -2.33 0.04     5 -12.42 38.59 3.65 0.05   
A/R -1.28    1.53     0.24      4 -14.21 38.77 3.82 0.05   
C -0.07      -0.11 0.52 0.53       5 -12.83 39.41 4.46 0.03   
Any -1.98    1.23 0.03          4 -14.83 40.01 5.06 0.02   
A -1.86    -8.18        0.06 0.46  5 -13.50 40.75 5.81 0.02   
A -2.66    1.49 -0.02       0.14   5 -13.50 40.76 5.81 0.02   
C -2.04 0.46 0.27 -0.07            5 -13.92 41.59 6.65 0.01   
A/R -2.75    1.86 0.02    0.23      5 -14.03 41.82 6.87 0.01   
A -0.63    -2.63     0.08     1.02 5 -14.18 42.11 7.16 0.01   
R 8.82    3.88 -0.17    -2.40 0.04     6 -12.28 42.16 7.21 0.01   
A -7.27    36.23 0.11      -0.55    5 -14.51 42.77 7.82 0.01   
C 1.11     -0.02 -0.21 0.58 0.66       6 -12.77 43.13 8.18 0.01   
C -0.35    1.53  -0.10 0.52 0.53       6 -12.81 43.21 8.27 0.01   
A -6.95    31.77 0.05      -0.47 0.15   6 -13.27 44.14 9.19 0.00   
A -1.68    -6.27 -0.01       0.09 0.36  6 -13.47 44.55 9.60 0.00   
A -7.38    32.88 0.10    0.22  -0.48    6 -13.79 45.18 10.23 0.00   
C -2.74 0.46 0.25 -0.07  0.01          6 -13.87 45.34 10.40 0.00   
C -1.87 0.50 0.28 -0.08 -1.25           6 -13.91 45.41 10.47 0.00   
A -1.84    -5.55 0.03    -0.06     1.83 6 -13.96 45.51 10.56 0.00   
C 0.83    1.48 -0.02 -0.20 0.58 0.66       7 -12.74 47.49 12.54 0.00   
A -7.32    33.14 0.13      -0.98 -0.08 1.48  7 -12.93 47.85 12.91 0.00   
A -7.20    30.57 0.12    -0.26  -0.63   2.97 7 -13.59 49.18 14.23 0.00   
C -2.58 0.49 0.26 -0.08 -1.02 0.01          7 -13.86 49.72 14.78 0.00   
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; C = Coercion of cooperation; R = Reproductive competition; Any = Any of the three hypotheses; Null = null model. 
Columns 2 to 16 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; CE = number of male helpers left per day of babysitting of the 
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previous litter; H = number of male helpers in the previous breeding attempt; R = mean group relatedness; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; ΔCE = change in 
the number of male helpers left per day of babysitting in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; ΔH = change in the number of male helpers in the 
breeding attempts before and of the eviction; B = number of breeding males; G = group size; : = interaction. k = number of estimated parameters including a 
random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AICc = corrected Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAICc = change in AICc value from the best performing 
model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Retained = tick indicates that the model was retained after applying the nesting rule of Richards, Whittingham & Stephens 
(2011); Adj. wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that the term was absent from that model.  
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Table A5. Temporary evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability that evictees are allowed to return to their group following an 
eviction event (N=37 eviction events in 7 groups). Analysis using the female reproductive success (CS) measure of helping performance under the 
coercion of cooperation hypothesis. Models above the line comprise the top model set where ΔAICc ≤ 6. 
Hyp. Int. CS HF HM CS:HF CS:HM R E ΔCS ΔHF ΔHM 
ΔCS: 
ΔHF 
ΔCS: 
ΔHM 
BF BM BF:E BM:E R:E G R:G R:BF R: BM k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Ret. 
Adj. 
wi 
Null 0.6                      2 -24.0 52.3 0.0 0.2  1.00 
R 1.9             -0.1         3 -23.5 53.8 1.5 0.1   
Any 1.4      -4.9                3 -23.6 53.9 1.6 0.1   
R 0.8              0.0        3 -24.0 54.6 2.3 0.1   
C 0.7        0.1 -0.1  -0.5           5 -21.5 54.9 2.6 0.1   
A/R 2.5      -4.5       -0.1         4 -23.2 55.7 3.3 0.0   
Any 2.3      -5.3 0.0               4 -23.3 55.8 3.5 0.0   
R 2.5       0.0      -0.1         4 -23.3 55.9 3.6 0.0   
R 1.9             -0.1 0.0        4 -23.5 56.3 4.0 0.0   
A/R 1.7      -5.2        0.0        4 -23.5 56.3 4.0 0.0   
A 1.3      -4.9            0.0    4 -23.6 56.4 4.1 0.0   
R 1.5       0.0       0.0        4 -23.7 56.6 4.3 0.0   
C 1.7      -5.8  0.1 -0.1  -0.5           6 -21.0 56.7 4.4 0.0   
C 0.7        0.1  0.3  -0.2          5 -22.7 57.4 5.1 0.0   
A -0.4      13.3       0.2       -2.2  5 -22.8 57.5 5.1 0.0   
C 0.9       0.0 0.1 -0.1  -0.5           6 -21.5 57.7 5.4 0.0   
A -0.2      15.4 0.0          -0.3     5 -22.9 57.8 5.5 0.0   
A/R 3.2      -4.7 0.0      -0.1         5 -23.0 57.9 5.5 0.0   
C -0.8 0.8  0.2  -0.1                 5 -23.1 58.2 5.9 0.0   
R -0.3       0.0      0.2  0.0       5 -23.1 58.2 5.9 0.0   
A/R 2.6      -4.6       -0.1 0.0        5 -23.2 58.3 6.0 0.0   
A 2.0      -5.1 0.0           0.0    5 -23.2 58.4 6.1 0.0   
A/R 2.5      -5.5 0.0       0.0        5 -23.2 58.4 6.1 0.0   
R 2.5       0.0      -0.1 0.0        5 -23.3 58.6 6.3 0.0   
C 0.8        0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.2          7 -20.4 58.7 6.4 0.0   
A 0.8      0.8        0.1       -1.4 5 -23.4 58.7 6.4 0.0   
R 0.5       0.0       0.3  0.0      5 -23.4 58.8 6.5 0.0   
A 1.8      -8.7            0.0 0.2   5 -23.6 59.1 6.7 0.0   
C 1.4 -0.5 -0.1  0.1                  5 -23.6 59.1 6.7 0.0   
C 1.8      -6.4  0.0  0.3  -0.2          6 -22.2 59.2 6.9 0.0   
C 1.6       0.0 0.0  0.3  -0.2          6 -22.4 59.6 7.3 0.0   
C 1.9      -5.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1  -0.5           7 -21.0 59.8 7.5 0.0   
C 0.1 0.8  0.2  -0.1 -5.7                6 -22.6 60.0 7.7 0.0   
A 0.4      11.0 0.0      0.2       -1.9  6 -22.6 60.1 7.8 0.0   
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Hyp. Int. CS HF HM CS:HF CS:HM R E ΔCS ΔHF ΔHM 
ΔCS: 
ΔHF 
ΔCS: 
ΔHM 
BF BM BF:E BM:E R:E G R:G R:BF R: BM k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Ret. 
Adj. 
wi 
A -0.7      15.6       0.3 -0.1      -2.5  6 -22.7 60.1 7.8 0.0   
A -1.2      19.1 0.0          -0.4 0.0    6 -22.8 60.4 8.1 0.0   
C 2.4      -8.8  -0.2 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 -0.2          8 -19.6 60.4 8.1 0.0   
C 2.8 -0.7 -0.1  0.1   0.0               6 -22.8 60.4 8.1 0.0   
A 1.1      10.5 0.0      -0.1    -0.2     6 -22.8 60.4 8.1 0.0   
C 0.0 0.8  0.2  -0.1  0.0               6 -22.9 60.5 8.2 0.0   
R 1.1      -4.1 0.0      0.1  0.0       6 -22.9 60.6 8.3 0.0   
A -0.1      15.1 0.0       0.0   -0.3     6 -22.9 60.6 8.3 0.0   
A 1.5      4.4 NA      -0.2 0.3       -2.0 6 -23.0 60.7 8.4 0.0   
R 1.5      -5.6 0.0       0.3  0.0      6 -23.0 60.7 8.4 0.0   
A/R 3.3      -4.8 0.0      -0.1 0.0        6 -23.0 60.7 8.4 0.0   
R 1.5       0.0      -0.1 0.3  0.0      6 -23.0 60.8 8.5 0.0   
C 3.5      -8.1 0.0 -0.2  0.4  -0.3          7 -21.6 61.1 8.7 0.0   
R -0.3       0.0      0.2 0.0 0.0       6 -23.1 61.1 8.8 0.0   
A 1.8      -0.9 0.0       0.1       -1.0 6 -23.2 61.1 8.8 0.0   
A 2.7      -10.0 0.0           0.0 0.2   6 -23.2 61.2 8.9 0.0   
C 2.0 -0.4 -0.1  0.1  -3.8                6 -23.3 61.5 9.2 0.0   
C 1.2       0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 -0.2          8 -20.4 61.9 9.6 0.0   
C 0.9 0.8  0.2  -0.1 -5.9 0.0               7 -22.3 62.5 10.2 0.0   
C 0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1                 7 -22.4 62.6 10.3 0.0   
A -1.2      22.8 0.0      0.2    -0.2   -1.8  7 -22.5 62.9 10.6 0.0   
A -1.0      19.8       0.2 0.2      -2.2 -1.5 7 -22.5 62.9 10.6 0.0   
A 0.2      13.2 0.0      0.3 -0.1      -2.2  7 -22.6 63.0 10.7 0.0   
R 2.2      -4.8 0.0      -0.1 0.3  0.0      7 -22.6 63.2 10.9 0.0   
C 3.2 -0.7 -0.1  0.1  -3.1 0.0               7 -22.7 63.2 10.9 0.0   
A -0.3      12.4 0.0          -0.4 0.0 0.4   7 -22.7 63.3 11.0 0.0   
A 2.3      2.9 0.0      -0.1 0.2       -1.7 7 -22.8 63.5 11.1 0.0   
A 1.1      10.5 0.0      -0.1 0.0   -0.2     7 -22.8 63.5 11.2 0.0   
A -0.7      19.3 0.0       0.1   -0.3    -1.0 7 -22.9 63.6 11.3 0.0   
R 1.1      -4.2 0.0      0.2 0.0 0.0       7 -22.9 63.6 11.3 0.0   
C 3.2      -9.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.4 -0.2          9 -19.5 63.7 11.4 0.0   
R 0.4       0.0      0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0      7 -23.0 63.8 11.5 0.0   
C 1.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1  0.0               8 -21.9 64.8 12.5 0.0   
C 1.3 0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.1 -4.9                8 -22.1 65.3 13.0 0.0   
A -0.3      17.3 0.0      0.2 0.1      -2.0 -1.3 8 -22.5 66.1 13.8 0.0   
A -1.2      22.9 0.0      0.3 0.0   -0.2   -2.0  8 -22.5 66.1 13.8 0.0   
R 2.2      -4.8 0.0      -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0      8 -22.6 66.4 14.1 0.0   
A 0.5      15.5 0.0      -0.1 0.2   -0.2    -1.5 8 -22.7 66.5 14.2 0.0   
C 2.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -4.2 0.0               9 -21.6 67.9 15.6 0.0   
A -1.5      25.9 0.0      0.2 0.1   -0.2   -1.9 -1.2 9 -22.4 69.5 17.2 0.0   
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Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; C = Coercion of cooperation; R = Reproductive competition; Any = Any of the three hypotheses; Null = null model. 
Columns 2 to 23 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; CS = number of emergent pups per female that contributed to the 
previous litter; HF = number of female helpers in the previous breeding attempt; HM = number of male helpers in the previous breeding attempt; R = mean group 
relatedness; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; ΔCS = change in the number of emergent pups per female that contributed to the litter in the breeding 
attempts before and of the eviction; ΔHF = change in the number of female helpers in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; ΔHM = change in the 
number of male helpers in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; BF = number of breeding females; BM = number of breeding males; G = group size; : = 
interaction. k = number of estimated parameters including a random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AICc = corrected Akaike’s information 
criterion; ΔAICc = change in AICc value from the best performing model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Ret. = tick indicates that the model was retained after 
applying the nesting rule of Richards, Whittingham & Stephens (2011); Adj. wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells indicate that 
the term was absent from that model.  
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Table A6. Temporary evictions. Model performance in predicting the probability that evictees are allowed to return to their group following an 
eviction event (N=22 eviction events in 6 groups). Analysis using the helping effort (CE) measure of helping performance under the coercion of 
cooperation hypothesis. Models above the line comprise the top model set where ΔAICc ≤ 6. 
Hyp. Int. CEF HF 
CEF: 
HF 
CEM HM 
CEM: 
HM 
R E ΔCEF ΔHF 
ΔCEF: 
ΔHF 
ΔCEM ΔHM 
ΔCE: 
ΔHM 
BF BM BF:E BM:E R:E G R:G R:BF R:BM k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Ret. 
Adj. 
wi 
Null 0.0                        2 -15.2 35.1 0.0 0.3  1.0 
R 2.0               -0.2         3 -14.6 36.5 1.4 0.1   
R 0.9                -0.2        3 -14.7 36.8 1.7 0.1   
Any -0.2       0.9                 3 -15.2 37.8 2.7 0.1   
C -2.8 32.0 0.3 -4.0                     5 -12.1 38.0 2.9 0.1   
R 3.1               -0.2 -0.2        4 -14.0 38.4 3.2 0.0   
R 2.9        0.0        -0.1        4 -14.4 39.1 4.0 0.0   
R 3.1        0.0       -0.2         4 -14.4 39.2 4.0 0.0   
A/R 1.8       1.6        -0.2         4 -14.5 39.5 4.3 0.0   
Any 2.4       0.3 0.0                4 -14.7 39.8 4.7 0.0   
A/R 0.8       0.3         -0.2        4 -14.7 39.8 4.7 0.0   
A 0.9       0.7             0.0    4 -15.1 40.5 5.3 0.0   
C 0.3         3.5 -0.2 -1.0             5 -13.4 40.5 5.4 0.0   
A -6.6       67.4 0.1           -1.0     5 -13.7 41.2 6.1 0.0   
A -3.1       32.9        0.4       -4.1  5 -13.9 41.5 6.3 0.0   
C -3.9 33.3 0.4 -4.2    4.7                 6 -12.0 41.5 6.4 0.0   
R 3.8        0.0       -0.2 -0.2        5 -13.9 41.6 6.5 0.0   
R 23.3        -0.3       -2.5  0.0       5 -14.0 41.7 6.6 0.0   
A/R 3.0       0.9        -0.2 -0.2        5 -14.0 41.8 6.6 0.0   
C -2.0 31.4 0.4 -4.0     0.0                6 -12.1 41.8 6.7 0.0   
R 3.4        0.0        -0.2  0.0      5 -14.4 42.5 7.4 0.0   
A/R 3.0       -0.2 0.0        -0.1        5 -14.4 42.5 7.4 0.0   
A/R 2.9       1.0 0.0       -0.2         5 -14.4 42.5 7.4 0.0   
C 3.7        -0.1 3.5 0.0 -1.0             6 -12.7 42.9 7.8 0.0   
A 1.8       -5.9         -0.4       1.5 5 -14.7 43.1 8.0 0.0   
A 2.4       0.3 0.0            0.0    5 -14.7 43.2 8.1 0.0   
A -3.6       46.5        0.7 -0.3      -5.9  6 -12.9 43.3 8.2 0.0   
C 1.1    -0.3 -0.1 0.1                  5 -14.8 43.4 8.2 0.0   
C -0.1            -0.3 0.1 0.0          5 -15.0 43.8 8.6 0.0   
A 0.4       4.3             0.0 -0.2   5 -15.0 43.8 8.7 0.0   
A -7.3       79.6 0.1        -0.2   -1.2     6 -13.1 43.9 8.8 0.0   
C 0.9       -2.9  3.9 -0.2 -1.2             6 -13.3 44.2 9.1 0.0   
A -5.4       61.8 0.1       -0.1    -0.9     6 -13.5 44.7 9.5 0.0   
A -2.8       44.3 0.0       0.8       -6.0  6 -13.6 44.7 9.6 0.0   
R 19.0        -0.3       -2.0 -0.1 0.0       6 -13.7 45.0 9.9 0.0   
A -6.6       67.6 0.1           -1.0 0.0    6 -13.7 45.0 9.9 0.0   
R 24.5       2.7 -0.4       -2.8  0.0       6 -13.9 45.4 10.3 0.0   
C 4.3        -0.1    -0.7 0.3 0.5          6 -13.9 45.5 10.3 0.0   
A/R 3.7       0.5 0.0       -0.2 -0.2        6 -13.9 45.5 10.3 0.0   
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Hyp. Int. CEF HF 
CEF: 
HF 
CEM HM 
CEM: 
HM 
R E ΔCEF ΔHF 
ΔCEF: 
ΔHF 
ΔCEM ΔHM 
ΔCE: 
ΔHM 
BF BM BF:E BM:E R:E G R:G R:BF R:BM k logLik AICc ΔAICc wi Ret. 
Adj. 
wi 
                                
R 3.5        0.0       -0.2 -0.1  0.0      6 -13.9 45.5 10.3 0.0   
A 3.1       -0.1        -0.2 -0.2       0.2 6 -14.0 45.6 10.5 0.0   
C -3.1 32.9 0.4 -4.1    4.6 0.0                7 -11.9 45.9 10.7 0.0   
C 3.5    -0.3 -0.1 0.1  0.0                6 -14.3 46.1 11.0 0.0   
A 3.4       -3.4 0.0        -0.3       0.8 6 -14.4 46.3 11.2 0.0   
R 3.4       -0.1 0.0        -0.2  0.0      6 -14.4 46.3 11.2 0.0   
A 1.5       7.9 0.0            0.1 -0.4   6 -14.7 47.0 11.8 0.0   
C 0.8    -0.4 -0.2 0.1 2.5                 6 -14.7 47.1 11.9 0.0   
C 4.2       -3.1 -0.1 4.0 -0.1 -1.3             7 -12.6 47.1 12.0 0.0   
A -2.7       46.6 0.0       0.8 -0.3      -6.1  7 -12.7 47.5 12.3 0.0   
C -0.2       0.8     -0.3 0.1 0.0          6 -15.0 47.6 12.5 0.0   
A -3.3       44.5        0.8 -0.5      -6.4 1.5 7 -12.8 47.6 12.5 0.0   
A -5.9       73.0 0.1       -0.2 -0.2   -1.1     7 -12.9 47.8 12.7 0.0   
A -6.5       70.8 0.1        -0.6   -1.3    2.6 7 -13.0 48.0 12.9 0.0   
A -6.6       72.0 0.1       0.5    -0.7   -3.8  7 -13.3 48.5 13.4 0.0   
A -7.2       70.2 0.2           -1.5 -0.2 1.2   7 -13.5 49.0 13.9 0.0   
R 19.9       1.9 -0.3       -2.2 -0.1 0.0       7 -13.7 49.3 14.2 0.0   
C -1.5 65.7 0.9 -8.2 -4.7 -0.4 0.3                  8 -11.1 49.3 14.2 0.0   
R 21.0        -0.3       -2.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0      7 -13.7 49.4 14.2 0.0   
C 4.2       0.2 -0.1    -0.7 0.3 0.5          7 -13.9 49.9 14.7 0.0   
R 3.5       0.4 0.0       -0.2 -0.1  0.0      7 -13.9 49.9 14.7 0.0   
A 3.6       0.6 0.0       -0.2 -0.2       0.0 7 -13.9 49.9 14.7 0.0   
C 3.3    -0.4 -0.1 0.1 2.0 0.0                7 -14.2 50.5 15.3 0.0   
A -6.5       75.3 0.1       0.5 -0.3   -0.7   -4.2  8 -12.4 51.9 16.8 0.0   
A -2.6       44.9 0.0       0.8 -0.4      -6.3 1.0 8 -12.7 52.5 17.4 0.0   
A -5.5       67.7 0.1       -0.1 -0.5   -1.1    1.7 8 -12.9 52.8 17.7 0.0   
C -4.1 103.6 1.6 -13.0 -7.7 -0.8 0.5 10.2                 9 -10.7 54.3 19.2 0.0   
R 23.0       2.3 -0.3       -2.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0      8 -13.6 54.4 19.2 0.0   
C -3.8 88.7 1.3 -11.1 -6.7 -0.7 0.4  0.0                9 -11.0 54.9 19.8 0.0   
A -6.4       72.4 0.1       0.5 -0.5   -0.7   -4.4 1.9 9 -12.4 57.8 22.6 0.0   
C -7.7 135.9 2.1 -17.1 -10.5 -1.1 0.7 11.0 0.1                10 -10.4 60.8 25.7 0.0   
Hyp. = Hypothesis: A = Adaptive forced dispersal; C = Coercion of cooperation; R = Reproductive competition; Any = Any of the three hypotheses; Null = null model. 
Columns 2 to 25 show parameter effect sizes from GLMMs on the logit scale: Int. = Intercept; CEF = number of female helpers left per day of babysitting of the 
previous litter; HF = number of female helpers in the previous breeding attempt; CEM = number of male helpers left per day of babysitting of the previous litter; HM 
= number of male helpers in the previous breeding attempt; R = mean group relatedness; E = mean rainfall in previous 6 months; ΔCEF = change in the number of 
female helpers left per day of babysitting in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; ΔHF = change in the number of female helpers in the breeding 
attempts before and of the eviction; ΔCEM = change in the number of male helpers left per day of babysitting in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; 
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ΔHM = change in the number of male helpers in the breeding attempts before and of the eviction; BF = number of breeding females; BM = number of breeding 
males; G = group size; : = interaction. k = number of estimated parameters including a random intercept for group identity; logLik = log-likelihood; AICc = corrected 
Akaike’s information criterion; ΔAICc = change in AICc value from the best performing model; wi = Akaike’s model weight; Ret. = tick indicates that the model was 
retained after applying the nesting rule of Richards, Whittingham & Stephens (2011); Adj. wi = adjusted Akaike’s model weight for the retained models. Blank cells 
indicate that the term was absent from that model. 
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Appendix B 
 
Analysis to investigate whether closer relatives represent a reproductive threat 
To investigate the possibility that more closely related individuals represent more of a 
reproductive threat we examined whether dominant females suffered higher 
reproductive costs when cobreeding with more closely related subordinates. We fitted 
the number of emergent pups to which each dominant breeding female (females over 
3 years of age) was assigned maternity as the Poisson response variable with a log link 
function in a generalised linear mixed effect model (GLMM). We included each 
dominant female’s mean pairwise relatedness to cobreeding subordinate females 
(females less than 3 years of age that contributed to the communal litter), the number 
of cobreeding subordinates, and the interaction between these two variables as fixed 
effects. We also included the dominant female’s age (days), group size (number of 
individuals over 6 months), and mean rainfall (mm) in the 30 days before birth. We 
controlled for repeated measures by including dominant female, litter and group ID as 
random intercepts, and fitted the model to data on 566 dominant females giving birth 
to 256 litters in 16 groups. This model was checked for overdispersion of the response 
variable. 
 
We found that there was no difference in the number of emergent pups to which 
dominant females were assigned maternity when they were more closely related to 
female subordinate cobreeders (GLMM, β ± SE=-0.002 ± 0.36, χ21=0.00005, p=0.99; 
Table B1). Therefore, we did not find evidence that dominant females suffer greater 
reproductive costs when they cobreed with more closely related subordinate females. 
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Table B1. Investigating whether closer relatives represent a reproductive threat. 
Model predicting the number of emergent pups to which each dominant breeding 
female is assigned maternity (GLMM, N=566 dominant females giving birth to 256 
litters in 16 groups). Model was fitted using a Poisson error structure and log link 
function, and with dominant female, litter and group ID as random intercepts. 
Fixed effect β SE χ2 p 
intercept -1.12 0.35   
relatedness to subordinate cobreeders -0.002 0.36 0.00005 0.99 
number of subordinate cobreeders 0.013 0.050 0.07 0.79 
dominant female age (days) 0.0002 0.0001 2.46 0.12 
group size 0.006 0.013 0.23 0.63 
rainfall (mm) 0.082 0.052 2.48 0.11 
relatedness to subordinate cobreeders x     
number of subordinate cobreeders 0.31 0.25 1.60 0.21 
 
 
 183 
  
 184 
 
